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ABSTRACT 
This study is an attempt to assess the degree to which strikes 
and stayaways in South Africa are related to broader political 
developments. Traditional theories of industrial conflict are 
first evaluated. This is followed by a direct study of 
industrial conflict in relation to wider political developments 
in South Africa in the 1970-87 period. The broad themes emerging 
from these chapters are then compared to established theories 
pertaining to strike action. The conclusion reached is that 
certain aspects of theory are of relevance to the South. African 
situation, but none are adequate in their entirety. It is noted 
that it is important to include theories covering the nature -6f 
broader society to make possible a coherent explanation as to the 
nature of strikes and stayaways in South Africa. 
The conclusions reached verify the stated hypothesis that 
political factors play an important role in determining the 
nature of strikes and stayaways. Furthermore, it appears evident 
that this relationship has become stronger over the 1970-87 
period, especially following the declaration of the State of 
Emergency which has severely curtailed most other avenues of 
peaceful protest. 
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INTRODUCTION 
1 
i)STATEMENT OF HYPOTHESIS 
Political developments have played an ever-increasing role in 
determining the nature of strikes and stayaways in South Africa 
in the 1970 to 1987 period. 
' It is argued that the specific nature of strikes and stayaways in 
South Africa in the period studied have been greatly affected by 
political variables. In recent years state action has cast a 
political shadow on almost all aspects of life in that country. 
In the sphere of labour relations, even the most normal aspects 
of an industrial relations system have been permeated by 
political factors. The ever-increasing extent of state repression 
has had the effect of forcing the independent trade unions even 
further into the political arena, whilst increasingly political 
forms of protest have become manifest at the workplace (e.g .. 
stayaways). Whilst economic factors as a determinant of 
industrial conflict clearly remain of import, it is argued that 
political factors have become increasingly of important 
significance. In a limited fashion 1 the applicability of 
traditional theories of industrial relations to the South African 
context will be evaluated. 
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ii)PREFACE 
This is a study of conflict in the workplace in the 1970's and 
1980's in the form of strikes and stayaways and how political 
developments have influenced the incidence and nature of this 
conflict. In the 1960's recorded instances of strike action were 
comparatively rare. By 1980 the situation had changed 
dramatically and strikes had become commonplace. In wider society 
significant changes had taken place. In the late 1960's there 
- appears to have been but little organized resistance to the 
apartheid state. This contrasts sharply with the atmosphere of 
revolt of the mid-1980's. As Foucault (Poster,1984; 158-162) has 
noted, studying conflict in a society may tell much about the 
functioning of wider relations of power. It is hoped that 
examining the linkage between industrial and socio-political 
conflict may prove not only historically interesting, but reveal 
new information on the relations of power operative in South 
Africa under apartheid. 
The aim of Chapter 1 will be to provide a brief overview of some 
of the major contributions to the theory behind strikes and 
stayaways and in particular those theories which attempt to place 
conflict at the workplace in the context of wider society. This 
will enable one to refer subsequent observations and conclusions 
to the established frames of reference of industrial conflict. 





in the late 1960's. It is hoped that just as with the 
overview, outlining the immediate past will enable 
to contextualise more readily the enormity of 
subsequent developments. 
This will be followed by reviewing and analysing the course of 
pertinent events from 1970. The 1971-2 period is of importance in 
that it saw the emergence of the forerunners of many of the 
independent unions in the form of worker training projects and 
benefit funds. During the same period, the Black Consciousness 
movement became established on a national level. Thus, the 
emergence of the independent trade unions was paralleled by the 
rise of the first significant black political organization since 
the post Sharpeville era. The year 1973 is best remembered by the 
Durban strike wave, an unprecedented development in post war 
South Africa. There is little doubt that the strike wave was the 
culmination of a growing dissatisfaction with the wider socio-
political reality. The Durban strike wave was followed by an 
unprecedented rise in strike action on a country-wide basis, a 
rise that continued well into 1974. The following year, 1975, 
seemed a somewhat more peaceful year at the workplace. In 
reality, it should best be viewed as a year of concerted 
organization by the fledgling trade unions, against a background 
of rising political conciousness. The latter was to culminate in 
the 1976 Soweto uprising. 
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The post- Soweto wave of repression not only affected political 
organizations, but also weakened the emerging trade unions, 
whilst relatively few strikes took place. By 1980, however, 
instances of strike action began to increase again. This was to 
culminate in the 1981 East Rand strike wave, the second "rolling 
strike" to take place in modern South Africa. Indeed, the early 
1980's may best be seen as a period of rising strikes and 
stayaways. By 1984 this was to be overshadowed by wider political 
developments. Originating in the townships of the Vaal triangle, 
an unprecedented wave of "unrest" spread country-wide. This was 
followed by other forms of resistance, from schools' boycotts to 
stayaways. The reaction of the state was to launch an ever-
increasing wave of repression which would culminate in the 
declaration of three successive States of Emergency. As this to 
some extent resulted in a decline of political "unrest", yet was 
followed by unprecedented levels of strike action, it may be 
argued that repression only redirected and did not quell the 
underlying combativity. A further issue arising could be the 
possible role played by banned political organizations such as 
the PAC, SACP, and ANC. Such organizations can be seen as 
"hidden" socio-political actors. Owing to the fact that they 
operate underground, with most relevant literature on their 
activities being restricted, it has not been possible to analyse 
fully the effects of their actions on the nature of industrial 
conflict in this study. 
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The analysis of the basic course of events outlined above will be 
followed by a reassessment of traditional theories of industrial 
conflict, in the light of conclusions reached. The South African 
situation is an extremely complex one, and it is clear that any 
theoretical paradigm developed overseas will have no little 
difficul~y in accommodating all the different factors present. 
In addition to assessing specific theories of industrial 
conflict, more general theoretical contributions that attempt to 
explain both the nature of certain manifestations of collective 
organizations and of the broader socio-political reality will be 
evaluated. Such contributions will include the work of Castells 
on social movements and Foucault's major new insights into the 
nature of modern society. Although developing new theoretical 
models goes beyond the scope of this study, some thoughts in this 
direction will be advanced. This will be followed by a general 
conclusion. 
There is no doubt that a strike is an extremely complex 
occurrence. Indeed, even the term "strike" may be defined in a 
wi,de variety of ways (~. A useful working definition 
may be to define it as a collective action where workers withdraw 
from the labour process as a means of gaining a particular demand 
(ibid.;17). This definition must be somewhat qualified in that in 
South Africa "stayaways" also take place. A "stayaway" may be 
defined as a collective action where workers across a wide range 
of industrial sectors withdraw from the labour process in order 
6 
to express a directly political demand on a regional or national 
level. 




groupings - "trials of strength" and "demonstration 
(Hyman,1981;19). The "trial of strength" is a 
dispute, embarked on as a last ,resort (ibid.;20). 
Having suffered all the losses a strike may entail, both sides 
. are determined to gain something (ibid. ; 2 0) . Only a minority of 
strikes fall into this category, the majority being 
"demonstration stoppages." Here, the decision to strike is 
quickly reached, often owing to the "perishable nature of the 
grievance - management will win if nothing is done" (ibid.;23). 
Generally, "demonstration stoppages" take place only on a limited 
scale and are quickly settled. 
Again, there have been a range of definitions advanced for 
is meant· by the term 11 political." In this context, a 




power", as well as rule and authority, with a political act being 
an action "performed in power perspectives" (Lasswell,quoted in 
Dahl,1978;8). As Giddens (1979;91) notes, power in itself is not 
a resource, but to exercise power will require resources. In this 
sense power and politics should be seen as distinct from, but 
related to, the "economic", which is seen as being concerned 
directly with scarce resources and the production a:nd 
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distribution of goods and services (Dahl,1978;10). As Dahl 
(ibid.;10) notes, "like most distinctions of intellectual 
enquiry, however, that between politics and economics is not 
perfectly sharp." Clearly, even the smallest and most economistic 
of industrial disputes may have some affect on wider political 
reality. As Rex(1981;36) notes, all strikes will result in some 
relocation of power at the workplace. However, there remains the 
question of the extent of such an effect. It is clear that a 
major nation-wide stayaway will have a far greater effect than a 
minor wage dispute. In addition, overall trends in strike action 
will be analysed in order to assess whether a general pattern 
emerges, and the political repercussions of such a pattern. 
It is important to note that strikes represent only one 
manifestation of industrial conflict. Other forms may include 
events such as absenteeism, go - slows, or industrial sabotage 
(Hyman,1981;53). Although cases of some of these events have been 
documented (see Chapter 2), they·represent a "hidden" form of 
industrial conflict. There is little way in which the extent of 
industrial sabotage may be uncovered, and it is therefore beyond 
the scope of this study. Unless industrial sabotage occurs on a 
widespread (and clearly visible) scale, it will have far less 
political effect than major strikes. Thus, although of import, 
it can be argued that the extent of industrial sabotage will not 
directly affect the interpretation of the political effects of 
strike action. This study concentrates solely on strikes and 
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stayaways. 
Owing to the complex nature of the South African situation, it is 
useful at this stage also to develop some definitions of trade 
unions and political organizations. In South Africa there are 
many conservative unions who rarely or never embark on · strike 
action, and thus largely fall outside the scope of this study. 
The primarily black trade unions which emerged in the post-1970 
period that had no formal ties to established unions, were 
democratically structured, and far more willing to embark on 
collective action have, for the purposes of this research been 
referred to as the "independent unions", in order that they might 
be distinguished from their established rivals, a term coined by 
the SA Labour Bulletin (see Maree,1987a;viii). It cah be argued 
that the independent unions in the 1980's have gone beyond the. 
conventional functions of a trade union and have become social 
movements, as Lambert (1988;34) suggested was the case with 
SACTU. However, in contrast to SACTU, the independent unions 
place primary emphasis on their organization, · providing them 
with a far stronger base (see Maree,1987b14). Likewise, there are 
a wide range of established political organizations. The 
commonly employed term "popular political organization" has thus 
been used to denote those (primarily black) political 
organizations that have emerged in the post-1960's period, be 
they "Charterist" (adhering to the Freedom Charter), Black 
Consciousness, ·or belonging to any other political philosophy·, 
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that are opposed to all aspects of the apartheid system and 
appear to enjoy substantial popular support. 
There is a growing interest in academic circles worldwide in the 
South African situation. It is hoped that this dissertation will 
go some way in shedding new light on a complex scenario, and 
provide a cautious first step towards developing fresh 
perspectives and new solutions to a specific political crisis. 
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iii)M.ETHODOLOGY 
This study is an attempt to test the stated hypothesis through 
the adoption of a historical perspective. The advantages of 
adopting such a perspective are manifold. Perhaps the benefits 
were most eloquently summarized by · tenth century English 
historian, Bede, who saw the past as "a force to be reckoned 
with, silentlymouldingthe present and the future." 
Both primary and secondary material have been used for this 
study. The. former includes some hitherto. unpublished figures (of 
frequency and magnitude of strike action on a monthly basis) from 
the Department df Manpower. It is important to note that these 
strike totals appear to have been slightly adjusted from those 
initially published in DOM Annual Reports, which will explain 
some discrepancy in overall figures. A wide range of 
sources have been employed. These sources are of 




integrated with perceptions of the South African reality in order 
that a fuller understanding may be gained of an important 
manifestation of social conflict in a crucial period. 
In recent years it has been increasingly common for Masters 
theses in the Social Sciences to use actual interviews as a 
source of data. Why then has this source not been employed for 
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this study? The reasons are manifold. Firstly, there exists a 
major need to consolidate existing information, to combine it 
with primary documentary source material, and to evaluate what 
major trends may be apparent over a period of time. By then 
interacting information gained with established theory, novel 
perspectives may be gained in a crucial area. There has been a 
growing trend on an international basis to conduct research in 
this manner. Indeed, powerful methodological tools have been 
developed to assist the researcher employing such methods. Most 
noteable have been Michel Foucault's "archaeology" and 
"genealogy". Basically, the researcher evaluates source material 
from the. following perspectives - as direct sources of data for 
evaluation, as products of a particular period of time, and to 
reveal through content and style much about relations of power in 
society (for a comprehensive overview of Foucault's methodology 
see, for example, Drey£ us & Rabin ow ( 19 8 2 )) . 
This is not to dispute the value of interview-based research. 
Indeed, a number of surveys conducted at specific periods of time 
by a wide range of researchers have been used as source material. 
However, it can be argued that a need exists first, through a 
synthesis of primary and secondary documentary material, to seek 
new perspectives. Much social theory was developed in nineteenth 
century Europe, a far cry from modern South African society. It 
can be argued that by employing recently-developed methodological 
tools, the first step to developing new paradigms to explain more 
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fully the unique circumstances pertaining to South Africa can be 
taken. It is hoped that ultimately through synthesising empirical 
data and theory, this study will reveal something more about the 
true nature of a rather unusual socio-political situation. 
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iii)A GRAPHICAL OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT TRENDS 1970-87 
While it is clear that an accurate picture of the relationship 
between industrial conflict and the wider political reality in 
South Africa can only be gained through a detailed assesment of 
the course of events, it is useful first to evaluate overall 
trends evident during the period studied. In this manner, a 
greater clarity on a macro-level can be gained, which will help 
to clarify subsequent points made. Where it is useful, 
correlation and curve analysis have been employed in order that 
the nature of relationships between the various variables might 
be more readily apparent. 
Looking at overall strike totals in the 1970's and 1980's (please 
refer to fig. 1 at the end of this chapter), it becomes clear 
that strikes have come in two waves. The first is the rise of 
strike action in the 1973-4 period, beginning with the Durban-
strike wave. Strike totals then gradually declined, reaching a 
low in 1977, when the post-Soweto wave of repression reached a 
peak. From this lull, strike totals began to increase again, 
culminating in the all-time (for South Africa) high of 1987. 
As can be seen from fig. 2 the inflation rate has generally risen 
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during the period under evaluation. However, some fluctuations 
have occurred, with a rise in inflation in the 1973-4 period and 
a decline in the years 1976-8 {data on the CPI rate for 1970 was 
not available). This was followed by further increases, a slight 
drop in the 1983-4 period, and then still further increases. 
Fig. 3 depicts this same data (for the 1971-9 period) in a line-
.graph form, over which has been superimposed a line-graph of 
strike totals. As can be seen, the 1973-4 period, era of the 
Durban strike wave and the subsequent rise of strike action on a 
countrywide basis, was paralleled by rises in inflation. While 
it is clear that inflationary pressures must have been a major ,/ 
stimulant on workers to strike, it is important to note that the 
rise in strikes was rather out of proportion to the increase in 
the CPI. Thus, the rise in strike action may be due rather to a\ 
combination of factors than simply inflationary 
\ 
pressures in 
isolation. This point will be further assessed in subsequent 
chapters. It is interesting to note that the decline in strikes 
in the 1975-6 period was paralleled by declining inflation. 
~~-~-· 
However, in 1977 strikes continued to decline despite increases 
in the CPI. Thus, it is clear that other factors came into play, 
which could well include the wave of political repression which 
followed the· 1976 Soweto uprising. The years 1978-9 seem to 
demonstrate once again but little relationship between the CPI 
and strike action. The dramatic drop in strike action in the 
1976-7 period and the peaks of 1973 and 1974 unfortunately 
distort a trend analysis of the 1971-9 period, with only a 
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negative relationship being apparent {see fig.4). 
Fig. 5. depicts the CPI rate in line-graph form, over which has 
been transposed a line-graph of strike action in the years 1981-
7. Between 1980 and 1984, a definite relationship seems evident, 
with fluctuations in the CPI rate being, once again, mirrored in 
similar fluctuations in strike action. From 1984-7 the picture 
changes somewhat, with changes in the CPI rate not always 
resulting in a proportionate fluctuation in strike action. The 
1984-7 period was one of unparalleled political resistance, and 
maybe this resulted in pressures other than simply inflationary 
affecting the decision of workers to strike. A trend analysis 
{see fig. 6) echoes the above points - an overall relationship 
does exist in the 1980-7 period, but it is not a proportionate 
one. Thus it is clear that a range of pressures must be playing 
a role in affecting the willingness of workers to resort to 
strike action. 
A number of interesting trends become apparent in evaluating 
strike triggers in the 1970-9 period {see fig.7). Most important 
of these is the changing role of wages as a strike trigger. It 
seems evident that in years of high strike action wages assume 
the role of the major strike trigger, but in years of lower 
numbers of strikes wage related factors become a significant . 
trigger of strike action. Although wage related factors may be 
potentially more far-reaching a demand than simply demands for 
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more pay, they may also simply represent a reaction to some or 
other action by management, and thus reflected reduced working-
class militancy or similar factors. As can be seen from the 
graph, there appears to have been no recorded instances of 
directly union-related strike action taking place. 
As can be seen from fig. 8, the 1980-7 period was marked by high 
numbers of wage strikes. However, it is interesting to note that 
wage strikes declined in 1983, in both total numbers and in 
proportion to other triggers. Some of these triggers, such as 
wage-related factors may have been more "reactive", than simple 
wage demands, a response to either reduced working-class 
militancy, or more probably, the result of such militancy being 
rather channelled off into the political arena, where major 
developments such as the founding of the UDF were taking place. 
Also of interest is the general r~se of union-related strikes 
during the period under evaluation, a symptom of the growing 
organisational strength of the working class. Unfortunately, the 
categories employed by the DOM in releasing the latest data on 
strike action in the 1980's differ somewhat from the categories 
employed by the CSIR/NIPR in the 1970's. Thus, it is unclear to 
what categories in the 1970's the "discipline" factor 
corresponds. 
1980-7 period 
However, the rise in disciplinary strikes 
must clearly be seen as a product of 




An overview of the regional distribution of strike action 
similarly reveals useful information about the nature of South 
African strikes. As can be seen from Figs. 9 & 10, the major 
centre of strike action in South Africa seems to be the PWV 
region. In every year other than 1973 (the year of the Durban 
strike wave )of the period studied, more strikes occurred in this 
region than any of the other major centres in South Africa. 
Although this can be partially ascribed to the degree of 
industrial concentration in the area, it seems that a wide range 
of other factors could also play a role. It is interesting to 
note that since 1985 this area, became relatively of even greater 
importance. As this region was also the centre of much of the 
political resistance taking place in the 1985-6 period, it could 
be that political factors may also have played a role. This point 
will be further evaluated in subsequent chapters. Although the 
second most strike-prone area seems, in general, to be the 
Durban-Pinetown area, in the 1978-81 period the P.E./Uitenhague 
area assumed an even greater importance. A resurgence of 
political activity took place in this area at the time. It seems 
likely that the rise in industrial conflict and political 
activism could have well had common ground in an upswell in 
working-class militancy in that area. Interestingly, East London 
seems (if the limited degree of industrial concentration in this 
area is borne in mind) to be throughout the entire period, 
unusually strike prone. This area has had a long history of 
working class militancy and activism, and may indeed fall into 
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Kerr and Siegal's thesis (see Chapter 1) on the tendency of 
certain communities to be unusually strike prone. 
Figs. 11-14 deal with the relationship between unemployment and 
strike action. Once again, the paucity of official information in 
the 1970's has necessitated the use of two separate sources. In 
the 1970's Simkins• {in Bell & Padyachee,1984) estimates have 
been employed. From 1981, fairly compreh~nsive official 
information is available on black unemployment levels. Although 
information from these two sources is not directly comparable, 
overall trends in unemployment will be reflected in both these 
indicators. Fig. 11 depicts a bar-graph of black unemployment in 
the 1970's, parallel to which a bar-graph depicting strike totals 
has been superimposed. Conventional wisdom holds that high 
unemployment will deter workers from striking for fear of risking 
their jobs and vice-versa, and this does seem to have been 
particularly the case in South Africa in the 1973-78 period. As 
can be seen from the graph, the 1973 Durban strike wave was 
paralleled by a drop in unemployment. From the peak in 1974, 
strike totals declined rapidly, while unemployment rose. It 
therefore seems likely that rises in unemployment could well 
under certain circumstances have discouraged workers from 
striking. Although this does hot always seem to hold (e.g.1980), 
generally it seems that fluctuations in unemployment result in 
strike totals fluctuating in the opposite direction. This becomes 
even more apparent if curve analysis is employed (see fig. 12) 
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rises in unemployment seem to result in a decline in strike 
totals and vice;...versa. 
In the 1981-7 period, this relationship no longer seems to be as 
strong. Although there appears some evidence for it in the 1981-4 
period (see fig.13), by 1985 major increases were taking place in 
·both, 
even 
a trend that was continued into 1987. This change 
more dramatic if curve analysis is employed (see 
appears 
fig.14). 
Thus, it seems that conventional wisdom on unemployment no longer 
holds in the post-1984 period. Clearly, there must have been 
broader reasons why workers increasingly chose to strike despite 
the risk of los.ing their jobs in an era of high unemployment. The 
reasons for this unusual occurrence will be assessed in the, 
following chapters. 
Fig.15 depicts the number of Industrial Court cases from its 
inception to 1987. As can be seen there has been a definite 
increase in its activity. However, during the same period the 
number of strikes also increased (see fig.!). Thus, strikes have 
not ·been reduced through Industrial Court activity. As will 
become clear in subsequent chapters, the reforms aimed at co-
opting the unions into the system markedly failed to do so. An 
assessment of the legal provisions governing strikes is contained 
in section (iv) of this introduction. 
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Fig.16 depicts black real wages in specified industrial sectors. 
Changes in black · real wages will have a different effect to 
inflation. The latter will directly effect workers' savings and 
pensions, while the former may have a more direct effect on day-
to-day living. If inflation is high, but real wages remain 
constant, workers will not be directly affected in terms of take 
home pay. However, any savings will be devalued. In this sense 
workers will get poorer. Conversely, workers will be affected by 
shifts in real wages, even if the inflation rate remains 
constant. Where information was available the number of strikes 
taking place in different industrial sectors have also been 
depicted. Unfortunately, only very limited data is available on 
the industrial distribution of strikes action in the 1970's, and 
where data is available it is often grouped into categories which 
are not directly comparable to officially available real wage 
categories. Thus only compatible figures for the mining and 
construction industries could be obtained by the researcher. 
After 1980 much more data is obtainable. However, after October 
1985 the Chamber of Mines stopped releasing data to the 
public on black real wages as it saw such racially-based 




data for the 1985-7 period is available in Hirschsohn (1988, 
n.p.) and this source has been employed where figures from the 
Chamber are not. available. This figure has been used on the graph 
for black miners' real wages for 1986. Unless otherwise 
indicated, the term "real wages" throughout this dissertation 
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refers to black real wages at 1975 prices. As can be seen from 
the graph, black miners' real wages did not increase 
significantly until the 1973-4 period, when they rose 
substantially. It has been argued that this was largely due to 
the high gold price, the sinking of new shafts on the Reef, and 
new mineral deposits in Namaqualand (all of which led to greater 
optimism in the mining industry) (SAIRR,1974;281). This led to 
the more progressive employers on the Chamber breaking ranks and 
increasing wages and the more conservative employers being forced 
to follow suit (ibid.;283). However, the increase cannot be 
solely explained by such factors. It does not necessarily follow 
that if employers are able to grant wage increases they will do 
so. The most plausible explanation has been advanced by Wilson 
(1980;155), who notes that by the early 1970's the number of 
South Africans working on the gold mines had fallen dramatically, 
owing to more attactive employment being available in the growing 
manufacturing sector. By this time the continued supply of 
foreign labour had become rather uncertain. In 1974 a plane 
crash killing 74 Malawian miners resulted in that country's 
government stopping recruitment by the South African mines 
(ibid.;156). The coup in Portugal and the prospect of 
Mozamibican independence made recruiting from the latter country 
uncertain. Wilson argues that these factors led to increases in 
wages in attempt to attract more South Africans to the mines to 
replace these sources (ibid.;157). 
A further pressure could have been the increase in strike.s on the 
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mines. In the 1975-9 period real wages increased gradually, the 
proportionately most significant increases taking place in the 
mining industry (again)- (see fig.16)~ Interestingly the 
significant drop in strike action in the construction industry in 
the 1975-9 period was matched by a decline in real wages (see 
fig.17). The 1980-4 period was marked by both increasing strike 
action in all sectors of industry and a rise in real wages. 
However, after 1984 real wages began to decline despite further 
rises in strike action. 
As can be. seen from the above, a number of interesting trends may 
be apparent. These include the changing nature of the economic 
pressures of unemployment, fluctuations in real wages and 
inflation as ~trike triggers/disincentives. In view of these 
changes it seems evident that other variables must also · be 
playing a role as determinants of industrial conflict. In the 
highly-charged socio-political environment of South Africa, 
political variables have pervaded many aspects of everyday life. 
Although evaluating the changing role of economic determinants of 
strike action does not by itself shed light on the nature of 
political forces, it does seem probable that the "second 
variable" determining the frequency of incidence of South African 
strikes could well be political. This seems even more probable if 
some of the aspects pertaining to the changing nature of worker 
demands and the regional distribution of strike action is borne 
in mind. However, the ultimate accuracy of the hypothesis will 
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only become clear in the more detailed assessments of the 
following chapters, where specific i~stances o~ strike action 
will be evaluated, as well as particular trends apparent from 
these graphs, in the light of, relevant political developments. 
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iv) LEGISLATION GOVERNING STRIKE ACTION 
Whilst the legislation of the greatest relevance to this study 
was introduced in the post war period, it is necessary to take 
account of the original Industrial Conciliation legislation which 
laid the groundwork for much of the subsequent system. Space 
precludes a full discussion of all aspects of labour related 
legislation. Instead the major provisions of most relevance to 
strikes in the 1970-87 period will be evaluated. The legislation 
dealing with strikes has undergone a long period of evolution 
aimed at incorporation and control since t.he original 1924 
Industrial Conciliation Act (no.11). This act was based on the 
principle of negotiation at an industry-wide level, enabling 
employers to bargain with a number of trade unions at once 
(Horner,1976;125). Blacks who were "non-pass bearing" were 
. excluded from the Act's provisions (ibid.;126). A complex range 
of procedures had to be followed before workers could embark on 
strike action. 
The accession of the National Party to power in 1948 led to a 
rethink of the legislation governing industrial relations and in 
this regard a new Industrial Legislation Commission was appointed 
(s~e Thompson,1989.;501). The Native Labour (Settlement of 
Disputes) Act (no.48) of 1953 prohibited all strike action by 
black workers and excluded all blacks from the provisions of the 
original 1924 Act (Horner,1976;134). It is important to note 
that official terminology defines the word 11 blacks 11 as Africans, 
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both before the law and in terms of official statistics (such as 
real wages). Instead, legislation allowed for the establishment 
of Works Committees in those enterprises employing more than 30 
workers, regional Native Labour Committees (under a white 
Chairman), and a Central Native Labour Board (ibid.;126). Any 
industrial dispute arising would first be dealt with by the Works 
Committee. Under the Industrial Conciliation Act (no.28) of 1956 
trade unions were generally forced to split up ori racial grounds 
(Webster,1985;111). However, black trade unions were never 
outlawed and loopholes in the legislation allowed mixed trade 
unions at the discretion of the Minister of Labour (see 
ibid.;112-3). 
The works Committee system was never very successful. Indeed, by 
1973 only 24 such committees existed (Horner,1976;127). The 1973 
Durban strike wave showed the inadequacy of existing legislation. 
In reaction to this, the 1973 Bantu Labour Regulation Act (no. 
70) was introduced, largely in an attempt to provide alternative 
structures to black trade unions (Bonner,1987;56). This Act 
established a system of works and liaison committees, the former 
wholly, and the latter only half composed of workers. The former 
were only advisory bodies, whilst the latter were intended to 
serve as a vehicle for communicating the aspirations of workers. 
Strikes by black workers were legalised under certain 
circumstances (see Horner,1976;135), but the procedure for 
striking legally was so complex and lengthy that few workers 
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actually used this concession (see the discussion on the 
Armourplate strike in Chapter 3). 
The report of the Wiehahn Commission (discussed in Chapter 4) led 
to amendment of the Industrial Conciliation Act in 1979. The 
Amendrilents extended the definition of the term "employee" to 
include blacks a·nd allowed for the establishment of both an 
Industrial Court and an advisory National Manpower Commission 
(Maree & Budlender,1987;119). Liaison Committees were renamed 
Works Councils and were opened to all races (SALB,1979;62). The 
1981 Labour Relations Amendment Act extended state control over 
the trade unions to prohibit further any political activities 
(Benjamin et al,1981;159). Unions were prohibited from granting 
financial or other assistance to illegal strikers, whilst further 
administrative controls were also introduced (ibid.;160). Up 
until the end of the period studied (1987) no further major 
changes took place in industrial relations legislation, with 
limited amendments in 1982 (to increase the power of the 
Industrial Court) and 1983 ( to allow unregistered trade unions 
access to the Conciliation Boards) (Maree & Budlender,1987;120). 
Under the Industrial Conciliation (later Labour Relations) Acts, a 
strike may normally only legally take place if the statutory 
collective bargaining machinery (either Industrial Councils or 
Conciliation Boards) has first been exhausted or the Minister of 
Manpower has refused to appoint a Conciliation Board in an 
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industry where no Industrial Council exists (Thompson,1989;642 G-
H). In addition a 30 day -"cooling off period" must pass before 
the strike can take place unless certain provisions have been met 
(such as the Industrial Council pronouncing that the dispute 
cannot be resolved) (ibid.;642 G-H). 
The Industrial Court has the power to assess a spectrum of Unfair 
Labour Practices and grant status quo orders (ibid.;620 0). While 
the latter do not constitute final pronouncements, they have 
served to provide guidelines on what constitutes an Unfair Labour 
Practice (ibid.;620 0). In order to gain access to' the Industrial 
Court a state of legally defined "dispute" must exist. The 1979 
Act extended the definition of this term from basically a change 
in conditions of employment pertaining to a dismissal or 
suspension to include Unfair Labour Practices. The Court has 
considerable discretion in deciding what constitutes such a 
L 
practice (ibid.;621). It is only possible to gain access to the 
Industrial Court if the dispute has first been referred to the 
Industrial Council, in the absence of a Council if the party 
concerned has applied for the establishment of a Conciliation 
Board or if "any party to a dispute ..... engaged in (an industry) 
providing essential services, where they have first reported to 
the Minister that-a Conciliation Board will not be able to settle 
the dispute" (ibid.;598A). This in effect allows the Minister of 
Manpower to prevent workers from gaining access to the Industrial 
Court in industries not covered by an Industrial Council or the 
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"essential services" provision. 
The Court has made a number of decisions ranging from those 
forcing employees to bargain in good faith (see Chapter S) to 
specific decisions dealing with strikes. Thompson (1989;642P) 
argues that the Court· grants protection to strikers where the 
action is seen as "legitimate 11 and . 11 acceptable", but has not, 
shown a great deal of consistency in this regard. Some early 
cases adopted an unsympathetic "basket of factors" approach (e.g. 
the BTR Sarmcol Case), but later decisions (e.g. the Sentrachem 
Case) were considerably more sympathetic (ibid.;642T). Thompson 
sees the latter case as particularly significant in that it 
granted job protection to strikers in disputes where intensive 
negotiation had failed (ibid. ;642V). 
The legal provisions governing strike action are extremely complex and 
have been subject to a great deal of change over the period studied. 
The Industrial Court has had a poor record of consistency (see Maree 
& Budlender,1987;121) and numerous amendments, the latest being the 
1988 Labour Relations Act Amendments (beyond the period studied), 
have altered both the definition of a legal strike and the rights 
pertaining thereto. It is hoped that this section has provided a 




Being a review of the existing major theoretical contributions on 
the nature of strike action and its place in the broader arena of 
social conflict. 
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Recorded instances of strike action are· as old as history. Even 
as formidable a character as William the 'Conqueror faced a 
builders' strike in 1066. However, industrial conflict is 
essentially a feature of the post-feudal era. The 
the urban proletariat created the conditions 
emergence of 
for a new 
manifestation of social conflict, where the worker withdraws from 
the labour process as a means for seeking redress of grievances, 
thus striking at the heart of the relations of production of 
industrial society. Particularly in modern times, there has been 
a growing collection of literature which attempts to explain the 
reasons behind this particular manifestation of social conflict 
and its role in wider society. The purpose of this chapter is to 
provide an assesment of such literature. This literature will, in 
the second theory chapter, be re-evaluated in the light of the 
South African socio-political reality. 
Essentially, this literature can be divided into a number of 
distinct categories. Firstly, there are those contributions which 
attempt to provide a general explanation for the existence of 
strike action from a particular frame of reference (such as 
unitarist, pluralist, or Marxist). Secondly, there are those 
which attempt to provide explanations for specific 
characteristics of strikes (such as why particular industries are 
strike prone). Whilst not attempting to be a comprehensive review 
of all the literature available on this topic, this chapter 
attempts to provide a broad overview of some of the major 
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contributions. 
Overall Theoretical Frames of Reference 
i)Unitarism. The unitarist school of thought is based on the 
belief that employers and employees share the same basic goals, 
with the result that it is possible to envisage a completely 
strike free economy(HYn:tan,1981;153). This perspective assumes 
that society is based on consensus. Central to unitarism is the 
notion of a "team" unified by a common purpose (Fox,1969;391). 
Some unitarists, such a.s Reddish (1980;298), even object· to the 
use of the term "worker" as it "implies management does not 
work." The participation of organized labour in any decision 
making concerning the company is seen as undesirable 
(Fox,1969;398). If employers and employees have ultimately the 
same objectives then industrial conflict is neither rational nor 
necessary. Strikes have no structural base in social relations 
(see Allen,1966;153). Indeed, from this perspective strikes can 
be seen as simply due to "agitators", "intimidation", or the 
idleness of the average worker. This approach fails to explain 
class-based inequalities in broader society, or, for that matter, 
basic issues such as the distribution of political power. 
However, by virtue of its very simplicity and inherent 
conservatism, the unitarist approach remains an attractive one to 
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many employers. In addition, unitarism gives management an 
essentially comforting definition of their own role (Nichols, 
quoted in Hyman,1981;154). Thus, despite its crudity, unitarism 
merits being taken seriously as it remains an important 
managerial ideo.logy. 
ii)Pluralism. Critics of unitarism have pointed out that this 
school of thought denies workers the right to question their role 
at the workplace (or even the amount of their remuneration) (Fox, 
quoted in Jackson,1983;30-1). In contrast (and rather in 
reaction) to unitarism, the pluralist approach argues that 
.industrial conflict is both normal and to be expected 
(Jackson,1983;30). Trade unions are seen as fulfilling a crucial 
role in that they restore a balance in what would otherwise be a 
most unequal situation. They shield their members from market 
fluctuations and limit the power of employers (Flanders,1969;22). 
In the collective bargaining process trade unions serve to 
represent workers' interests (ibid.;22). Fox (1983;215) has noted 
that by balancing conflicting interests and managing conflict in 
a competent fashion, pluralists believe that the long term 
welfare of the enterprise can be ensured. In the end, although it 
recognizes competing interests at the workplace, pluralism fails 
to take cognizance of broader inequalities present in society. 
In his later writings Fox shifted to a more radical position 
c-iting as his reasons the often. unequal relations of power at the 
workplace(1977;136-7). He suggested that pluralism had failed to· 
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take account of the possibility that agreements reached at the 
workplace could be unequal "one-sided" affairs, serving the 
interests of the employer only (ibid.;141). Fox argues that trade 
unions may be incapable of countering such imbalance (ibid.;141). 
Essentially, pluralists see industrial conflict as containable 
' ' 
and even being a potential source of strength, by permitting a 
range of interests to voice themselves. Based on the Parsonian model. 
Pluralists have argued that strike action (and related forms of 
protest) represent in general a form of negative inducement 
i.e. more an attempt to increase one's leverage over certain 
sectors of society, than to change the underlying social 
see Hyman, 1981;156-8) 
structures~ This perspective fails to take account of the 
potential for strikes to destroy (or at least to attempt to 
challenge) the existing social order, such as took place in 
Czarist Russia in 1905. In such cases conflict could not simply 
be resolved (or even contained) in the workplace. Thus, it can be 
argued that pluralism does not take account of the possibility 
that broader political struggles may extend into the workplace. 
As Rex (1981;17) notes, the strike represents but the first step 
in the direction of total withdrawal from the employer/employee 
relationship(ibid.;17). If taken to the ultimate conclusion it 
would necessitate the restructuring of the relationship on rather 
different lines(ibid.;17). Thus strikes may be seen as the 
potential first step towards ultimate revolutionary change. 
iii)Marxist Perspectives. In contrast to the pluralist approach, 
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Marxist writers have argued that industrial conflict is an 
ongoing and inevitable process owing to the irreconcilable 
interests of employer and employee, the former seeking to 
maximise profits,. and the latter wages, as well as to alter 
.broader relationships of control. 
Whilst critical of the role of established trade unions, Lenin 
(1977b;61) argues that every strike is "school of war" that 
teaches workers to unite and shows them that their real enemy is 
the government. However, the working class can by no means 
confine their struggle to strike action (Lenin,1977b;62). 
Miliband(l969;140-5)notes that even if aims are limited, strike 
action has utility in the sphere of collective bargaining. 
Demands which employers claim are unrealistic "become realizable 
when organised labour shows that it will not desist"(ibid.;40-5). 
Thus, striking workers have the potential to challenge existing 
relations of power at the workplace. Lenin's arguments on the 
lack of potential of trade unions have been taken one stage · 
further by Perry Anderson (1967;264), who argues that trade 
unions represent an accomodation with existing power structures 
within society. Unions are in the contradictory position of being 
both an opponent of capitalism and an integral part thereof 
(ibid.;264). 
Engels viewed strike action as an unlikely vehicle for social 
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change. Indeed, he suggests that a mass strike (the only strike 
he sees capable of bringing about such change) is unlikely to 
occur, as this would necessitate both perfect organisation and 
large reserves of strike pay (quoted in Luxembourg,1971;224). 
Luxembourg rejected this viewpoint, claiming that it became 
outdated by the 1905 Russian revolution, when the dream of a mass 
strike became realized (ibid.;225). Indeed, she views the mass 
strike as "the most perfect weapon in the struggle for political 
rights"(ibid.;227),. In her writings, Luxembourg argues that 
politics and economics are "inseparably interrelated" 
(ibid.;241). Interestingly, Luxembourg rejects Engels's stress on 
organisation, seeing the mood of workers as being of greater 
importance (ibid.;245). Indeed, she argues that a mass strike is 
more likely to occur spontaneously as the culmination of 
political and economic developments and not as a result 
of organisation(ibid.;245). However, it can be argued that strong 
organisation will increase the chances of a mass strike 
succeeding (after all, the 1905 revolution was, in the end, 
unsuccessful). As Rex(1981;17) points out, ,a major constraint 
against using strikes as a vehicle for revolutionary 
the ability of employers to recruit alternative labour 
Unusually high levels of organisation and solidarity 




It can be argued that although making many valuable theoretical 
contributions, much of the established radical thought 
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incorporates major shortcomings in (as is the case with unitarist 
and pluralist theory) its attempts to impose theoretical unity 
without taking full account of the range of social forces 
operating in various different situations. Oakeshott (quoted in 
Minogue,1975;127) argues that social theory frequently represents 
m~rely the abridgement of social practices current at the time 
of that theory's formulation. As Hyman (1979;323) notes, third 
world strikes tend to differ from the "typical Anglo-Saxon 
bargaining strike" in that they frequently represent a form of 
direct pressure on government rather than individual employers, 
thus incorporating an overtly political dimension. Indeed,· it is 
even difficult to gain an overall conception of the third world 
owing 
with 
to its diverse nature, with economies ranging 




Hyman argues that the dominant theoretical orthodoxy assumes 
trade unions will become incorporated into the system (1979;325). 
However, several third world trade unions have shown little sign 
of this and in fact may be further radicalised through state 
action (ibid.;328). This argument appears to be particularly true 
of South Africa, where the independent trade unions have adopted 
an increasingly outspoken stance following unprecedented levels 
of state repression in the mid-to-late 1980's. Although Hyman 
accepts that many issues facing workers are universal, he is 
critical of the "theoretical imperialism" of many established 





many useful tools of analysis, it can be, argued that 
exists a need to go beyond established theory to 
new theoretical constructs in the light of 
the relevant social circumstances. Theoretical contributions 
attempting to explain specific characteristics of strike action 
will now be assessed. 
Causes and Characteristics of Strikes 
i)Community Structures. An interesting approach in industrial 
relations has been provided by Kerr and Siegel(l954;193) with 
their argument that certain industries will automatically tend to 
be strike prone, which will especially be the case when the work 
force is drawn from small, closed communities. By such they mean 
communities where workers from a particular industry are 
concentrated and are poorly integrated with wider society 
(ibid.;199). Of course, the ultimate closed community would be 
the South African mine compound, and this argument will be 
further assessed in the South African context. Kerr and Siegal 
(ibid.;193) argue that closed communities will give birth to 
their own sets of norms, attitudes and values, which will have 
d~rect effect on relations at the workplace. Eldridge (1968;37) 
sees group cohesion as the most likely variable underlying strike 
action, the factor which lies at the base of the Kerr-Siegal 
thesis that particular industries, whose workforce is drawn 
from certain types of community, will show an unusual propensity· 
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to strike. It can be argued that whilst a degree of community 
cohesion may be necessary for striking, it cannot provide a 
suffient explanation on its own. The question emerging from 
theory is whether the structure and nature of society in 
this 
the 
country/continent when this theory was conceived is similar to 
contemporary South Africa and thus applicable to this country. 
ii)Alienation at the Workplace. The question of whether certain 
industries will tend to be more strike prone than others has also 
been raised by Blauner. However, Blauner(l966;176-8) sees 
technology, and not thenatureof communities, as being the 
determining factor. As McCord argues, the very nature of the 
work situation could contribute to increased levels of conflict 
(1980; 117). In other words, jobs that are unpleasant, .dirty or 
dangerous will result in a more militant workforce than would be 
the case in industries where the work is less so. If one's 
employment involves physical danger, one is bound to feel more 
strongly about certain issues. However, this argument is often 
disproved in practice. For example, British car workers seem to 
exhibit a far greater tendency to resort to strike action than 
their West German counterparts, despite similar·technology in the 
industry (Hyrnan,1981;63). Hyman (1981;64) argues that workers in 
one industry may 
another(or,as is 
industry), some 
indeed have different views to 
often the case, another part of 




bargaining process, others as a last resort. However, he argues 
56 
that it is extremely unlikely that workers may react solely to 
the technology of production, and let this alone dictate whether 
they choose to strike or not(ibid.;63). It is even harder to 
label particular industries as strike prone in view of the ever-
changing nature of technology. For example, the modern robotised 
motor assembly line is a far cry from methods of production 
employed in the 1930's, or for that matter the 1970's. 
iii)Communications. In contrast to the above approach; the 
"human relations" school sees poor communication as the basic 
cause of industrial conflict (Hyman,1981;58-9). This school of 
thought has been largely identified with the works of American 
sociologist Elton Mayo, and. seems to be largely an extension of 
the unitarist school of thought which stresses the common aims of 
management and labour (see the discussion of unitarism in 
preceding sections). By providing "supportive leadership", 
encouraging cohesive social relations within the workforce, and 
keeping channels of communication :>pen, it is possible to ensure 
harmony at the workplace (ibid.;58). Critics of this approach, 
such as Kerr & Siegel, have argued that it fails to take account 
of differences that may exist between various sectors of industry 
(ibid.;59). Also, this approach d:>es not allow for any regional 
differences to exist. 
iv)Strikes as 
(1979;17) have 
a Cyclical Phenomenon. Writers 








clumping together in 
others"(1979;17). Cronin 
some years and dying down in 
goes on to suggest that strike waves 
tend to correlate with waves of unionisation(ibid.;17), which 
seems to have some merit for South A0frica if the parallel rise 
of recorded instances of strike action and the rise of the 
independent unions is borne in mind. The 





frequent strikes less concerned with issues such as wages, and 
more with factors such as organisation on the shop floor or the 
possibility of new technology being introduced into an industry 
(ibid.;35). In other words strikes tend to be cyclical, whilst 
common demands in strike prone industries will hinge less around 
basic economistic factors, and more on far reaching demands aimed 
at pushing back the frontiers of =ontrol. Indeed, the character 
and nature of the economic system may be determined by the nature 
of labour disputes. 
Cronin (1979;17) argues that the cyclical nature of strike action 
represents the product of historical forces and not the result of 
particular industries being strike prone. He points out that in 
years where 
by strikes 
strikes are frequent, most major industries are hit 
(ibid.;17). The changing percentage of union 
membership and the cyclical nature of strike action are seen as 
part of a "broader learning process" by union members that is the 
product of "different phases of economic development" 
(Cronin,1979;40). Unfortunately, Cronin is rather vague as to 
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what is precisely meant by "different phases of economic 
development". Perhaps it might be useful to broaden this concept 
to include issues such as the changing nature of society and 
relations of power therein. 
v)The Complexity of Strike Action. It can be argued that a 
cautious approach should be adopted before assigning the cause of 
strike action to a single fact~r. Clearly, strikes differ 
greatly in both the form in which they manifest themselves and 
their objectives. McCord(1980;116) argues that strikes represent 
such a complex form of social dispute that it is indeed extremely 
difficult to impose any concepts of uniformity. In retrospect, it 
is hard even to comprehend all the forces that brought the strike 
about. Key factors could be a decline in the standard of living 
of the average worker, or workers being declared redundant in a 
depressed industry (ibid.;116). However, the simple contention 
that increased levels of conflict ~ill be the direct response to 
social or economic change remains debateable (Tilly & 
Tilly,1981;328). From this it can be argued that there is a need 
to develop more advanced tools of analysis to explain fully the 
nature of industrial conflict. rhis point will be taken up 
further in subsequent chapters. 
In his study 
is always of 
on strikes, Knowles(l952;6) 






frequently unpremeditated and represent spontaneous outbreaks of 
conflict. Whilst often economistic in origin, they are frequently 
more all-encompassing, having broader effects which are far 
harder to forecast or assess (ibid.;7). The question emerging 
from Knowles's writings is the circumstances under which 
spontaneous strikes occur. 
In reality, a strike is but one manifestation of industrial 
conflict, which may also include sabotage, restrictions on 
output, or extend to the wider community in the form of consumer 
boycotts. Strikes are normally far more visible than other forms 
of protest at the workplace. Indeed, it is often hard to gauge 
the extent of the latter. It is important to note that workers 
have a range of options when seeking to register their 
dissatisfaction at the workplace, and that certain strategies 
(such as strikes) will only be attempted once a certain degree of 
militancy, solidarity, and organisation has been attained. 
However, if workers suffer a certain degree of deprivation, their 
grievances will be expressed in some form (even if only increased 
absenteeism)(Hyman,1981;53). Hyman argues "that attempts to 
suppress specific manifestations of conflict without removing the 
root causes ... may merely divert the conflict into other forms" 
(ibid.;53). Whilst Hyman was referring specifically to workplace 
issues, it can be argued that in a society such as South Africa, 
where no adequate channels exist for voicing a broad range of· 
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grievances, this argument may be true on a far broader basis. 
It can be argued that if the state with its monopoly on legal 
violence intervenes in a dispute, the result could be that the 
basic collective bargaining situation could be altered to one 
escalating towards a civil war (Rex,1981;36). It is clear that 
this perspective needs qualification. Worldwide, states have 
intervened in industrial disputes without this taking place. 
However, under certain social conditions state action in 
repressing instances of strike action could merely serve to spark 
off broader resistance as the events in Russia in 1905 and 1917 
have shown. 
In summary, it can be seen that strike action, and indeed 
broader socio-political conflict,may be ascribed to a variety of 
causes from relative deprivation, to poor communication, or to 
irreconcilable class-based differences. It can be argued that 
none of the established theoretical constructs provides a wholly 
satisfactory account of the causes of strikes nor of the nature 
of trade unions. As Hyman (1979;323-5) notes, there is a vast 
diversity in material conditions prevailing in the third world, 
making it difficult to justify the maintenance of the established 
theoretical orthodoxy. In particular, it can be argued that it i~ 
important to take cognizance of the wider socio-political 
reality, which is often not taken account of in established 
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theories. It is hoped that theories on the role of unions as 
social movements seeking far reaching political change and 
insights on broader power relations may be useful in filling this 
gap. 
Beyond Established Theory 
It is clear that important questions remain on the role of the 
independent trade unions vis-a-vis community organizations and 
the extent to which the former can be termed social movements in 
the sociological sense of the word. One of the most influential 
writers in the area of social movements has be been Manuel 
Castells, who has developed new theoretical tools and insights, 
using them to explain the nature of a wide variety of such 
movements from the Paris Commune of 1871 to the Paris Grandes 
Ensembles of the 1960's and 1970's. Castells argues that social 
movements can fall into three broad categories: those which seek 
autonomy at a local level from central government; those which 
seek to establish/defend specific communities;· those concerned 
with creating a system of living where their needs can be 
fulfilled, in place of an existing system orientated around 
capital seeking to accumulate profit(Lowe,1986;33). 
Interestingly, Castells (1983;4) argues that class analysis is 
not sufficient to understand urban change. Instead, he argues 
that there is a need for a more comprehensive view of social 
causality able to account for the full diversity of human 
experience (ibid.;4). 
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In contrast to locally-based social movements, political parties 
tend to be bound to the "political level" concerned with 
influencing the state apparatus, an apparatus which is inexorably 
tied to political interests (Lowe,1986;35). Owing to this 
linkage, only social movements can serve as the vehicle 
for achieving real change in society(ibid.;35). Clearly, 
neither the independent trade unions nor locally based community 
organizations fall into the category of a political party. In 
fact, both seem to have much in common with Castells' third type 
of social movement - those seeking a more equitable society. 
Castells (1983;301) admits that his theories owe much to the 
writings of Alaine Touraine. Touraine (1981;79) sees the key 
point in studying social movements as their historical location. 
He suggests that when class relations and relations of production 
hold the "centre stage" social movements will become increasingly 
involved in social conflict (ibid.;100). However, he raises the 
possibility of conflict becoming institutionalised and thus the 
role of social movements declining (ibid.;100). Castells largely 
differs with Touraine over the issue of class analysis. Castells 
argues that such analysis is insufficient to account for the 
complexities of urban change (Castells,1983;4). 
Lambert (1988;34) argues that social movement trade unionism 
arises when the trade union leadership consciously seeks to break 
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down barriers and establish alliances with political social 
movements. By doing so the orthodox nature of trade unionism is 
transcended (ibid.;34). Trade unions can thus escape being 
frozen into a reformist pattern (see ibid.;468). The lesson to 
be learnt from worker organizations such as SACTU is that there 
is a need to get away from the "pessimistic tradition" of trade 
union theory (ibid.;468) trade unions can avoid being 
incorporated into the system. Although Lambert bases this 
argument on the experience of SACTU, it seems even more valid in 
the light of the rise of the independent trade unions in the 
1970's and early 1980's. 
Probably the most comprehensive evaluation of the role of the 
South African independent trade unions as social movements has 
been provided by Webster. Webster argues that the independent 
trade unions have defied established pluralist theory in that 
they have not been incorporated to such an extent that industrial 
conflict has become institutionalised (1986a;l6), just as Lambert 
suggested was the c~se with SACTU~ Thi~ has been the result of 
the failure of the state to incorporate politically the 
independent trade unions owing to exclusion of blacks from 
meaningful political rights (Webster,1987a;217). This situation 
has been further prevented owing to a worsening economic 
situation(ibid.;217). A further factor is the democratic internal 
structures of the independent trade unions, which has forced them 
to be sensitive to the needs of their members. This stance 
represents a reaction to declining standards of living and a 
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continued lack of political rights for blacks. This has led to 
the independent trade unions becoming both economic and socio-
political movements. W~bster's writings clearly provide useful 
insights, especially if considered in the light of Castells' 
contributions to the theory of social movements. Greenberg 
(1983;216) argues that if democratically structured, popularly 
based worker organization may give members valuable experience of 
the democratic process, which will have wider social 
applicability should far reaching change occur. In this manner, 
the independent unions may serve as harbingers of a new, more 
equitable society. 
On a more global basis, insights can be gained through Foucault's 
notions of power. As Poster (1984;158-162) notes, Foucault provides a 
major new contribution to social theory, in his argument that 
underlying all social relations is power and strategies for 
domination. In modern society these strategies have become 
increasingly sophisticated, even to such an extent that greater 
freedom of expression may be tolerated as long as ultimate relations oi 
power remain unchanged (ibid.;158-162). 
Giddens has provided further insight into the nature of power 
with his- inclusion of the effects of structural constraints. 
Giddens can be seen to reject both those who rule out the 
possibility of any structural factors and the "scientific 
Marxist"/Althusserian "base-superstructure" metaphor. Giddens 
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argues that in essence there are two basic views of power: the 
"will intended action" of Dahl and Weber and Arendt's notion of a 
social community (Giddens,1979;89). Giddens argues that while 
power in itself is not a resource, the use of power depends on 
the amount of resources available(ibid.;91). Thus, power has no 
inherent connection with will. This provides a useful critique of 
much of established industrial relations theory which makes the 
error of assuming a system of relations that actually functions -
that interests will act in a predetermined fashion, ruling out 
the effects of different sets of circumstances. 
Giddens (1982;32)rejects established "structuralist/Marxist" 
theories of trade unions on account of the fact that it discounts 
working class resistance. In.this manner, Giddens' theories allow 
for the possibility for power relations to change - the powerless 
can gain power through the.mobilisation of resources through 
organization. There is particular scope for · worker action in 
advanced capitalist societies, where workers have to be managed 
without the moral and military power available to ruling groups 
in previous types of society (ibid.;41). Many third world states 
have a greater freedom to resort to overt repression. 
Nonetheless, the third world has become a major site of struggle, 
with the unions actively resisting incorporation (ibid.;44). 
As can be seen by the above, few of the established theoretical 
constructs provide a wholly satisfactory account of the causes 
and nature of strikes, nor the role of trade unions. As Hyman 
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(1979;32-3) notes, there is a vast diversity of material 
conditions prevailing in third world countries, making it 
difficult to justify the retention of the established theoretical 
orthodoxy. In particular, it can be argued that it is important 
to take account of the wider political reality, a factor often 
neglected in established theories. It is hoped that by evaluating 
questions such as the role of trade unions as social movements 
seeking far-reaching change, or the nature of broader power 
relationships may help fill this gap. The applicability of 
established theory and recent theoretical constructs to South 
African strikes in relation to the broader political environment 
will be assessed in the second theory chapter. 
67 
CHAPTER 2 
Before the Awakening 
1970-2 
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The 19705 and 19805 clearly have been an era of resistance, 
collective action and revolt unprecedented in South African 
history. In the labour sphere, this resulted in a record number 
of industrial disputes taking place. By contrast, at the 
workplace, the late 1960's and, indeed, 1970, seemed a far more 
peaceful period. Nonetheless, these years are of interest when 
evaluating industrial conflict in modern South Africa, if only 
because of the fact that they represented a lull after the storm 
of Sharpeville and before the disturbances of 19~3 Durban. It was 
in the "quieter era" of 1970-2 that the foundations of the 
independent union movement were laid. Durban, Cape Town and 
Johannesburg were to all emerge as centres of the fledgling 
advice bureaux, benefit funds and training projects. 
Background to a New Era: The Late 1960's 
By the late 1960's most of the apartheid edifice was already in 
place. Subsequent legislation was to prove more concerned with 
fine tuning discriminatory measures already in place, or with 
·increasing the repressive power of the state. In fact; the late 
1960's can best be viewed as largely a period of inaction. 
Repression had not only silenced most representative black 
political organizations, but also the few black unions that had 
survived till then. It was in this period that the Nationalist 
government appeared to be at its strongest. As Davenport 
(1987;417) notes, Africans were voiceless and totally vulnerable 
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to the government's social engineering projects. In the sphere of 
white politics it had made further advances against the already-
dying UP. The government had a massive battery of legislation at 
its disposal to counter any stirrings. These included such all 
encompassing measures such as the Suppression of Communism and 
Riotous Assemblies Acts. The shock of Sharpeville had largely 
been forgotten. Indeed, the government and its allies had already 
convinced themselves that it could never happen again. 
In the sphere of labour the various attempts at mass unionization 
of Africans over the years had largely failed. This left most 
Black workers unrepresented by the late 1960's. Fisher (1977;343) 
argues that many black workers, having seen so many earlier 
attempts at worker organization fail, had come to the conclusion 
that trade unions for blacks were simply not viable. However, the 
real reason for the failure of these attempts was not only state 
repression, but also the fundamental mistakes committed by most 
of the pre-1970 unions. Before 1970 many black unions had tended 
to rely far more on charismatic leadership figures than on a 
sound organization. Unions such as the ICU of the 1920's had 
placed but little emphasis on internal democracy. As Bonner 
(1978;118) notes, "the ICU had been created and the leadership 
imposed from the outside." It was thus a simple matter for the 
state to crush such organizations should it so desire. The state 
had not hesitated to intervene whenever it felt its position was 
threatened. As Webster (1985;128) notes, whenever it appeare~ 
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that African trade unions were about to be established, they 
faced state action. Furthermore, such repressive action had 
created a more invidious weakness - a lack of will. Many felt 
that organizations such as SACTU owed their downfall solely to 
state repression and adopted a strongly "survivalist ethic" - it 
was safer not to risk state action by attempting to organize 
black workers (Browne,1987;56). It was only when a fresh 
direction was given by intellectuals were foundations of a new 
generation of more effective unions laid. As will become evident 
in subsequent sections, this was initially not undertaken through 
founding unions but rather through the establishment of 
organizations which, it was hoped, would seem less threatening to 
state and capital (Maree,1987;2). 
It has been suggested that SACTU made the mistake of entering 
the political arena prematurely, whilst not paying enough 
attention to 'workplace organization. For example, Lambert 
(1980;104) suggests that "SACTU swept unprepared into the midst 
of the political struggle." SACTU was forced into exile in the 
early 1960's in the post-Sharpeville period of repression. 
Despite the de facto banning, of SACTU, some of its member unions, 
such as the African Food and Canning Workers' Union survived and 
retained their former militancy. It can be argued that the 
surviving unions both gave lie to the belief that it would be 
impossible ever to effectively organize black workers, and served 
as beacons of hope in a bleak era. 
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Strikes in the Late 1960's 
Strikes in the late 19605 were fairly rare. The few surviving 
unions were both organizationally weak and vulnerable to state 
repression. What few strikes that did take place tended to be of 
a fairly short duration and involved on average few workers. 
Demands expressed by workers tended to reflect short term 
concerns and focussed on immediate issues such as the manner in 
which workers received their payment (see fig. 7). Strikes in 
the late 1960's tended to attract a hard line response by 
managers and resulted in an unusually high number of dismissals, 
when compared to either the 1970's, or indeed the early 1960's 
(CSIR/NIPR,1983; 39-41). Plentiful supplies of unskilled labour 
were available and there were few incentives to reach 
negotiated settlements. 
In late 1969 Durban dock workers struck for more pay. As Friedman 
notes, to many this has been seen as the first sign of a new era 
of worker revolt(1987;44). Although seemingly economistic, this 
strike should be seen as having a far broader significance - as a 
harbinger of a new era of collective action, and as the first 
indication of an unusual degree of combativity in the Durban 
district. Indeed, this dispute adds credence to Knowles' 
assertion (1952;6) that strikes may have a far broader effect 
than might seem the case at first. Even if its limited objectives 
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are acknowledged, it is important to note that such action 
represented an opportunity for a disenfranchised grouping in 
society to register protest when all other channels were closed 
(see March, 1977;56). The Durban strike ended a period largely 
characterized by inaction. 
Trends ih Strike Acti~n in 1970 
Few, if any major instances of strike action took place in . 1970. 
All in all, a total of 75 strikes took place (see fig.1 in the 
introduction). This was a marginal decrease from 1969, despite a 
small increase in the inflation rate - the average rate of 
increase of the CPI for the period 1963-70 had been 3.3% (SA 
Reserve Bank, 1974;10), but had now begun to rise to over 5%. 
10% of strikes ended in the firing of striking workers 
(CSIR/NIPR,1983;37). This represents a generally more hardline 
response from employers than was to prove the case for most of 




to strikes with many refusing to accept 
their means by which workers could express 




trade unions made it all too easy for employers to take punitive 
action against workers who resorted to strike action (see 
Bonner,1987;36). 
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The number of worker~ involved in the average strike was slightly 
• 
fewer than was the case in 1969 (NMC,1979;45). However, in both 
the late 1960's and 1970's, the average dispute involved far 
fewer workers, than was to be the =ase in subsequent years. This 
can be seen as the result of almost any formal collective 
organization. The 1973 Durban strikes did indeed show that 
successful collective action on a large scale could take place, 
despite the absence of a union presence. However, this was only 
possible owing to a specific set of circumstances and the pent-up 
frustrations of a lifetime, and was not repeatable. 
Significantly more strikes were triggered off by wage-related 
factors and working conditions than straight wage demands during 
1970 (see fig. 7). Although disputes revolving around these 
issues may have far-reaching consequences, they may represent the 
defensive reaction of workers · to some or other action by 
management. The latter would be particularly the case prior to 
the 1973 Durban strikes and the re-emergence of the independent 
union movement. Of course, the economy was in a far less parlous 
state in the late 1960's than it ~ould be in the 1980's, which 
would serve to make the need for higher wages somewhat less 
pressing. Some degree of latent solidarity amongst workers was 
indicated by the several disputes =aused by dismissals (ibid.). 
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The Birth of a New Militancy 
Between the respective storms of the Sharpeville crisis and 
Durban of 1973, the late 1960's and 1970 have been rather 
·overlooked by those researching the South African iabour 
relations scene. The apparent calm of these years can be directly 
attributed to repressive state a=tion in the post-Sharpeville 
era. Few black unions had existed in the 1960's. The structure 
and focus of most of them (e.g. many of the SACTU unions) enabled 
the, state to take effective action against them. Following the 
banning of the PAC and ANC in the earlier half of the decade, the 
late 1960's appeared to be relatively politically peaceful. 
However, as noted earlier, the first warnings of a new era of 
resistance emerged in the Eastern Cape, where the philosophy of 
black consciousness had begun to develop (Kane Berman,1978;103). 
By 1971, there were already signs of a growing combativity 
amongst the black working class. In a survey conducted by 
Schlemmer (1975;5) during this year 70% of black workers 
interviewed were dissatisfied with the wages they received. The 
inflation rate had increased, with the CPI now reaching 6.9% (SA 
Reserve Bank,1974;12), as is reflected in figs.2-4 
(introduction). Repeated price rises were to be one of the major 
causes of the 1973 Durban strike wave. A high degree of relative 
deprivation was indicated by the fact that seven out ten of those 
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who indicated that low wages were a major problem, blamed it on 
' 
factors such as discrimination and "ill will"(Schlemmer,1975;5). 
Thus a sizeable percentage of the black workforce ascribed their 
problems ultimately to arbitary social injustice. This was to 
have direct effects on the subsequent nature of collective 
action. Interestingly, although very few black workers were 
unionized during this period, 45% (ibid;7) of workers surveyed 
were aware of the considerable bargaining strength the black 
working class had at its disposal. It seems evident that the 
potential existed for a scenario of mass unionization, and 
explains why the early worker service organizations got such a 
good response from workers. As noted in Chapter One, the concept 
of relative deprivation has often been used to explain unusually 
high levels of working class combativity. However, it is 
important to view this as the ultimate product of the underlying 
structures of society and apartheid, with all the - attendant 
inequality, both at a basic class level and with regard to 
consequent access to politic~l power. 
Intellectuals as Union Founders 
In 1971 a mass breakaway of NUSAS's black members took place,to 
align themselves with the Black Conciousness movement. Meanwhile, 
many white students had become increasingly critical of the 
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dominant part of the liberal opposition, which they believed had 
become ineffectual and incapable of addressing the question of 
class-based inequality (Webster,1985;132). As a result of this 
"Wages and Economic Commissions" were established on all NUSAS 
campuses. Originally these commissions were concerned with 
gathering data on wage levels. The first commission was 
established on the Durban campus of the University of Natal. Most 
of these commissions soon changed from their original data-
gathering role, to a more direct one of assisting in the 
organization of black workers (NUSAS,1980;39)~ 
The Durban "Benefit Fund" 
With student help, Harriet Bolton (a TUCSA union official) 
established the "General Factory Workers• Benefit· Fund" in 
Durban. As the name suggests, one of the primary functions of the 
Fund was to provide benefits for its members, in this case,· 
funeral benefits. It was decided to avoid a more overtly trade 
union type role for fear of attracting the unwanted attention of 
the repressive arm of the state. At this stage, it was still 
unclear what the state's response to independent trade unions for 
blacks would be, but the experience of SACTU in the 1960's had 
shown that it was unlikely to be· favourable (see Maree,1987;2). 
Despite this, the Fund attempted to represent some basic worker 
demands. Fisher {1977;342) argues that the success of the Benefit 
Fund can be ascribed to the fact that many workers recognized it 
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as having the potential to become a genuine workers' 
organization. 
Eleven strikes took place in the Durban/Pinetown region in 1971 
(CSIR/NIPR,1983;45-7). Although by contemporary standards this 
might seem relatively few, it was at the time proportionately 
speaking significant (only 69 strikes had taken place country-
wide [NMC,1979;45]), as can be seen from fig.9 (in the 
introduction). The success of the "Benefit Fund", and the number 
of recorded instances of strike action that took place in this 
region, shows that in at least two respects the Durban area set a 
lead that most of the rest of the country was to follow. It also 
serves to demonstrate the tendencies of "simultaneosity" in 
collective action 
Cronin,1979;17). 
that strikes come in "clusters" (see 
Bolton soon attracted the attention of the security police 
(SALB, 1975;3). Eventually she was forced to resign from the 
Garment Workers' Union over the issue of her support for black 
unionism (ibid.;2). Garment Workers' Union officials then 
distanced themselves from her stance, arguing that to attempt to 
organize black workers "was not worth the trouble", as one would 
"be in trouble like her" (quoted in SALB, 1975;3). 
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The Western Province Workers' Advice Bureau 
Meanwhile, the activities of UCT's Wages Committee in conjunction 
with former SACTU organizers had led to the establishment of the 
Western Province Workers' Advice Bureau in 1972 (see 
Mareel986;324). Although officially an advice bureau,it was 
involved in the organization of workers at factory level 
(NUSAS,1980;39). This led to a change of name in 1977 to the 
Western Province General Workers' Union. The surprising degree 
of success with which the bureau was met demonstrates the extent 
of the organizational vacuum that existed. The role played by 
both students and academics (e.g. Turner and Maree) has few 
precedents. Although the independent union movement is now firmly 
established, with workers themselves playing the major role in 
organization, 
early days 
the contribution of students and academics in the 
is both historically significant and creates 
interesting possibilities for future joint action. 
Other Philosophies of Union Organization 
In Johannesburg, the South African Students Organisation (SASO) 
had also started to enter the field of worker organisation with 
the establishment of the Black Allied Workers' Union (BAWU). 
BAWU formed part of a broader plan by SASO to link black students 
with workers, under the overriding Black Conciousness philosophy 
(Kotze,1975;184). Fisher (1977;347) ascribes the lack of success 
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of the Black Conciousness mqvement in organizing black workers to 
its failure to address the nature of the oppression of the 
proletariat. Black Conciousness was overwhelmingly a middle class 
movement and their ideology reflected this (ibid.;347). SASO 
lacked an awareness of the issues facing the average worker, and 
thus had very little influence amongst the working 
class(ibid.;331). Indeed, the basi~ aim of the Black Conciousness 
movement seemed often more that of ttconscientising" workers, 
"making them aware of their potential", than developing worker 
organization (NUSAS,1980;45). 
In 1971 the 
Johannesburg 
Urban Training Project(UTP) was founded in 
by a two former TUCSA officials who were dismissed 
owing to their commitment to organizing black workers 
(Maree,1986;361). The UTP was·originally intended to be a service 
organization, assisting black workers, but by 1973 it had changed 
its avowed objectives to assisting directly in the development of 
independent trade unions (Maree,1986;362). Initially, the UTP 
depended largely on church assistance (see Maree,1986;362). A 
small number of unions, including former TUCSA member unions (who 
had been expelled on account of their black membership) 
affiliated to this project. From the unlikely source of a fairly 
conservative union federation a significant part of the 
independent union movement was to emerge. Of the nine original 
UTP unions, five formed the basis of what would eventually be 
CUSA, the remaining four, FOSATU (ibid.;30). 
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Meanwhile, a group of former trade union activists met in 1972 in a 
little-known (and still-born) attempt to revive SACTU 
(Webster,1985;132). 
Increases in Unemployment 
By 1971 unemployment had reached 12.8% (Simkins, quoted in Bell & 
Padyachee, 1984;12), an increase of almost 1% from 1970. This is 
reflected in figs.11-12 (in the introduction). Conventional 
wisdom holds that increases in unemployment serve to discourage 
strike action. This would account for the slight drop in the 
total number of strikes from 1970. 7.1% of strikes ended in the 
dismissal of striking workers (CSIR/NIPR,1983;37). This 
represents a substantial increase in the figure for the previous 
year. It is difficult to account for this fluctuation, but it may 
simply be explained by the continued uncertainty of employers as 
to what response to adopt to what was still a comparatively rare 
occurrence. The willingness of many employers to 
workers adds additional credence to the assertion 
fire striking 
that rising 
unemployment may have served to discourage workers from striking. 
However, the success of the advice bureaus demonstrates that 
unemployment would not serve to deter latent worker militancy. In 
fact, as borne out by the Schlemmer poll, it may only serve to 
increase the degree of latent de.privation present and thus fuel 
working class combativity. 
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The Strike of the Ovambo Migrants 
In late 1971/early 1972, a major industrial dispute took place in 
Namibia. This was the strike of the Ovambo migrants. There seems 
to have been much evidence that Ovambo workers were very unhappy 
with the contract system, many going so far as to see it as a 
form of slavery (Voipio,1972;4). Despite this, most whites 
believed workers were .happy with the system, the strike coming as 
a total surprise (ibid.;3). ·The first signs of dissatisfaction 
were manifested at Walvis Bay, where workers demanded an end to 
the contract system, or failing that, repatriation (Dekker et 
al,1975;228). News of the strike reached the Windhoek township of 
Katatura. Following a mass meeting, this led to a strike of 5500 
workers (ibid.;228). Eventually over 13500 workers in twelve 
centres were on strike (ibid.;228). Large numbers of the strikers 
were repatriated. A strike committee elected by these workers 
managed to negotiate eventually some concessions from white 
employees and Bantu Department Officials (ibid.;229). One of the 
most interesting demands expressed was the persistant demand for, 
repatriation, which later manifested itself in strikes on the 
South African mines. Whilst not in South Africa, it can be argued 
that the Ovambo strikes set a precedent in sustained collective 
action to be emulated by South African workers. In addition, the 
manner in which the dispute unfolded (and especially conspicious 
riot police action) (ibid,;228), provided evidence of the 
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interlinking of political and economic (and specifically labour-
related) factors in both countries. 
Strike Triggers in 1971 
The major causes of strike action 1971 are r~flected in fig.7 
(introduction). Four strikes were caused by "poor communication" 
during this year(CSIR/NIPR,1983; 39-41). This can once more be 
seen as the product of a complete lack of effective channels for 
workers to voice grievances. Whilst the "Human Relations"school 
of thought can be criticised for being over-simplistic, it seems 
that it does contain a germ of truth - poor communication and a 
lack of effective channels of communication can be a significant 
cause of industrial conflict. Ten strikes were caused by wages 
and 19 by wage related factors (ibid.;39-41). Whilst the latter 
may be potentially a more far-reaching demand, it can also be 
seen as a "softer" demand, for workers to express, if they feared 
, 
to ask directly for more wages. Twenty five strikes were caused 
by dissatisfaction with working conditions. Probably the high 
number of strikes in this category can be ascribed to similar 
causes as the wage related strikes. The Schlemmer survey 
indicates that the primary concern of workers during this year 
was strictly with wages. Eight strikes were caused by dismissals 
(ibid.;39-41) and is indicative of latent 





organization. By 1972, the total number of strikes taking place 
had increased to 71, not a significant increase over the total 
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fi.gure for 1971 (NMC,1986; 107) (see fig.1). 
Demands expressed by striking workers in 1972 were, in 
similar to those expressed in 1971 - a relatively high 
general, 
(by the 
standards of the 1980's) number of strikes caused by factors such 
as poor communication and wage-related issues (CSIR/NIPR,1983;45-
7). Only in periods of unusually high working class militancy 
would demands shift to a more explicit and sophisticated level. 
This is reflected in fig.7 (introduction). 
The PUTCO Strike 
The June PUTCO bus drivers strike represents one of 
the most significant manifestationsof strike action in 1972. 
PUTCO threatened to fire the striking drivers, and 300 were 
arrested by police, which resulted in the strike's end 
(Maree,1986;366). However, the Drivers' Action Commitee 
contacted the UTP (ibid.;366). This was to result in 




action by police in arresting some of the strikers, indicated 
that the state viewed collective action by workers as a direct 
threat, despite the seemingly economistic aims of the strike. 
All in all, 33 strikes took place in the PWV region in 1972 
(NIPR/CSIR,1983;45-7). Thus, working class cornbativity in this 
region was not confined to transport workers. Owing to its 
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conspicuous nature, the PUTCO strike may well have encouraged 
workers to resort to similar action elsewhere. 
Collective Action by Stevedores 
In September 1971 African stevadores threatened to resort to 
strike action (SAIRR,1972;325). A wage increase was granted, but 
the Durban Stevadore•s Labour Supply Company said that this was 
not as the result of the threatened action (ibid.;325). However, 
in November the African stevedores did resort to strike action. 
Workers refused to elect spokesmen for fear of victimisation, 
with an apparent incident between workers and police taking place 
(ibid.;325). Many workers returned after being threatened with 
dismissal(ibid.;326). Whilst workers returned to work the 
following day, it nonetheless is unusual for the time on account 
of its magnitude. In addition, it seems to have represented a 
further symptom of the unusually high degree of working class 
combativity in that area, with 11 strikes in all taking place in 
1972 (CSIR/NIPR,1983;45-7). Dekker et al (1975;221) see the 
dispute as a sign of "smouldering worker discontent", that was 
also expressed in the 1969 dockers• strike and eventually led to 
the 1973 strike wave. On the 24th of October Cape Town African 
and "coloured" stevedores instituted an effective overtime 
ban(SAIRR,1972;326). Interestingly, this dispute attracted some 
overseas attention with the International Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions (ICFTU) sending a telegram of protest to the South 
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African Prime Minister and calling on the United Nations to take 
up the dockers• case (ibid.;327). The wage board eventually 
recommended a 40% increase in stevedores wages(ibid.;327). 
Real Wages vs. the Industrial Distribution of Strike Action 
From 1970 to 1972 there was a slight overall increase in black 
real wages, from R745 to R801 p.a. (NMC,1979;45/ SA Reserve 
Bank,1974;12). In the two industrial sectors where comparable 
figures existed for the number of strikes taking place, miners 
and construction workers both experienced a slight increase in 
real wages: from R339 to R369 and from R914 to Rl025, 
respectively. In the mining industry strikes began to rise by 
1972, while in the construction strikes dropped significantly in 
1971 and began to rise again in 1972 (see fig. 17). Little is 
known about these strikes and at this stage it is difficult to 
draw any conclusions. 
Overall Trends in the Pre-1973 Period 
In general, strikes in the 1971 period are characterized by the 
lack of a formal union presence, and the seemingly economistic 
nature of demands. However, the Schlemmer survey indicated that 
workers already often ascribed their economic misfortunes to the 
Apartheid system. In itself, this system cast a political shadow 
on all disputes. 
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The period of inaction in the late 1960's was ended with the 
establishment of the first workers' advice bureau, benefit 
society and training project. However, strikes still tended to 
be short spontaneous affairs with little evidence of formal 
worker organization present. By 1972 this situation had changed 
somewhat, with s~veral major instances of strike action taki~g 
place. At least one of these disputes led to the formation of a 
union. Nonetheless, there was to be a conside~able lapse of time 
before the fledgling unions became firmly established. 
As was the case with employers, the state seemed uncertain as to 
what response to adopt towards.striking workers .. However, it 
stepped in in the case of at least two major disputes the 
strike of the Ovambo migrants in Namibia, and the PUTCO bus 
drivers' strike. Fear of state action discouraged the fledgling 
worker advice bureaux from taking up political issues. 
Nonetheless, there were indications of a latent working class 
consciousness and solidarity, which finally was to emerge in the 
Durban strikes of 1973. Furthermore, during the 1971-2 perio_d 
the foundations were laid on which the independent union movement 
was built. Thus, this period is of import in that the first signs 
of what was to become an era of unprecedented resistance became 
evident. The fact that the establishment of the first independent 
unions would be soon followed by a wave of strike action seems to 
add credence to Cronin's (1979;17) assertion that "strikes tend 
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to come in clusters", paralleled by waves of unionization. In the 
"lull period" of 1970-2 most collective action seemed largely the 
result of short term economic stimuli, with little evidence of a 
broader political dynamic that was to become an integral part of 
many instances of collective action in the 1980s. 
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CHAPTER 3 
The Crowded Years 
1973-6 
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As can be seen from the previous chapters, the 1970-2 period was 
by no means tranquil in terms of either industrial conflict or 
wider social issues. However, a new era of opposition was ushered 
in by the Durban strikes of 1973. The following year was to see 
unprecedented increases in strike action on a country-wide basis. 
By 1975 the total number of strikes had decreased somewhat, a 
trend that was continued into 1976. However, the wider socio-
political tumult of that year cast a shadow over both the nature 
of collective action at the workplace and on trade union 
organization. 
The Course of the 1973 Durban Strike Wave 
To many, the 1973 Durban strike wave came rather as a bolt of 
lightning on a clear day, a totally unexpected development. The 
first strike was to occur at the Coronation Brick and Tile 
factory. ~his strike affected a relatively large work-force and 
was, to a degree, successful. From this start, the strikes spread 
rapidly throughout the Durban district. Most notably hit was 
the FRAME group of companies, perceived by many workers to have 
extremely poor labour relations {SAIRR 1973a;226). In fact, the 
role of Mr. Philip Frame came under no little criticism from a 
range of quarters, most notably the English language press 
(Institute for Industrial Education [IIE],1974;18). Taken by 
surprise, many managers were quick to grant wage increases, 
resulting in the strikes being of comparatively short duration. 
The situation was further complicated by rumours of an impending 
transport boycott (Institute for Industrial Education, 1974; 16~ 
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1_7). Police turned out in force on the morning the boycott was 
meant to take place, yet nothing occurred (ibid.;16-17). It can 
be argued that despite its failure to materialize, rumours of the 
boycott could have served to fuel worker militancy and popularize 
the idea of striking. The entire strike wave came to a 
halt when the Durban corporation threatened to dismiss all 
striking workers at its premises. The state's reaction was 
surprisingly muted. Although riot police were flown in from 
Pretoria and a strong police presence was visible in the 
townships, almost no violence occurred (Fisher,1977;329). Indeed, 
it seems that police hardly ever interfered in disputes 
(ibid.;329). Significantly, only 3% of strikes ended in 
dismissals during the entire year(CSIR/NIPR,1983;37). 
Arguably, this was the result of state and capital being 
confronted with a totally unexpected and almost unknown 
occurrence. This resulted in a greater willingness to compromise 
to some extent, the former in the 1973 proclamation (this 
permitted legal strikes by blacks, but only once a complex 
process had been exhausted), and the latter by granting limited 
wage increases. Of course, the lack of readily identifiable 
leaders made it hard for state and capital to take effective 
action. It would be far harder to fire an entire work-force 
a few supposed "instigators". Likewise, as Dekker et 
than 
al 
(1975;225) note, it would be virtually impossible to detain an 
entire work-force. 
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Nontheless, the shock of the 1973 strike wave led to the state 
adopting a range of strategies from simple repression to attempts 
to develop more complex methods of control (see Chapter 8) I all 
(as Sitas,[1983;382] notes) with the aim of disorganizing the 
unions. The government initially rejected the idea of extending 
union rights to blacks and instead attempted to revitalise the 
committee system by amending the 1953 act to introduce liaison 
committes and upgrade works committees (Maree & 
Budlender,1987;17). However, black workers opted for proper trade 
unions and tended to only use works commitees as a temporary 
expedient to gain a pres.ence on the shop floor, enhance their 
position and to protect the rights of black workers (ibid.;118). 
All in all, 61 000 workers were involved in the Durban strike 
wave (Maree,1986;125). Clearly a major cause of worker 
grievances was economic deprivation. The 1974 Institute for 
Industrial Education (IIE) report argues that the central 
grievance of workers was low wages (1974;84). The lack of any 
effective negotiating mechanisms and the unwillingness of 
employers even to consider the needs of workers exacerbated the 
problem (ibid.;84). The fact that wages in the Durban region were 
slightly lower than in other major centres, does not appear, on 
its own to provide a .sufficient explanation why the strike took 
place in Durban (ibid.;88). Other factors could have been present 
in the Durban area. However, once the first strikes took place, 
the sight of workers striking and the "general atmosphere of 
crisis" seems to have encouraged further workers to strike 
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(ibid.;100) - a concertina effect not unlike the chain of events 
during the 1971-2 Namibian strikes. Fisher (1977;344) argues that 
there was much dissatisfaction amongst workers with the apartheid 
system of discrimination, which had placed them in a most 
unfavourable position. However, workers had yet to "develop a 
detailed understanding of the relationship between the socio-
poli tical system and economic exploitation "(ibid.;344). Despite 
this, there was a "dim awareness" of the link between the wider 
socio-political reality and work-place struggles (ibid.). 
Indeed 81% of the strike-hit firms paid the minimal wages of less 
than RSO a month, compared with the general figure of 67% of all 
firms located in the Durban-Pinetown area (Fisher,1977;355). In 
fact there had been a general decline or slowing of the rate of 
increase of real wages, owing tb a rising inflation rate (see 
fig.16). In 1973 the rate of increase of Consumer Price 
Index had risen by some 2.7%, from just over 7.3% in 1972 to 
10.0% in 1973 (SA Reserve Bank, 1974; 12). 
The 1973 Durban Strikes and a Broader Political Ineguality 
It is important to note that in the South African context, an 
issue such as wages cannot be viewed in complete isolation. 
Basic social issues, such as housing assume far reaching 
political significance. Indeed, the housing issue became 
particularly significant after the Vorster government's use 
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of housing, and specifically its restrictions on constructing 
further units as a means of promoting a return to the 
bantustans (see Dekker et al,1975;210). 
In general, demands expressed were strictly economistic. Of all 
the strikes in 1973, 293 (by far the most)were ostensibly caused 
by either demands for better wages, or wage-related factors 
(CSIR/NIPR,1983;39-41), as reflected by fig.7 (in the 
introduction). Fisher makes the point that traditionally South 
African managers have viewed their prerogative as absolute 
(1977;335). Consequently, wage demands may not only be 
economistic, but also represent a challenge to far broader issues 
of control (ibid.;355)i Thousands of Durban workers had resorted 
to collective action, with (as can be seen by the above), high 
levels of solidarity. This in itself represented a political act, 
no matter what the demands expressed were, when the government's 
attitude towards strikes by blacks is borne in mind. In 
addition, striking Durban workers often drew up long lists of 
demands (probably including community issues) with wages (the 
reason cited in the DOM returns) simply being the one at the head 
of the list (ibid.). Thus, demands for higher wages may be simply 
one of many other demands, others of which could well have been 
more political. It seems likely that Fisher's assertion could 
well hold true not only for the Durban strikes, but also for many 
other instances of strike action in South Africa as well. The 
fact that wages may only be the first of many demands should 
always be borne in mind. Although wage demands were central to 
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the strikes, the IIE Report sees them as also being political -
the large increases demanded (far larger than workers could hope 
to receive) demonstrated dissatisfaction with the status quo and 
the desire for a better society (IIE,1974;101). 
Significantly, black unemployment declined by some 2.3% from 
15.8% to 13.5% from 1972-3(Simkins, quoted in Bell and 
Padyachee, 1984;12)(Please refer to fig.7, in the introduction). 
Although the role of unemployment as a deterrent to striking in 
the South African context remains a complex one , c.onventional 
wisdom holds that declining unemployment will result in workers 
being more willing to risk their jobs by resorting to collective 
action. This could have been particularly the case with those 
Durban companies paying their workers less than R50/month. 
In his survey of workers involved in the strikes, Mare (1975;21) 
notes that 98% of strikers surveyed said that they chose to 
strike from their own volition, and not as a result of pressure 
and/or intimidation from "instigators". Most of the strikes were 
of relatively short duration. Indeed, 70 % of strikers surveyed 
by Mare said that they ended their strike as soon as their wage 
demands were acceded to (1975;20). Clearly there was a strong 
underlying. militancy, but it can be argued that workers lacked 
the basic resources to press for anything more than readily-
realizable short-term demands. 
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The Unions and the Strikes 
The established unions appear to have played little or no role in 
the disputes. Indeed, as Fisher (1977;343) points out, it would 
have been virtually impossible at the time for any trade union 
legally to organize a strike of black workers. Thus, any 
involvement by the unions (there was a limited role played by the 
new worker service organizations) would, of necessity, be post 
hoc(ibid.). In fact, the all-white Building Workers' Union 
blamed "the left" for permitting the situation to arise. Whilst 
other unions blamed employers (IIE,1974;18), very little seems to 
have been done in the way of support. It appears that the 
decision to go on strike was reached independently by the workers 
themselves. It was far more viable for workers to adopt informal 
methods of collective organization, 
"wildcat strikes " than to rely 
employing strategies such as 
on the established unions 
(Fisher,1977;347). It is clear that workers must have had some 
form of highly efficacious informal organization which, when 
combined with the high degree of relative deprivation, resulted 
in well organized "total strikes". In view of the limited 
coercive action taken by state and capital, it seems that a lack 
of formal organization could, at times, prove an asset. Workers 
had been very reluctant to elect spokesmen (Fisher,1977;330). 
-rndeed, workers seemed aware that requests by employers for 
"somebody to negotiate with" could simply be a ploy to identify 
activists who would then,face dismissal (ibid.;330). However, the 
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ability to mount successful collective action would then largely 
depend on a high degree of latent working class combativity. 
There is no doubt that in most circumstances formal organization, 
is advantageous, but the success of collective action without 
such organization demonstrates the limits of the state's coercive 
power. The Durban strikes had the effect of encouraging workers 
to formalise their organization and establish new structures. As 
noted in the following sections, several new worker organizations 
were established in the Durban region in the aftermath of the 
strikes. 
Buthelezi and the Strike Wave 
Equally unclear is the role some have argued Buthelezi played in 
the strike wave. Today, many South Africans identify both the man 
and Inkhata with the status quo. However, in 1973 Buthelezi had 
yet to break with the ANC, or indeed the independent unions. The 
break with both these movements only came in the late 1970's. 
Buthelezi has argued that the split with the independent unions 
came when FOSATU failed to invite him to the launch of their 
Northern Natal branch (see Green,1986b;74). He was, in fact, 
invited, and a more likely explanation seems to be that it 
followed Buthelezi's sacking of the pro-union Councillor, Barney 
Dladla, who had gained great popularity amongst Zulu workers and 
could have thus posed some threat to Buthelezi's leadership 
(Maree,1986;349-350). In 1973 many employers viewed him as being 
the chief instigator of the strikes, despite the fact that he was 
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visiting the United States at the time the strikes occurred 
(Mare,1975;24). Despite the fact that many of the intellegentsia 
viewed him with suspicion, Fisher (1977;332) argues that 
Buthelezi enjoyed much worker support at the time, and his anti-
goverrunent stance could have served to strengthen the resolve of 
striking workers. However, such support must have been rather 
tenuous if the results of a 1975 survey by Webster (1979;24) are 
anything to go by - when members bf three different'trade unions 
(then Natal-based) CWIU,MAWU, and NUTW, were interviewed only 1% 
saw increased ties with KwaZulu as being of value in making · 
worker organization more effective.On dubious ground, the SAIRR 
report into the strikes (SAIRR,1980; 226) argues that factors 
which could have caused the strikes include the homogeneous 
composition of the Zulu work-force and the coronation of King 
Goodwill. The latter, it is argued, caused an upturn in Zulu 
nationalism. However, Zulu nationalism is an intrinsically 
conservative force, whilst even in 1973 King Goodwill was 
generally perceived to be highly conservative . (more so than 
Buthelezi). Despite this Buthelezi did not publicly oppose the 
strike wave. Arguably, at the time his silence could have been 
taken as tacit. approval. (In 1973, many, including the 
ANC,perceived Buthelezi to be less pro-establishment than he is 
believed to be today.) 
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Indian Workers and the Strike wave 
Also of interest is the role that was played by Indiant workers 
during the strikes. Most of the literature on the Durban strike 
wave describes it as a primarily black phenomenon. However, 1973 
is characterized by an unusually high percentage of Indian 
workers taking part in strike action. In 1973 40 per 1000 "Asian" 
workers struck, whilst none did so in 1972 (CSIR/NIPR,1983;18-
25). In comparison 31 per 1000 blacks struck during 1973 
(Ibid.;18-19). As the centre of strike action during this year 
was the Durban-Pinetown region (168 out of 369 [ibid;45-7]), the 
area where most Asian South Africans reside, it seems fair to 
assume that there was a high degree of solidarity across racial 
barriers during the 1973 Durban strike wave. The 1974 IIE report 
' -
(1974;19) points out that many Indian workers seem to have joined 
the Durban Corporation strike. In addition, in a poll conducted 
at the time, most Indian workers supported the idea of non~racial 
unionism (IIE,1974;64). · It could be argued that the success 
enjoyed by black workers during the initial strikes had the 
effect of encouraging Asian workers elsewhere in the district to 
resort to similar action. 
Major Unions Founded 
All in all, 229 281 work-days were lost through strike action in 
1973, whilst an average of 267 workers were involved per strike 
(NMC,1979;46). This represents a substantial increase over 
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figures for the previous year, which can be taken as a reflection 
of the high degree of worker solidarity which exhibited itself 
during the Durban strike wave. This year is also significant in 
that it saw the emergence of the first independent unions, MAWU 
(Metal and Allied Workers Union) in May,and NUTW (National Union 
of Textile Workers) and CWIU (Chemical Workers Industrial Union) 
in October. MAWU was founded in Durban and may best be seen as 
the result of an increased consciousness (and arguably 
politicization) amongst workers. There is little doubt that there 
was a considerable rise in working class militancy in Durban as a 
result of the strike wave ·c see Maree, 1986; 144) . This resulted in 
the Durban region leading the rest of the country in the 
establishment of independent worker organizations. Thus, the 
long-term effects of the 1973 Durban strikes on wider power 
relations within society (see Chapter 8) were considerable. This 
adds credence to the argument that strike action in itself may 
serve to increase worker consciousness and politicization (see, 
for example, Dekker et al [1975;231] on the 1972 Namibian 
strikes). The formation of these new unions soon resulted in the 
need for·a co-ordinating body (NUSAS,1980;26). This led to the 
formation of the. Trade Union Advisory and Co-Ordinating Council 
(TUACC). TUACC would eventually form the core of the Federation 
of South African Unions (FOSATU). Meanwhile, UTP associated 
unions such as the recently-emerged SFAWU (Sweet,Food and Allied 
Workers Union), EAWU (Engineeringand Allied Workers Union) and 
PWAWU (Paper,Wood and Allied Workers Union) formed the 
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Consultative Committee of Black Trade Unions(CCOBTU). CCOBTU was 
strongly committed to black leadership in the independent union 
movement, and had a general political orientation towards the 
Black Conciousness movement (NUSAS,1980;32). 
As can be seen by the above, 1973 saw not only a resurgence of 
strike action, but also the re-emergence of independent trade 
unions, against a backdrop of growing political and economic 
discontent. The role, nature and causes of strike action in 1974 
will now be assessed. 
General Trends in Strike Actitm in 1974 
Altogether, 387 strikes occurred on a country-wide basis in 1974 
(NMC,1979;46), which represents an increase from 1973 (please 
refer to fig. 1 in the introduction). The PWV region emerged as 
the most strike prone area in the country, reflected in fig.9 of 




industrial concentration in this area 
mini strike wave broke out on the 
14 firms, with approximately 5000 
is borne in 
Reef in July, 
workers being 
involved (Hudson,1974;45). Although there is very little material 
on what actually took place, the strikes were largely blamed on 
"agitators" (ibid.;45). What is clear is that they were of 
comparatively short duration, owing to a lack of resources, or 
indeed effective union organization (ibid.;45). 
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The East London region and the Durban/Pinetown district remained 
important centres of industr~al conflict(see fig.9). A second 
strike wave took place in East London in July-August, involving 
at least 21 firms (Mare,1974;26). The basic demand expressed by 
most of the striking workers was for more wages, which were 
extremely low in the region owing to the government's policy of 
decentralization (ibid.;26). There was considerable intervention 
in the disputes by both police and bantustan leaders (ibid.;26). 
Although the latter were less rabidly opposed to collective 
action by workers than would later become the case, already their 
r 
role had become highly problematic(ibid.;26). Despite the greater 
number of strikes country-wide they were of far shorter duration, 
with only 98 583 work-days being lost (NMC,1979;46). In addition, 
strikes involved fewer workers on average (153 per strike 
[ibid.;46]). 
A Rising Consciousness:The Changing Nature of Worker Demands 
Significantly, 5 % of strikes ended in dismissals of workers 
(CSIR/NIPR,1983;37), almost twice as many as in 1973. This could 
be owing to strikes affecting more smaller enterprises in 1974, 
where managers would be more likely to adopt a harder line. This 
would also explain why fewer workers were involved per strike and 
the shorter duration of strikes on average (see NMC,1979;46). An 
alternate explanation for the latter two factors could be that a 
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lower degree of working class militancy was manifest on a 
country-wide basis when compared to the Durban-Pinetown micro-
climate of 1973. The primary cause of strikes in 1974 remained 
wages and wage-related factors (approximately 194 and 97 
respectively [CSIR/NIPR,1983;39-41]) (see fig.7 in the 
introduction) . 
Indeed, it is significant that proportionately more strikes were 
caused by wage related than purely wage issues than was the case 
in 1973. This could reflec~a growing sophistication in demands, 
especially when the fact that 22 (ibid.;39-41) strikes were 
caused by dismissals (essentially a "solidarity" factor)is borne 
in mind, possibly a reflection of growing organization at the 
workplace. This represents a more than two-fold increase over 
1973. Several industrial disputes showed further evidence of of 
an underlying militancy, combined with a surprising degree of 
solidarity. For example, an overtime ban by Cape Town stevedores 
was highly effective, despite the difficulty of organizing 
collective action of such a nature (Maree,1975;59). Indeed, 
workers interviewed by Maree voiced a strong commitment to the 
ban, with one worker seeing such co-operation as being a prelude 
to co-operation on a far bigger scale (ibid.;60). The dispute was 
marked by security police intervention and a number of "ring 
leaders" were arrested (ibid.;63). The dispute was eventually 
resolved through a change in the working hours of shift workers 
(ibid.;62-3). The relative success of the action demonstrated the 
potential of collective action, but at the same time demonstrated 
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that the state viewed collective action at the workplace in the 
same light as wider socio-political resistance. Indeed, it was 
becoming clear that a definite linkage existed between the two. 
This would have definite consequences in shifting worker demands 
away 
level. 
from purely economistic issues onto a more sophisticated 
The actual material conditions of black workers and their 
struggle for betterment remained inherently linked to wider 
political issues. It seems evident that the state would view any 
large protest action by black workers in a most serious light. 
Real wages in the non-agricultural sector generally rose in 1974 
(see fig 16). In the two sectors of industry where comparable 
detailed figures of strike totals were available, construction 
and mining, real wages increased from R1089 to Rll35 and from 
R442 to R618 respectively (NMC,1979;45/ SA Reserve 
Bank,1977;12). Please refer to figs •. 16 &17. The most likely 
reason for the mining houses• decision would be changes in 
recruiting policy (see introduction section c.). Nontheless, 
fears of rising worker discontent (see subsequent section dealing 
with conflict on the mines) could have helped prompt the 
decision. 
A number of politically significant events occurred in 1974. For 
example, Mozambique and Angola achieved independence which seems 
to have had some ·effect in increasing black political 
consciousness (Kirkwood,1975;4-10). Meanwhile, there was an 
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increase in state repression, with several prominent Durban trade 
unionists being arrested and then barred from engaging in future 
union activity. Despite this, the evolution of the new, 
independent unions continued apace, against a backdrop of growing 
black political consciousness. However, as we have seen, many of 
the demands expressed by strikers continued to be primarily 
economistic in focus. Indeed, factors such as increased 
inflation (the rate of increase in the Consumer Price · Index 
increased to 14.1% {SA Reserve Bank,1977;1}) alone have 
accounted for the increased numbers of strikes. Clearly, 
however, the political variable continued to have 
significance in determining the nature of industrial conflict. 
Declining Strikes yet Renewed Challenges 
Standing between the "rolling" strikes of 1973 and the tumultuous 
events of 1976, 1975 has been rather overlooked by those studying 
industrial conflict in South Africa. In fact, a new era of 
labour relations was being ushered in, with renewed challenges by 
the mine workers. To many, the gold mines form the foundations on 
which the entire apartheid edifice was constructed. It was 
originally to ensure cheap and regular labour supplies for the 
mines that the entire bantustan system was established. 
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Conflict on the Mines 
As noted in previous chapters, there had been a substantial rise 
in violent conflict, ostensibly "faction fighting" on the mines ; 
in the early 1970's. This growing conflict was the subject of a 
substantive article by the labour editor of the Financial Mail 
(quoted in Kirkwood,1975;p30). In interviews conducted with mine 
workers, a frequent complaint expressed was the complete lack of 
any effective channel for articulati~g basic 
grievances(ibid.;30), let alone any power to change them. 
These grievances could include a wide range of areas, 
food, to a lack of any means of political expression. 




means many miners had of drawing attention to their plight. 
Significantly, many miners interviewed argued that mine managers 
often ascribed any form of violence to "faction fighting", in an 
attempt to draw attention away from any range of grievances 
miners may have had (ibid.;30). This adds credence to McNamara's 
(1985;186) _argument that crudely racially-orientated explanations 
were often advanced to explain any resistance or conflict on the 
mines. Kirkwood (~975;32) argues that the mine disturbances of 
January 1975 ushered in a "new age of struggle". 
Significantly,strikes on the mines during this month 
crossed tribal barriers. Indeed, as Kirkwood (ibid;32) notes, 
reports suggests that militant Basotho miners attempted to use 
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force to ensure cross-tribal solidarity. The resultant conflicts 
were described by mine management as "faction fights", in this 
context rather a misnomer. Owing to the nature of the compound 
system, with segregation on tribal lines, it would be extremely 
difficult to organize unified strike action across tribal 
barriers (Sitas & Joakamides, 1979b;18). Although a far cry from 
the European mining village, the compounds have many of the 
characteristics of closed communities in the sociological sense 
of the word. Segregation on a tribal basis had resulted in groups 
of miners developi~g different sets of norms,- attitudes and 
values. Some groups of miners appear to be more militant than 
others, a good example being the Basothos. Thus, it seems that 
the Kerr-Siegel thesis(see Kerr,1964;80-189) is not universally 
applicable. Miners from different ethnic backgrounds (e.g. 
Xhosas) seem to have been less militant, although subjected to 
the same compound system. 
A broader perspective seems necessary here. It is essential to 
bear in in mind the sending country/district. Workers from the 
Transkei, subject to a highly repressive government, may have 
been more reluctant to challenge the system and be seen as 
"troublemakers" than workers from the more enlightened Frontline 
States. Interestingly, workers from some regions seem to have had 
little incentive to stay on the mines and a frequent demand 
expressed by workers after protracted instances of conflict was 
repatriation {McNamara,1985;206). Similar demands were expressed 
by the 197,2 Owambo workers striking in Namibia. 
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Although attempts to· organize workers across tribal lines were 
not always successful (the militant Basotho miners were opposed 
by other, less militant, miners from other ethnic groups), there 
are several instances of successful cross-tribal solidarity. For 
example, the Lorraine/ Harmony/ Merriespruit strikes seemed to 
involve miners recruited in a wide range of different regions 
(ibid.;34). Arguably, these early instances of cross tribal 
solidarity paved the way for the future National Union of Mine 
workers. 
In addition to the above-mentioned strikes, abnormal levels of 
violence continued 
compounds. 'Kirkwood 
reflection of the 
Significantly, the 
Kirkwood,1975;30-35) 
to be exhibited in many of the mining 
(ibid.;35) argues that this was but a 
powerlessness felt by the average miner. 
Financial Mail report (quoted in 
argues that the continued restlessness on 
the mines was partly a response to broader polit~cal 
developments. These included the rise of the Black Consciousness 
movement, and the independence of Mozambique and Angola. 
Meanwhile, the Durban strikes had demonstrated the efficacy of 
strike action(ibid.30-35). Thus, for the first time in many years 
miners began to view the weapon of strike action as a means of 
articulating their grievances. 
In their study of conflict on the mines Sitas and Joakamides 
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(1979b;9) evaluate the abnormally high levels of violence 
present. This violence assumed a variety of forms from "faction 
fighting" to destruction of property. It has been argued that the 
violence was not only the product of an absence of unions (which 
would limit the manner in which workers could voice their 
grievances), but also the result of the high degree of violence 
inherent in the system of control(ibid.;9). At the centre of this 
system lies the compound, and endemic to the compound is 
autocratic control (ibid .. ;13). As McNamara (1985;206) notes, 
much conflict revolved around issues of scarce resources (usually 
issues such as access to women, liquor, and gambling). The fact 
that such resources could be a major source of conflict should be 
seen as an inevitable product of the entire system of control. 
Although the demand most commonly expressed by striking workers 
was for higher wages, it was common in the resultant violence for 
symbols of the system of control (such as beer halls. and 
"acclimatization chambers") to be attacked (Sitas. and 
Joakamides,1979b;l4). Consequently, it seems evident that wage 
demands were but the articulation.of discontent with the entire 
system of control. This ties in with Fisher's (1977) previously-
noted assertion that wage demands cannot be simply dismissed as 
economistic. Indeed, wage demands and an underlying desire for 
far-reaching political change may be interrelated. 
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Overall Trends in Strike Action in 1975 
Despite these growing stirrings on the mines, the total number 
of strikes during this year, 274 (NMC,1986;32), represents a 
substantial decline from the figure of the previous year (see 
fig.1 in the introduction). This could have partially been a 
result of an increase in the unemployment rate of blacks to 
13.8%(Simkins, quoted in Bell & Padyachee,1984;15). This is 
depicted in figs. 11-12. Arguably,increases in unemployment could 
have resulted in workers concentrating their attention on 
consolidating their gains, rather than risking their employment 
in a situation of economic decline. Far fewer workers were 
involved per strike (85.06 on average) and only 18 709 man-days 
were lost owing to strike action (NMC,1979;46). 
Fewer strikes resulted in the firing of strikers. This figure 
now stood at 4% (CSIR/NIPR,1983;37), possibly an indication that 
employers were becoming more used to strike action on a country-
wide basis, and were therefore prepared to adopt a more pragmatic 
approach than was the case in 1974. Nontheless·,as noted above, 
increased unemployment could have provided a disincentive to 
strike action, as could declining inflation. The Consumer Price 
Index's rate of increase .now stood at just under 13.5% (SA 
Reserve Bank 1977;13), reflected in figs.3-4, in the introduction. 
Regional variations are depicted in fig.9. As can be seen, 
PWV/Southern Transvaal region emerged as the most strike prone 
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area in 1975, with a total of approximately 122 strikes occurring 
(CSIR/NIPR,1983;45-47). This was followed by the Durban Pinetown 
region, with a total of 63 (ibid. ; 45-7) . It can be seen that 
proportionately far fewer strikes occurred in the 
Durban/Pinetown region when compared to previous years. 
Possibly the relatively high figures for 1974 were the 
result of the legacy of the 1973 strike wave, which had 
somewhat dimmed by 1975. 
Interestingly, at least 77 strikes were caused by disputes over 
working conditions (ibid.;39-41), country-wide, representing an 
increase from the previous year. Working conditions is in some 
ways a more sophisticated demand than wages, and demonstrates 
that workers were now seeking to improve their position in a wide 
range of areas. However, the ravages of inflation· alone would 
ensure that wages remained high ort the bargaining agenda (please 
refer to fig.7). Black real wages in the non-agricultural sector 
increased in 1975 (refer to fig 16) to R1098 p.a. (NMC,1979;45/ 
SA Reserve Bank 1977;13). It was in the mining sector that the 
most significant increase took place, from R618 to R1098 p.a. 
(CSO;l976). The number of mining strikes increased significantly 
(see fig.17). However, as a proportion of the total number of 
strikes taking place the figure remained small. Nonetheless, the 
strikes could have further motivated the Chamber of Mines to 
grant wage increases. 
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Setbacks for the Independent Unions 
. 
By 1976, the organization of the independent trade unions had 
proceeded apace. However, they were still extremely vulnerable. 
For example, at the Heinemann strike of March of that year, MAWU 
suffered a major setback. MAWU had attempted to challenge the 
liaison committee system at Heinemann by organizing a boycott 
thereof. This led to an apparent lockout, and police intervened, 
baton charging workers (see MAWU,1977;49-59). Workers gathered 
at the factory gates, but began to disperse peacefully when 
instructed to do so by police (Maree,1986;476). Nonetheless, they 
were then attacked by baton and pick wielding policemen 
(ibid.;477). MAWU officials were then arrested and charged with 
inciting a strike and obstructing the police (MAWU,1977;49-59). 
Eventually, the officials were found not guilty on appeal, and 
MAWU workers won R20 000 in an assault case against the Minister 
of Justice (Webster,1985;141). However, at a time of high 
unemployment trade union members were in an extremely vulnerable 
position making it easy to victimise workers identified with the 
trade union (see Webster,1985;143). As a result of the dispute 
MAWU's organization at the plant was effectively destroyed. 
A few months later, South Africa's first legal strike by black 
workers took place at Armourplate. Here management seemed to have 
had adopted a very hard line policy towards the unions. The Glass 
and Allied Workers' Union claimed that management's attitude made 
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it hard "to organize" both on the shop floor and at works 
Committee level (1977;61). Finally, three workers were fired 
. . 
without consultation, one of the fired being a works committee 
member (ibid.;61). The union began the cumbersome procedure for 
instituting a legal strike. When the required 30 days "cooling 
off period" had elapsed, the strike began. Despite the strikes 
legality, workers were dismissed, with a Bantu Labour Official 
claiming they had deserted (ibid.;64). The union then attempted 
picketing action, but workers were promptly arrested under the 
Riotous Assemblies Act (ibid.;65). They were rushed before a 
magistrate and quickly sentenced (Maree,1986;439). However, the 
convictions were then set aside on Appeal on the grounds that 
they had not received a fair trial (ibid.;439). In addition 
security police intervened, interrogating groups of workers 
(ibid.;439),. The fact that workers were vulnerable to both 
instant dismiss.al and police action demonstrates the total 
inadequacy of the pre-Wiehahn industrial relations legislation. 
The Soweto Uprising 
On June 16th 1976, police opened fire on a crowd of 
demonstrating school pupils, providing the spark that ignited the 
1976 Soweto uprising. Twenty thousand schoolchildren had marched 
in protest against the government's decision to introduce 
Afrikaans medium instruction into Soweto schools (Kane-
Berman,1978;1). This was the result of a decision made three days 
earlier at the launch of the Soweto Students' Representative 
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Council(SSRC), on June 13th,to hold a demonstration against 
proposed changes in the education system (Lodge,1983;32~). 
Following the shootings the revolt spread to the black townships 
in Pretoria and on the East Rand. "The first stage of the revolt 
was a class boycott, with sporadic incidents of arson 
(ibid.;329). This was followed by a series of stayaways. These 
developments were to have severe economic repercussions, 
including a decline in investment, especially by foreign firms. 
Unemployment climbed to 15% (Simkins, quoted in Bell & 
Padyachee,1984;13). It can be argued that this was responsible 
for the decline in the total number of strikes to 245 
(NMC,1979;46) (see fig. 1). A further factor which could explain 
the decline in the total number of strikes is that the Consumer 
Price Index rate declined to 11.1% (SA Reserve Bank 1977;13). 
This is depicted in figs.2-4 (introduction). The decline could 
have had the effect of removing some of the immediate pressure on 
workers to seek wage increases. A third factor which could be 
responsible for the drop in the number of strikes could be the 
effects of the widespread social unrest in the second half of the 
year. It could be argued that much of the underlying discontent 
which would have found expression at the workplace was channelled 
elsewhere. In addition, workers ma·y have been reluctant to resort 
to collective action in view of rapidly escalating repressive 
action by the state. 
Five percent of strikes ended in the dismissal of strikers, up 
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from 4% in 1975 (CSIR/NIPR,1983;37). This could be partially the 
result of some employers adopting a harder line towards strikers 
as a result of the growing political turmoil in society, albeit 
that the increase in firings was fairly limited on a ~ountry-wide 
basis. 
A number of explanations have been advanced for the uprising. 
Kane-Berman (1978;14-16) from a liberal perspective ascribes the 
revolt to a combination of dissatisfaction with the educational 
system and the system of influx control, as well as heavy-handed 
police action. He sees the rise of the Black Conciousness 
ideology as one of the major causes of the "growing 
assertiveness" amongst black schoolchildren which led them to 
take collective action (ibid.;103). Brickhill and Brooks (quoted 
in Lodge,1983;331) see the revolt as largely the result of 
increased pressures being place on the black educational system 
as a result of the shortage of skilled labour. They play down the 
role of Black Conciouness and suggest that increased ANC activity 1 1 
may have played a role in fuelling militancy (ibid.;331). Even 
more critical of Black Conciousness is Hirson (1979;142-3). 
Instead, he sees rising working class militancy as playing a key 
role. This would directly affect schoolchildren faced with the 
prospect of structural unemployment. Working class self-
confidence was boosted by both the 1973 strike wave and by events 
in Angola (ibid.; 142.-3). However, the lack of concrete ties 




the Soweto uprising (ibid.;142-3). 
Probably the most convincing explanation would be a combination 
of the causes listed above. While the educational system clearly 
provided the necessary stimulus, the underlying causes were far 
more complex. These should be seen as including a general rise in 
militancy, reflected by the rise of Black Conciousness; ANC 
activity and possibly the growth of worker organization. As 
Hirson (see ibid.;142-3) notes, the lack of co-operation between 
organizations helped government suppress· the revolt. Hirson 
(ibid;142-3) suggests that the increased militancy should be seen 
as the result of events such as the 1973 Durban strike wave, but 
economic pressures should also be borne in mind, including the 
struggle for improved material conditions, itself the inevitable 
result of the government's bantustan policy (see Bonner,1987;56). 
Conventional industrial relations theory fails to take account of 
either such a possibility, or how a political uprising could 
directly affect the trade union movement, even if unions have 
ties with political organizations. 
Struggles over Wages 
During 1976 102 strikes occurred over wages (CSIR/NIPR,1983; 39-
41), a small increase over the previous year. Further increases 
would largely have to be won through work-place struggles. It is 
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interesting to note that the number of strikes over dismissals 
increased to 25(ibid.). This,and the rise of sympathy strikes, 
can be seen as the result of increased working class militancy 
and solidarity, itself a result of wider political developments 
during this year. 
The Stayaways of 1976 
During this period SASO attempted to extend its influence from 
that over students into mobilizing workers to participate in work 
stoppages. The 4-6 August stayaway on the Reef resulted 50-60% of 
workers not going to work (Kane-Berman,1978;112). The stayaway 
was enforced by students, who set up roadblocks and stoned buses 
and taxis (ibid.;112). This sparked off a conservative reaction 
, in Alexandra, where factory workers attacked a crowd of youths 
(ibid.;112). Realizing their mistake, students employed more 
peaceful methods of persuasion in obtaining support for a 
subsequent stayaway on the Reef between the 23rd and 25th August. 
Nontheless, some groupings of hostel dwellers went on the 
rampage, and attacked crowds of youths. Allegedly, the police 
were responsible for inciting them (ibid;ll3). A third stayaway, 
took place between 13-15 September. Students organizing the 
stayaway stressed the need for peaceful co-operation by all 
sectors in the community, including migrants (ibid.;114). The 
stayaway seems to have been wide.ly observed by all ?ectors of the 
community (ibid.;114). The police response was to employ the old 
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tactic (employed as early as 1911) of going house to ·house and 
questioning or arresting those who had not gone to work. 
The 1976 stayaways were not confined to the Reef. In Cape Town a 
stayaway took place on the 16-17th September, following the 
spread of "unrest" to that centre. This stayaway seems to have 
enjoyed the support of +/-50% of workers in Cape Town 
(SAIRR,197St.;86). A further stayaway on the Reef was called in 
November 1976. This stayaway was generally unsuccessful and can 
probably be ascribed to threats of a hardline response by 
employers (ibid.;115). However, it was observed by 100% of 
many 
black 
matriculants in the Soweto/Katlehong area (SAIRR,197~;26-27). 'In 
December, students called for a two-day stayaway in Cape Town. 
This was unsuccessful and led to much violence between students 
and migrants (Kane-Berman,1978;~30). There were persistent 
allegations that police prevented householders from defending 
their homes against attacks by migrants (ibid.;131). Two reports 
detailing this were published, but both were subsequently banned, 
along with the author of one, the Rev. David Russell (ibid.;131). 
This conservative reaction has some interesting parallels.to the 
"unrest" of the 1980s, during which frequent clashes took place 
between conservative elements (such as the notorious "witdoeke") 
and more left wing groupings.· 
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Setbacks for Unions yet Rising Militancy 
In November, a number of prominent trade unionists were 
banned(Bonner,1983;16).This had the effect. of weakening the 
independent union movement. However, all was not totally bleak. 
As noted earlier, there were indications of greater worker 
solidarity during this year. Although fewer strikes took place 
than was the case in 1975, they involved far greater numbers of 
workers (28 013 [NMC,1979;46]). Many more worker-days were lost, 
all in all 59 86l(ibid.;46). An average of 114 (ibid.;46) 
workers participated per strike, again a substantial increase 
over the previous year. Thus, it appears that the political 





whilst proving detrimental to 
benefit of building working 
union 
class 
Once again, the PWV was the centre of strike activity, with a 
total of 114 (CSIR/NIPR,1983;45-47) strikes occurring. This is 
reflected in fig.9 (in the introduction). ·Although this can be 
partially explained by the degree of industrial concentration in 
that area, it important that the political context be borne in 
mind. This region was the epicentre of the 1976 uprising. Many 
workers had been mobilized into resorting to collective action in 
the form of 'stayaways. ·Given a graphic example of the strength of 
the major weapon they had at their disposal, the ability to 
withdraw their labour power, they would clearly be encouraged to 
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employ it again, even if ·only for more mundane demands. 
Real wages for blacks increased slightly, as can be seen from 
;ig. 16. Likewise, only a small change in the number of strikes 
in the chosen sectors took place (see fig. 17). In the mining 
sector the total number of strikes taking place increased only 
slightly (see fig. 17). 
Overall Trends in the 1973-6 Period 
During the 1973-4 period, the number of strikes taking place had 
increased dramatically. This increase was partly a response to 
economic factors, such as declining unemployment and rising 
inflation. However, it is also important to note the rise ·in 
general political consciousness during this period, with strike 
action being often the only vehicle available for voicing a wide 
range of grievances. Thus, although strikes for higher wages 
may appear economistic in orientation, they may simply represent 
the articulation of a plethora of grievances. Although there 
appears to have been little role played by trade unions in 
organizing the Durban strikes, the stoppages were characterized 
by a high degree of working c:;:lass solidarity. This represented a 
sound foundation on which the independent unions could be built. 
While less spectacular that the 1973 Durban strike wave, strikes 
in 1974 are significant in their broader geographical 
distribution., the seemingly greater sophistication of demands, 
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and the fact that they occurred against a backdrop of rising 
political consciousness. 
It appears evident that despite a decline in total strike figures 
for 1975 and 1976, from the peaks of 1973 and 1974, these years 
remain of extreme significance. This is particularly so if the 
effects of wider political developments are borne in mind. In 
1975, continued dissatisfaction on the mines led to outbreaks of 
strike action. These strikes are important, in that they 
involved workers drawn from a wide range of regional/ethnic 
backgrounds, paving the way for a single, united mine workers 
union. Also, it became clear 'that much of the violence endemic to 
the compound system represented the response to a complete lack 
of effective channels for voicing a wide range of grievances. 
Events in 1976 are rather overshadowed by the repercussions of 
the Soweto uprising. As noted above, it seems as if there was a 
general rise in workers' solidarity during this year, a solidarity 
inculcated by events in the townships. 1976 is also significant 
in the emergence of stayaways as a means of voicing protest of a 
specifically political nature. However, the failure of the 
November Reef stay-away is indicative of the need for a 
democratic decision making process, based on the shop floor. As 
workers were not consulted in November, they felt little 
inclination to risk their jobs by staying away for a longe,r 
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period than was the case in August and September. Thus it became 
clear that organizational democracy lay at the root of successful 
collective action. However, on the whole 1976 should be viewed as 
a bad year for the independent unions. The political disturbances 
weakened organization, several major strikes (such as the 
Heinemann and Armorplate disputes) ended in defeat, and the 
November bannings were the start of a fresh wave of repression. 
Only in 1980 would the unions have fully recovered from the 
damage suffered in 1976. 
Although demands expressed by striking workers throughout the 
1973-6 period may on the surface seem economistic, it is clear 
that they often represented a more far-reaching dissatisfaction 
with many aspects of the status quo. From the 1973 Durban strike 
wave to the rising unrest on the mines, many workers sought not 
only short term betterment of their economic plight, but also 
more far-reaching political change. Incidents such as the rising 
conflict on the mines had in themselves intensely political 
consequences, owing to the close relationship between the control 
of mine labour and the origins of the entire apartheid edifice. 
Even more overtly political was the emergence of political 
stayaways in 1976 - workers withdrawing their labour power as a 
means of registering political protest. Thus it is clear that the 
nature of strike action in the 1973-6 period had become 
increasingly affected by political factors. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Reform and Repression 
1977-9 
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By the late 1970's it had become increasingly clear that the 
momentous events of 1976 had irrevocably changed the entire 
South African socio-political scenario, with far-reaching 
repercussions into all aspects of South African life. Major 
changes were to take place in state policy towards trade unions 
for blacks. The reforms of 1979 and the legacy of the revolt of 
1976 would change the nature of collective action at the 
workplace irrevocably. 
Declining Strike Totals 
Altogether, 91 strikes took place in 1977 (see fig.l), involving 
an average of 168 workers per strike (DOM;1985), being a decrease 
over the previous years figures. Bonner (1980;189) argues that 
the decline in strike totals was the result of the ongoing 
economic depression, which resulted in workers being extremely 
reluctant to risk their employment. Indeed, unemployment 
increased to 17% (Simkins, quoted in Bell & Padyachee,1984;12). 
This ·increase is depicted in figs.11-12. According to 
conventional wisdom, unemployment serves as a deterrent to strike 
action. However, it is important to note that a further deterrent 
existed in the form of the massive increase in state- directed 
repression that followed the 1976 Soweto uprising. As Hyma~ 
(1981;13) notes, the suppression of protest may simply redirect 
the _underlying latent resistance into a different direction. It 
can be argued that an alternative effect may be simply to defer 
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much of the protest to a later date, in the case of strike action 
to the post-1980 period. Likewise, political "unrest"would only 
re-emerge in the mid-1980s, albeit on an even larger scale than 
was the case in 1976. Thus, the state's repression of protest in 
both workplace and township would only result in a greater 
future challenge, in which the common ground between political 
factors and strike action would become increasingly apparent. 
Cronin's (1979;17) argument that strike action is cyclical may 
go a long way towards explaining the drop in strike totals during 
this period. Cronin (ibid.) argues that strikes tend to come in 
clusters, which he sees as being linked to waves of unionization. 
This could explain why strikes declined in periods where unions 
) 
were weakened by state repression - in other words the nature and 
frequency of strike action being directly affected by state 
action, further demon$trating the linkage between industrial 
conflict and political variables. State action in November 1976 
against the independent unions had reached unprecedented heights 
(Maree,1987;5). This resulted in worker organization being 
severely. damaged and necessitated a period of reconstruction 
' (ibid.;5). 
All in all, 15 471 man days were lost owing to strike action 
during 1977 (NMC,1979;46). Interestingly, the average South 
African strike continued to be of relatively short duration, when 
compared to those of Western Europe. As can be seen from fig 16, 
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there was only marginal increases in real wages in the mining and 
construction sectors, with a dramatic drop in strike totals in 
both such sectors~ The lack of serious worker resistance would 
remove one of the reasons for increasing real wages. 
Reconstruction of Union Organization 
Significantly, although the total number of strikes for 1977 
represents a significant decrease over the previous years figures 
(see fig.1), the independent unions had survived the setbacks of 
· 1976 and commenced their reconstruction, laying the foundations 
for the challenge of the 1980's. The mounting economic recession 
had exacerbated the problems the independent unions faced 
following the arrest and/or banning of several prominent trade 
unionists (Bonner,1983;16). No less than 24 trade union activists 
were banned, including proven leaders in the Western Cape, Natal 
and on the Reef (Maree,1986;119). This would prove damaging to 
those unions which lacked internally democratic structures. 
Already by late 1974 it had become clear to the TUACC unions that 
there was more to effective action than simply signing on members 
- there was a need for 6rganizational growth to be balanced by a 
sound base on the shopfloor (Maree,1986;590). This resulted in 
the unions generally adopting a defensive posture and retreating 
into their strongest factories in order to consolidate their 
gains (Bonner,1983;16). Many.workers still only belonged to TUCSA 
unions. For example, in the Cape Peninsula (albeit an area where 
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TUCSA was fairly strong), they accounted for 54% of unionised 
workers (Hendrie & Horner,1977;23). 
A total of 40 strikes took place in the PWV region(CSIR/NIPR, 
1983;45-7). Thus, this area remained the centre of strike action 
in the country. Nineteen strikes took place in the 
Durban/Pinetown district(ibid.;45-7). Although this represents a 
decline over figures for the previous year, a significant 
proportion of the overall number of strikes continued to take 
place in this area. This can be ascribed not only to the degree 
of industrial concentration in this area, but also to an 
apparently significant degree of working class combativity. This 
combativity first became fully apparent with the 1973 strike 
wave. Six strikes took place in the East London region (ibid.;45-. 
7), again a proportionately fairly significant figure. This is 
especially so when the far lesser degree of industrial 
concentration in this area, when compared to, say, Cape Town, or 
even the adjoining Port Elizabeth/Uitenhage district(where no 
strikes occurred during this year). This can be seen as but a 
further reflection of the long tradition of political militancy 
existent in the East London district. This trend was to continue 
into the following year, with 14 strikes taking place in this 
district (ibid.;45-7). These trends are reflected in fig.9. 
Strike Triggers and Worker Perceptions 
The relative importance of the main strike triggers are depicted· 
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in fig. 7 of the introduction. Altogether 29 strikes were over 
wages(ibid;39-41), more· than one third of the total number of 
strikes for the· year. This indicates that basic economic factors 
remained of crucial import. Meanwhile, 24 strikes were caused by 
wage related factors (ibid.;39-41). As noted earlier, it can be 
argued that wage related factors can represent a more 
sophisticated long-term deman~when compared to purely wage 
demands. As the Tillys (1981;328) note, changes in conditions 
may simply change the form of contention, without eliminating the 
underlying conflict per se. This would explain the rise.of wage 
·demands, while accounting for the continued high degree of 
dissatisfaction with all aspects of the existing relations of 
power in the broader socio-political context. Six strikes were 
caused by "dismissals" (CSIR/NIPR,1983;39-41), an indication that 
working class solidarity had not been weakened by the post-1976 
repression. 
It is interesting to compare these apparent causes ascribed for 
strikes with Graaff and Maree's (Graaff,1977;87) survey of worker 
grievances in a non industrial dispute situation. In their 
sample, 77 % of the 211 workers interviewed complained about low 
wages, and 43 % about wage related grievances. Thus,it appears 
that a far greater proportion of workers were dissatisfied with 
wages, as averse to wage related factors, than is reflected in 
the actual figures for strike action. This serves to back up the 
above assertion that although potentially a more sophisticated 
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demand, wage related factors may be used by workers seeking a 
"softer" demand, less likely to bring on retaliatory action by 
either employers or the apartheid state. According to 
Graaff(ibid.;87), 39% of workers surveyed were dissatisfied with 
their basic relations with management. This does not appear 
surprising, in view of the near-total lack of adequate channels 
other than strike action for voicing grievances. 10% were unhappy 
with living conditions in the townships and blamed management for 
this (ibid.;87). This demonstrates that already a significant 
proportion of workers were linking political inequality with 
workplace issues. Indeed, it can be argued that significant 
numbers of strikes during this period could well be the end 
product of a broad dissatisfaction with all aspects of the 
political status quo. 
Rising Unemployment and Strikes 
By 1978, the total number of strikes per month began to increase 
again, with a total number of 107 being recorded for the year 
(DOM;1985). This rise in strike action came despite an increase 
in the unemployment rate to 19.9% (Simkins, quoted in 
Bell & Padyachee, 1984;12). This rise in unemployment vis-a-vis 
strikes is depicted in figs.11-12. It was becoming clear that 
unemployment was structural, partially brought about by the very 
nature of the South African state and exacerbated by 
discriminatory legislation such as the colour bar laws 
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(SALB,1978;1-2). Rising unemployment resulted in many Africans 
being placed in an increasingly desperate situation (ibid.;1-2). 
In view of the massive deterrent of unemployment, it is 
significant how many black workers actually resorted to strike 
action during this period. This demonstrated the' high levels of 
dissatisfaction with conditions of employment, high levels of 
solidarity and broader issues. 
There was a small decrease in the CPI rate ·for 1978 to 
approximately 10.1% (SA Reserve Bank, 1979;12), depicted in 
figs~3-4. It can be argued that this drop was so slight as to 
have had only a very limited effect. Meanwhile, the general 
economic environment had become one of virtual stagnation. The 
number of workers per strike declined to 132 (NMC,1979;46), 
whilst the total number of man-days lost decreased to 10 558 
(ibid.;46). In this case, these decreases can probably be 
ascribed to strikes spreading away from larger enterprises to 
smaller ones as well. Despite this, no strikes 
(CSIR/NIPR,1983;37) ended in the dismissal of workers, continuing 
evidence that many employers had become reconciled to · the 
prospect of endemic strike action. 
Increasing State Involvement in Industrial Disputes 
Although, following the 1973 concession, it was technically 
possib.le for black workers to embark on legal strike action, most 
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strikes remained illegal. By mid-1979 there appeared to be an 
increase in police interference in strikes, most notably the riot 
police and special branch (Sitas and Joakamides, 1978;65). This 
increase can be seen as a continuation of the increasingly 
repressive policies of the South African state in the post-1976 
period. However, it is interesting to note that 
~ ' 
a parallel 
development was the government's gradual recognition of the need 
to grant black labour some basic form of representation (Maree & 
Budlender,1987;118-9). Despite limited earlier reforms, the 
government had failed to prevent the establishment of black trade 
unions, or stop their growth (see ibid.;118-9). This gradual 
shift allowed blacks to establish an organizational base in the 
economy(ibid.). It is doubtful if the independent unions would 
have been tolerated in the South Africa of the 1960's. 
Significantly, this was probably the first instance of the 
government's reform and repression policy, which has become so 
much a feature of the South African political scene of the 
1980's. This provided further evidence of the linkage between 
. workplace conflict and wider political issues. 
However, in the pre-Wiehahn period, the government still hoped to 
bypass the independent unions by creating alternative bargaining 
structures by simply amending existing industrial relations 
legislation (Sitas and Joakamides,1978;10). Union involvement in 
strikes ,remained low key for fear of attracting unwanted state 
attention. This had the result that most strikes continued to 
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erupt on an apparently spontaneous basis, with very little 
evidence of a union presence in many cases. This was even more 
true where Liaison Committees existed, as they proved 
ineffectual, with their recommendations being ignored (e.g. the 
Armorplate strike). Meanwhile, however, the independent unions 
had established sound organizational foundations, to assume the 
role of an autonomous force within society. 
The major strike triggers in 1978 are reflected in fig. 7. All 
in all,25 strikes were caused by demands for higher wages in 1978 
(ibid.;39-41). This represents a decrease over the figure for 
1977. However, the number of strikes over wage related factors 
increased substantially to 36 (ibid.;39-41). ';I'his represents the 
culmination of wage-related factors as a strike trigger in the 
1970's. Once again real wages increased only slightly (see 
fig.16). As can be seen from figs. 16 & 17 there was only a 
slight increase in mining real wages, and a drop in miners' 
strikes. However, in construction where real wages had dropped 
the number of strikes increased (see fig. 16). Of significance 
.was the substantial increase in dismissals as a strike figure, 
causing 19 strikes in all (ibid.;39-41). Again this represents an 
increase over the figures for 1977 and can best be viewed as a 




Organized Labour as a Force for Political Change 
to many representatives of management 
in Bissell & Crocker,1979;51) it 
(see,for example, 
had already become 
apparent that the potential existed for black workers to act as a 
major force for securing political change. Indeed, it was 
conceded that it was possible independent unions could serve as a 
force for democracy within society (ibid.;51). There appears to 
be no little truth in this assertion. Many black workers had 
received their sole exposure to democratic decision making within 
the independent unions. Thus, the potential existed for the 
independent trade unions to serve as torchbearers for democracy 
and train their members for a broader degree of decision making 
in the future, in both workplace and wider society. This adds 
credence to Greenberg's · (1983;216) assertion that "any 
institutions of workers' democracy" may serve as forerunners of a 
broader democracy. By 1979, it had become increasingly apparent 
that the independent unions were going to play a permanent role 
in the South Africa of the future. During this year, the TUACC 
unions, some former TUCSA and CCOBTU unions plus several 
unaffiliated unions merged to form FOSATU. FOSATU had basically a 
"workerist" orienatation that is committed to building 
organization under worker control, independent of community-based 
political bodies. The new federation had a total membership of 35 
000 (MacShane et al,1984;58). Meanwhile, the Black Consciousness-
orientated BAWU had split, with its Eastern Cape branches 
forming SAAWU (South African Allied Workers' Union)~ The new 
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union was committed to playing a role in struggles in both 
township and factory, and experienced rapid growth in the year 
following its inception (Maree,1982;34). 
Strike Statistics in 1979 
All in all, 102 strikes occurred during this year, which 
represents a slight decrease from 1978 (please refer to fig.1). 
Approximately 224 workers were involved in the average 
strike during this year (NMC,1979;46). However, the number of 
workdays lost owing to strike action greatly increased. According 
to the NMC (1979;46) 67 099 workdays were lost, a more than six-
fold increase over 1978. However, the independently arrived-at 
figure supplied by the Anglo-American manpower department for the 
year was 75 000 (Anglo-Arnerican,1979;n.p.). Generally, as can be 
seen in subsequent chapters, the most comprehensive figures on 
strike action tend to.be those supplied by the Department of 
Manpower(DOM). However, the fact that it was possible for an 
independently-sourced figure to be substantially higher, 
indicates limitations on the DOM figures(see appendix). Thus, 
a considerable number of strikes could be taking place which are 
not recorded officially. Sadly, in subsequent years the figures 
supplied by the Anglo-American corporation seem to be those 
supplied by the DOM rounded off ·to the nearest 1000. 
Du.ring 1979, inflation increased substantially, with the rate of 
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increase in the CPI now reaching approximately 13.5% (SA Reserve 
Bank, 1981;11). This increase is reflected in figs. 2 & 3 
(introduction). Whilst this did not have the effect of 
increasing the total number of strikes, it may in part explain 
wages becoming once again the major strike trigger(see fig.7). In 
total, 40 strikes were caused by wages during this year 
(CSIR/NIPR,1983;39-41). Although wages can be seen as a 
primarily 
would be 
economistic demand, they are also a demand employers 
extremely reluctant to accede to during a recession. 
Thus, workers would only consistently express such a demand if 
they felt capable of embarking on sustained strike action. This 
would only be the case if there was a relatively high degree of 
working class militancy, which itself can be seen as both a cause 
and effect of the independent unions. Once again black real wages 
in the industrial sectors depicted in fig. 16 increased slightly. 
Mining strikes remained comparatively rare in these years, 
but by 1980 the number of strikes in the construction industry 
had increased dramatically (see fig. 17). Real wages in this 
industry had dropped slightly in .1979 (see fig. 16). This could 
have provided some extra stimulus for workers to resort to strike 
action. 
Twelve strikes resulted irt 1979 owing to dissatisfaction with 
working conditions and fourteen to dismissals 
(CSIR/NIPR,1983;39-41). According to the CSIR/NIPR survey 
(1983;39-41), a compilation of DOM returns, no recognition 
strikes took place during this year. However, at least one 
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recognition strike did take place, at the Cape Town docks in 
December. Here the WPGWU (Western Province General Workers Union) 
struck for recognition of its stevedores' committee. After 
striking for only one day, employers acceded to this demand. 
Possible Effects of Further Rises in Unemployment 
During 1979 unemployment increased to 20.6% (Simkins, 
Bell & Padyachee, 1984;12). Conventional wisdom 
increases in unemployment serve to deter workers from 





(particularly as it appears that in previous years relatively few 
strikers were fired for resorting to collective action) appears 
to have become less and less of an effective deterrent. This .is 
borne out by the trends shown in figs. 11 & 12. It is important 
to note that South Africa lacks a comprehensive social welfare 
program and unemployment has the effect of increasing the number 
of dependants per worker. Wages which w,ere already minimal thus 
declined even further in real terms~ This would force workers to 
resort to collective action in order to gain a subsistence wage, 
even if it could result in unemployment for themselves. Bonner 
(1987;56) argues that government initiatives aimed at entrenching 
inequality (such as influx control and the bantustan policy) had 
the effect of increasing inherent contradictions. The collapse of 
the rural economies of the homelands placed immense pressures on 
workers to improve their material. conditions of employment 
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(.ibid. ;56). 
Although, according to official sources (CSIR/NIPR,1983; 37), 
only approximate~y 1.5 % of strikes ended in the dismissal of 
strikers, Cooper (1980b;l6) argues that increasingly employers 
were resorting to the tactic of mass dismissals of striking 
workers, followed by selective rehirings. No black workers struck 
legally during this year, but there appears to be no evidence of 
prosecutions for resorting to illegal strike action. Thus black 
workers had won a de facto right to strike. However, it appears 
that frequently strikers were prosecuted under the Riotous 
Assemblies and General Laws Amendment Acts. Out of a total of 33 
strikes studied by Cooper (1979;13) during this year, 12 (more 
·than a ~hird) were marked by some form of police interference. 
Strikes and a Consumer Boycott 
A significant instance of industrial conflict took plaqe in 
Hammersdale (Natal), when over 600 workers struck at Rainbow 
Chickens, after the introduction of a new system of shifts 
(Hosken,1979;51). TUACC had established the TUACC Workers' 
Project (TWP) to provide services for non-unionised workers 
(Maree,1986;290).0ne of the first plants where the TWP tried to 
establish a presence was Rainbow Chickens. Workers seemed very 
militant at this plant · and wanted to go on strike at once 
(Maree,1986;291). The TWP attempted to go through the lengthy· 
' 
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procedures of instituting legal strike action, only to find out 
that officially speaking, Rainbow was an "agricultural" factory 
and thus excluded 'from the Industrial Conciliation Act 
{ibid.;292). An "illegal" sit-down strike was attempted, but 
workers were simply dismissed and a protest march was met by riot 
police (ibid.;292), showing a continued willingness of the state 
to intervene in industrial disputes. Workers had put forward a 
range of demands (Hosken,1979;51-4), demonstrating the difficulty 
of ascribing strike action to a single cause. In the end the 
dispute was resolved by management granting limited wage 
increases. Workers interviewed generally believed that the strike 
had been a success (ibid.;54). Although the tasks performed by 
workers were classified as unskilled, Hosken argues that the work 
required a sufficient degree of dexterity to make management 
think twice about permanently dismissing the workforce (1979;55). 
This could be also the case with many other production line-based 
companies, demonstrating that the potential existed for 
collective action even in a period of high unemployment. 
At Fattis & Monis a dispute surrounding the dismissal of a number 
of workers actively involved in trade union organization led to a 
strike in April 1979 (McGregor,1979;123). Management refused to 
negotiate with the independent unions active in the plant, namely 
the FCWU and AFCWU. This led to a highly successful (albeit 
protracted) consumer boycott lasting no less than seven months, 






argues that the success of the boycott, which proved 
effacacious in both "coloured" and black communities 
evidence of the high degree of working class militancy 
in the country (ibid.;127). The success of the boycott 
provides further evidence of the close ties between the workplace 
and community, and the legitimacy the two Food and Canning Unions 
seem to have enjoyed in the eyes of society at large. 
The Wiehahn Reforms 
On the first of May 1979, the Wiehahn report was released. The 
report called for the state recognition of black trade unions and 
their inclusion into the established bargaining structures. The 
nature and repercussions of this report are fully discussed in 
the introduction and subsequent chapters. The report was greeted 
with a considerable degree of scepticism by FOSATU, who predicted 
that the more progressive elements of the report would not be 
implemented by the government (SALDRU,1979;91). TUCSA accepted 
the report in its entirety and CCOBTU with reservations (ibid.92-
3). Meanwhile, BAWU welcomed the report, but (like almost all 
the other independent unions)criticized the exclusion of migrants 
from the provisions of the 1979 Industrial Conciliation Amendment 
Act, which implemented the Wiehahn Commission (ibid.;92). This 
provision was soon relaxed, sparking off a bitter debate within 
the independent union movement over the issue of registration in 
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The White Miners' Strike 
Even before Wiehahn the report was released, rumours of its 
contents resulted in the white Mine Workers' Union striking at 
the O'Okiep Copper Mine in March, ostensibly to protest the 
hiring of additional "coloured'"labour (see Cooper,1979;4). 
Striking miners were fired and then rehired on a selective basis 
(ibid.;8). This led to a solidarity strike being called by the 
MWU. This call was observed by 6 500 miners on 70 mines, mostly 
in the Transvaal (but with the notable exception of the East Rand 
mines) (ibid.;10). This strike soon crumbled (ibid.;10) resulting 
in a major setback for the MWU in that it showed the extremely 
weak position in which white labour found itself. White 
separatist unionism-had in this case proved powerless when forced 




Workplace Activism and Community Organizations. 
significant instance of industrial conflict 
of strikes that followed the Botha incident ~t 




Thomazile Botha, a PEBCO leader, a series of disputes followed in 
reaction to an allegedly racist foreman. Indications are that 
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PEBCO used these incidents to mobilize workers at Ford 
(Maree,1980;13). The FOSATU-affiliated United Auto Workers (UAW) 
made a series of errors of judgement during these disputes, most 
notably when a UAW leader offered to translate statements by 
management 
conceded 
(ibid.; 14) . 
leadership 
Reluctant to challenge PEBCO, 





organization(ibid.;19). Maree argues that the UAW made the 
fundamental mistake of trying to draw a line between workplace 
struggles and the rising socio-political conflict at a time when 
it was becoming clear that the two were inexorably interwoven 
(ibid.;26). A PEBCO-dominated Ford Workers' Committee was soon 
formed. This body began to negotiate directly with Ford 
management and formed the basis of a new motor workers' union, 
MACWUSA (ibid. ;26) . MACWUSA adopted a more overtly-political 
stance and chose to place more emph~sis on community struggles. 
The Ford strikes should be viewed in the context of broader 
resistance in the community, and represent the direct effect of 
political variables on the nature of strike action. 
Indeed, a significant increase in strike action occurred in the 
Port Elizabeth/Uitenhage district (to seven in all 
[CSIR/NIPR,1983;45-7]). This can be seen as a result of the 
growing strength of working class militancy in this region, 
also reflected in a growing politicization of the community at 
large. 
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Overall Trends in the 1977-9 Period 
Limited reform of state policy became apparent in the gradual 
acceptance of some form of representation for black workers. This 
was to take place through the Wiehahn reforms, after the failure 
of the ineffectual Liaison Committee system. This heralded the 
birth of the current "reform"/Repression policy, where all but 
the basic underlying structures of power are subject to some or 
other form of adjustment. These "reforms" were embarked on in the 
hope of reducing mounting pressure from both domestic quarters 
and abroad, of which strikes only represented one aspect. 
Unemployment appears to have represented a less major deterrent 
to strike action than was the case in the mid 1970s when, in 
several notable instances, fluctuations in the unemployment rate 
resulted in changes in the number of strikes taking place. As 
noted above, it appears evident that many workers had become 
increasingly militant and willing to strike despite fears of 
unemployment. Fear of state repression resulted in unions 
adopting an extremely low profile in many recorded instances of 
industrial conflict. However, behind the scenes, union 
organization continued to strengthen, representing the foundation 
for the challenge of the 1980's. 
The emergence of the reform/repression policy in the sphere of· 
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labour relations demonstrates the role of the state in casting a 
political shadow on almost all aspects of life for the average 
South African. As Webster (1984;96) notes, repression need not be 
inconsistent with reform. Indeed, the former may be necessary for 
the latter to suceed. A~ Bonner (1987;56) notes, the apartheid 
system placed immense pressures on the urban blck workforce to 
improve their material conditions. This would result in large 
numbers of wage strikes, further evidence of the linkage between 
worker struggles and wider society is provided by the need for 
unions to co-operate closely with the community. Where they did 
so, such as during the Fattis and Monis boycott, community action 
strengthened the hand of workers where strike action had failed. 
Where unions did not take note of the political aspirations of 
the community, they were subject to immense pressures that could 
even result in divisions within the unions. A good example of 
this would be the formation of the breakaway union, MACWUSA, 
following the Botha incident at Ford. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE CHALLENGE RENEWED 
1980-4 
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The 1980-4 period was marked by substantial increases in strike 
action countrywide. Probably the most significant development 
during this period was the East Rand strike wave; a "rolling 
strike" of a scale unprecedented since 1973. However, unlike the 
1973 strike wave, this did not represent a spontaneous occurrence 
and should be seen against a backdrop of growing union 
organization and rising working class militancy. Meanwhile, 
important changes were made in existing industrial relations 
legislation, rounding off the 1979 reforms. All these 
developments serve to make this period one of crucial import in 
evaluating the role of industrial conflict within the broader 
socio-political reality. In an editorial written in 1980, the SA 
Labour Bulletin (1980;2) noted that the rising numbers of strikes 
taking place formed only a part of a growing popular challenge to 
the status quo. It was becoming clear that blacks had rejected 
all aspects of the arbitary power the apartheid state exercised 
in their lives (ibid.;2). 
Increasing Strikes and Changing Demands 
During 1980 a total 
(NMC,1986;107)(see 
of 222 strikes occurred according to the DOM 
fig.l). For the same year, the IIR list four 
strikes as occurring (IIR,1980; n.p.). However, the IIR relied ori 
press reports for its information and this would result in only 
the more newsworthy strikes being recorded (please refer to 
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appendix). Conversely, smaller strikes which never made it to the 
press would go unrecorded. A total of 278 workers were 
involved per strike (NMC,1986;87). Thus, not only did the number 
of strikes increase, but also the average size thereof. During 
this year the rate of increase of the CPI now reached 13.B % 
~~A Reserve Bank, 1981;11), a definite rise from the previous 
year, as borne out by figs. 2-3. Black real wages increased in 
this year with definate increases in the mining, manufacturing, 
and construction industries (see fig. 16). Although the struggle 
for better wages could partly explain the rise in strike action, 
the effect of generally rising working class militancy must also 
be considered. Black unemployment increased to 20.9% (Simkins, 
quoted in Bell & Padyachee, 1984;12). This adds credence to the 
thesis that beyond a certain point unemployment will no longer 
discourage strike action (refer to figs.11-12). Major strike 
triggers during 1980 are reflected in fig.8. Ninety-six strikes 
were caused by wages during this year (CSIR/NIPR, 1983;.39-41), a 
substantial .increase over the figure for the previous year. 
Interestingly, the number of strikes sparked off by dismissals 
increased to 33 and, for the first time in several years, 
sympathy strikes(lO in all) took place (ibid.;39-41). These 
provide a further illustration of the general rise · in working 
class militancy. Hiring and firing had been regarded by many 
South African managers as their prerogative. Thus, strikes 
demanding a say in these areas represented a concerted bid to 




took place over the issue of union recognition 
No strikes had occurred over this issue in the 
preceding two years. Twelve strikes were sparked off by the 
pensions issue during this year (ibid.;39-41). This can be seen 
as xhe first response of workers to proposed changes by the 
government in the legislation governing pensions schemes (see 
FOSATU,1982;113)B. 
Stronger Organization, Boycotts, and Police Action 
By 1980 it was clear that the independent unions were playing an 
increasingly important role at the workplace. Unions may have 
one of two possible effects on the number of strikes taking place 
- opening channels of communication and thus reducing the number 
of strikes taking place, or giving workers the ability to mount 
more effective collective action and increasing the incidence 
thereof. Whatever the effect they might have one point became 
increasingly clear -·the growth of the independent unions, as was 
the case with the growth of community organizations, were the 
product of rising working class combativity, a combativity 
furthermore which could no longer be readily broken by state 
repression. 
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A major schools boycott had broken out in the Western Cape 
"coloured" schools. Demands by scholars ranged from calls for a 
reduction in scool fees to an end to an autocratic system of 
control (Molteno,1980;26). The impact of the boycott was 
manifold. On the one hand many dropped out of school never to 
complete their education, but on the other, the boycott increased 
popular awareness of the prevailing socio-political inequality 
(ibid.;11). A further development was the rise of "multi-class" 
local organizations (Hudson,1984;210). Following the formation of 
PEBCO in Port Elizabeth in 1979 many township based community 
organizations were founded (ibid.;210). 
The Meat Boycott 
Once again, in 1980 the weapon of a consumer boycott was used by 
workers fired after resorting to strike action. At Table Bay Cold 
Storage workers had gone on strike following management's refusal 
to recognize a WP General Workers' Union factory committee 
(WPGWU,1980a;78). All striking workers were summarily dismissed· 
(ibid.;79). Meanwhile, disputes had broken out at two other meat 
companies, National Meat Suppliers and Braams, both over the 
issue of union recognition (ibid.;80). These developments led to 
750 Cape Town meat workers striking on an industry-wide basis on 
Monday, 19th May, in a gesture of solidarity and general protest 
(ibid.;81). Returning to work the next day, workers were 




(ibid.;81). At a mass meeting on the 21st 
implement a red meat boycott, a call that 
May, it was resolved to/ 
I 
/ 
was observed by several 
community organizations, as well as many traders and the majority 
of township butchers in Cape Town (ibid.; 81-2). 
The boycott was most successful in the African townships, where 
strong support was received from community organizations 
(WPGWU,1980b;67), demonstrating that many saw the importance of 
linking worker with township struggles. However, the boycott was 
in the end unsuccessful owing to a combination of factors 
confusion over organization (when it seemed the boycott was going 
to be taken up nationally it was suspended in the Western Cape); 
the difficulty in keeping the protest focussed on meat workers 
and not wider social issues; state repression (union leaders were 
detained and striking workers arrested under the pass laws) 
(ibid.;69-71). The dispute was charactorized by a high degree of 
state involvement, arguably owing to concern about the increasing 
ties between factory and community struggles (ibid. ;72). The 
degree of support the boycott received in the township during its 
early stages provides further evidence of the close ties between 
workers and the community at large. Perhaps there is no' little 
merit in March's (1977;56) assertion that both forms of protest, 
strike and boycott, represented attempts by disenfranchised 
groupings to gain effective representation at all levels of 
government and society. 
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Major Strikes in Durban and Uitenhage 
This dispute was ·followed by one at FRAME in Durban, call~d by 
/ 
the NUTW (National Union of Textile Workers). Mawbey (1980;4) 
argues that Frame workers faced an extremely repressive work 
environment, with low wages, constant pressure to increase 
productivity, and arbitary disciplinary action by management, 
including repressive measures against worker organization There 
were indications of continued dissatisfaction by workers 
stretching back many years and culminating in the brief strike of 
1979 (ibid.;5). In May 1980 a few larger strike broke out over 
the wage issue. It is interesting to note that the independent 
union which had established a presence at Frame, the NUTW rather 
lagged behind its grass roots membership, in the degree of 
militancy manifest (see Mawbey, 1980; 4-5). Th_e strike began at the 
Co~solidated Frame Cotton Corporation. Workers from this plant 
then went to other factories to mobilize workers there (ibid.;7). 
This led to a series of confrontations with police, and groups of 
workers stopping busses bound for the industrial areas in order 
to prevent strike breakers from journeying to work (ibid.;11). 
This was followed by a series of demonstrations, culminating in 
severe "unrest" in the neighbouring township of Cleremont. A 
conservative reaction then occurred (allegedly aided and incited 
by police) with groups of armed strike breakers attacking 
striking workers (ibid.;14). All further meetings by strikers 
were banned and the announcement of a limited wage increase 
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resulted in a limited return to work (ibid.;15). However, frame 
refused to re-employ 123 strikers identified as 
"troublemakers"(ibid.). Even if the basic demands expressed by 
Frame strikers were non-political, the hard line response by the 
state cast a political shadow over the dispute. 
A major strike took place at Volkswagen in Uitenhage, involving 3 
500 "coloured" and black workers (Friedman,1987;210). Once again, 
police intervention led to widespread unrest in the townships. 
This strike may have had a concertina effect, encouraging workers 
to resort to strike action elsewhere in the district. This would 
help to explain why instances of strike action in the Port 
Elizabeth/Uitenhage district increased substantially, with 34 
being recorded in all (CSIR/NIPR,1983;37). It is important to 
view this regional increase in strike action against a growing 
politicization, reflected by the rise of PEBCO during this 
period. While the FOSATU unions had no formal ties with PEBCO, 
and tended to favour concentrating on workplace issues, they did 
have good ties with the Uitenhage Black Civic Organization, and 
it was becoming clear that increased militancy in the townships 
would have effects on the degree of militancy manifesting itself 
at the workplace and vice-versa. Indeed, it seemed that political 
factors may not only serve as a trigger(direct or indirect) of 
industrial disputes, but that police interference in non-
political disputes may cause a greater politicization of the 
community at large. 
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The Rise of SAAWU 
Several strikes took place in the East London district over 
recognition of SAAWU liaison committees. SAAWU had experienced 
substantial growth in the 1979-80 period. In 1980 its membership 
topped 15 000 workers (Maree,1982;34). However, these gains and 
its overtly-political stance attracted the wrath of three 
groupings the more conservative employers, the SAP and the 
Ciskeian Police (most of East London's townships are located in 
the Ciskei). The hardest line of all was adopted by the latter, 
with Charles Sebe (then head of the Ciskeian Central Intellegence 
Services) claiming that "unions were redundant in the Ciskei, as 
the Ciskeian government looked into the problems of each 
worker" (quoted in Maree,1982;35). Meanwhile, the SAP tried to 
persuade employers to "present a united front" and to "hold out 
against SAAWU" (ibid.; 35). Chloride (known for it's enlightened 
industrial relations policies) broke ranks and recognized SAAWU. 
However / SAAWU continued to face the onslaught · by both South 
· African and Ciskeian police, severely damaging organization. 
This did not reduce industrial conflict, and 28 strikes took 
place in this region during 1980 (CSIR/NIPR,1983;37), an increase 
from the previous year (see figs.7&8). Thus, it appears evident 








Although, acco'rding to official. sources, only L 5% of s·t:tikes in 
1980 ended .in the dismissal of strikers (CSIR/NIPR;l983; 37), 
these strikes were often among the largest (e~g. t·he~Durban Frame 
. strike). Unions. still only enjoyed limited legal protection and_ 
. were thus most ~u'inera.'ble to arbitary actions by rnanangement·, 
can be seen by SAAWU's subsequent decline. 
as 
The.Johannesburg Municipal Workers Strike 
A further major instance of industrial conflict was to take place 
in Johannesburg. The Johannesburg muncipality had aided the 
formation of an in-house ·union,· the Un'ion of Johannesburg 
Municipal Workers (Keenan,1981;5). In reaction to this, the 
independent.Black Municipal Workers union (BMWU) was fouhded. The 
• ' ' I • 
municipality refused to negotiate with the new union and this led. 
to a strike at Orlando Power·,station (ibid.; 28). The striking 
workers were then fired and ,;locked· out ti of the compound, with . a 
heavy police presence in the. background (ibid.;29). This led to 
almost r() 000 municipal .wdrkers in Johanm:fsburg coming out -On 
strike in sympathy with the power statj,.on ·workers·' 
demands(ibid.;4). However, the strike was soon broken by' police 
action. Workers were refused·access to.the compounds and many 
were questioned individually by·· ·police, ·.while many· were 
subsequently bussed back to thebantustaris (ibid.;44). The result 





the politically powerful Afrikaans pensions industry, the state 
was forced to first modify and then scrap the proposed scheme 
(FOSATU,1982;113). Although it was clear that the state would 
not have so readily given way on a more political issue, the 
scrapping of the proposed changes demonstrated the growing power 
of the independent unions and collective worker action. 
Friedman(l987;263) points out that it demonstrated that black 
workers had the power to halt the passage of legislation. As 
such, it represented a significant shift in political power from 
white to black South Africans (ibid.;263), adding credence to 
Rex's (1981;36) assertion that protracted industrial conflict 
will lead to a relocation of the basic centres of power. 
The Rising Tide of Unionization 
Approximately 6.2% of strikes ended in the dismissal of striking 
workers (CSIR/NIPR,1983;37). This represented a increase over the 
figure for the preceding year. It seems that many employers, 
particularly in the Eastern Cape, were seeking to reverse the 
growing tide of worker militancy. 
Unemployment increased slightly to 21% (Simkins, quoted in Bell & 
Padyachee,1984;12). This slight rise seems only to have had the 
effect of encouraging workers to resort to strike action for 
reasons outlined in previous chapters (see figs. 10 & 11). When 
compared to the percentage of workers unionized in Europe, the 
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number of trade unionists in South Africa remained small, and 
there were always significant numbers of unemployed ready to take 
the place of hired strikers. Still vulnerable to state 
repression, detentions of union activists were to prove extremely 
damaging to union organization. This was particularly so in the 
Border region where detentions of SAAWU leaders severely weakened 
that union. 
The Registration Debate 
As noted earlier, the Wiehahn Report resulted in the introduction 
of new legislation, which implemnted most of the recommendations, 
and allowed black trade unions access to statutory collective 
bargaining structures. The legislation resulted in an intense 
debate within trade union circles. CUSA and TUCSA welcomed the 
reforms without serious reservations (Fine et al,1981;40). In 
contrast, FOSATU adopted a more sophisticated stance. FOSATU 
argued that although the legislation incorporated repressive 
provisions, it also embodied genuine' reforms, which had been 
forced on the state through workers' struggles (ibid.;41). Thus, 
registration in terms of the act and participation in the 
established bargaining structures could be used as a means of 
furthering the long term aims of the independent unions 
(ibid.;41). Others (such as the Western Cape Unions) argued that 
the independent unions should have nothing to do with the system. 
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For example, the GWU argued that the fundamental principle of the 
unions should be that of worker control (GWU,1981;18). As 
registration entailed surrendering some of this control to the 
state, it should be rejected out of hand (ibid.;18). 
Webster (1987;217) points out that the long term effect of the 
reforms was fundamentally contradictory. In the years following 
their implemenation, the unions were to make increasing use of 
the established structures. Cases heard by the Industrial Court 
increased from a modest 20 at its inception to 2042 in 1986 
(ibid. ;216). Management was to lose many of its former 
prerogatives, including the power to dismiss workers unilaterally 
(ibid.;216). In. addition to the disputes resolved through the 
established bargaining structures, increasing numbers of disputes 
in the 1980s were resolved by informal mediation, by bodies such 
as the Independent Mediation Service of South Africa (IMSSA). 
Despite this rise in negotia~ion and mediation, industrial 
conflict, be it in the form of conventional strikes or stayaways 
also rapidly increased in the 1980's. Webster suggests that this 
is most probably due to the fact that the state, while succeeding 
in drawing many unions into the official structures, has 
manifestly failed to incorporate them politically (1987;217). In 
the political arena blacks are still totally excluded, directly 
affecting the nature of conflict at the workplace (ibid.;217). 
The state continued to reject calls for universal franchise, 
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instead mainta~ning its commitment to racially segregated 
structures of government and to white domination (ibid.;217). 
While Wiehahn foresaw the need for political rights (ibid.;217), 
significant changes were confined to the sphere of directly 
factory related issues, with little attempt to redress wider 
inequalities. This ultimately led to the 1984 insurrection and 
the unions adopting an increasingly political stance (see 
Webster,1987;217). Already by 1980 "rank and file workers on the 
the East Rand took the initiative" following rising political 
pressures and "formed shop steward councils in an attempt to 
respond to township problems" (Lambert,1987;237). The successful 
use of the Industrial Court in its arbitration of a growing 
number of disputes and yet its failure to prevent the unions from 
becoming more politically active (and thus not be co-opted into 
the system) will be more fully assesed in subsequent sections. 
The East Rand Strike Wave 
A major strike at Colgate-Palmolive had ended in a call by CWIU 
for a general boycott of Colgate products. The strike followed a 
persistant struggle waged by CWIU for recognition (CWIU,1981;18). 
Despite its enlightened image, Colgate adopted a "hard line" 
approach and attempted to hold out against any recognition 
(ibid.;18). The boycott call received widespread community 
support and ended with management giving way. Friedman (1987;250) 
argues that the successful conclusion of the Colgate-Palmolive 
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dispute gave workers in the East Rand a greater degree of 
confidence in collective action. This was to result in the strike 
at Salcast, Benoni. From there, strikes spread right across the 
East Rand,affecting mostly the metal industry. Between July and 
November over 25 000 workers resorted to strike action in this 
region (Baskin,1982;21), the largest approximation of a mass 
strike since 1973. However, the East Rand strikes differed from 
the Durban strikes in that the former did not occur\ 
spontaneously. Unlike the Durban strikes,the East Rand strikes , 
involved mostly unionized workers. Rapid unionization had 
.occurred in the metal industry, simultaneous to a 
political consciousness amongst blacks. However, 
rising 
despite 
differences, both strike waves were symptomatic of a wider 
miiitancy. Baskin (1982;24) argues that 1981 "was a year of 
heightened militancy"- this led to the rise of "a progressive 
political' ideology complementing the growth of the independent 
unions. Perhaps there is merit in Lenin's assertion that the 
revolutionary potential of strike action (although only feasible 
if occurring in combination with unprecedented broader 
resistance) should not be overlooked, and indeed that such action 
represents the "dress rehearsal for the big one" (quoted in 
Knowles,1952;7). 
Roughly half the East Rand stoppages involved MAWU, with other 
FOSATU affiliates, CCAWUSA, African Food and Canning Workers, and 
CUSA affiliates being involved in the remainder (Baskin, 
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1982;21). Sitas (1983;452) argues that MAWU "had a powerful 
stratum of grass-roots level leadership", leading to it becoming 
"wittingly or unwittingly, a social movement with unfathomable 
implications. This would result in the union being directly 
affected by an rise in combativity in the townships. Baskin 
(1982;22) notes that a major factor behind the strike wave was 
the continued pressure of inflation resulting in massive 
increases in the costs of basic foodstuffs (e.g. the bread price 
rose by 30-40% in August). In addition a political complexion was· 
cast on the origins of the strikes in that the East Rand 
Administration Board had begun to step up action against 
"illegals" in the period leading up to the strikes'. As -Baskin 
(.1982;22) notes, the East Rand Administration Board had cut down 
on the number of jobs available to contract workers, resulting 
in migrants adopting a very militant stance during the strike 
wave. 
Baskin (1982;25) argues that a further cause was the growing 
r.eluctance of workers to let racist insults (or other, racist 
actions) at the workplace pass them by. This was the result of 
I 
the intrusion of a rising political awareness in the community to 
the shop floor (ibid.;25) providing further proof of the growing 
links between worker struggles and the wider political reality. 
Most strikes in the East Rand in 1981 were .of comparatively short 
duration (Webster,1985;245), with the basic demands expressed by 
workers being for increased wages and union recognition. The 
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demands for pay increases were strongly resisted by SEIFSA (the 
employer association in the metal industry). In early 1982 a 
series of longer strikes took place(ibid.;245). During April 1982 
a "trial of strength" took place at Scaw Metals 
(Webster,1985;245). Management adopted a very hard line and all 
striking workers 
(ibid.;246). The 
were dismissed and then selectively rehired 
strike was effectively broken when police 
forcibly prevented dismissed workers from re-entering the company 
compound (ibid.;246). This defeat was followed by a series of 
other setbacks at plants such as Transvaal Malleable Foundries 
and National Springs (ibid.;246). 
Swilling (1983;159) argues that one of the major reasons for the 
1981 strike wave spreading was the "multiplier effect" that 
workers in specific companies were encouraged by the successful 
example of other workers to.resort to collective action. Trade 
unions often only became involved in disputes after they had 
begun, but then used the strike wave as an opportunity to 
establish strong organizational presences (ibid.;142). The 
conflict in the East Rand foundries resulted in increased working 
class leadership skills being developed. This was then reflected 
in the important role that worker participation played in 
community struggles (ibid.;159). Swilling's research thus 
provides further evidence of the linkage between struggles on 
the shop floor and the wider political conflict. 
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The Eastern Cape Community Unions: Struggles and Repression 
Meanwhile, in the Eastern Cape MACWUSA had reached the 
its support in May 1981. A sympathy strike was called 
peak of 
by that 
union at Ford, in solidarity with striking Firestone workers. 
Unionists claimed that the Firestone strike was a ·"community 
strike", deserving the support of all members thereof 
(Friedman,1987;253). MACWUSA, like SAAWU continued to argue that 
a strong 
(generally 
linkage existed .between workplace and 
political) issues. Thus, they argued that 
community 
grievances 
in the community should be taken up by workers and vice versa. 
Consequently strong ties should exist between trade unions and 
political organizations. The Firestone strike was resolved when 
that company agreed to a reinstatement package. However, a week 
later MACWUSA's organization received a severe.blow when a number 
of its key officials were detained. 
In the East London district SAAWU had made rapid gains despite 
state repression. By 1981, at least 10 companies had given SAAWU 
at least de ~acto recognition (Maree,1982;37). However, as 
Ciskeian "independence" neared, the Sebe brothers spearheaded a 




was a Communist Party front(ibid.;39). Ciskeian 
played a prominent role in the Wilson Rowntree 




been rebuffed. Three workers were dismissed in February 1981 over 
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a dispute with a foreman (Morris,1982;26). This led to a 
solidarity strike by 502 workers (ibid.;26). However, the 
strikers only represented one third of the workforce (ibid.;26). 
They were consequently in an extremely vulnerable position and 
were soon dismissed. This led to a consumer boycott, that was 
ultimately unsuccessful. Ciskeian police played a prominent role 
in attempting to screen those workers which were re-employed 
(Maree,1982;39). 
This was only the start of a major attack by the Ciskeian 
authorities on SAAWU. According to an interview with its 
president, S Njikelana, SA,.AWU saw itself as "part and parcel of 
the community" (WIP,1983;38) and thus became a target of the Sebe 
brothers paranoia of any form of resistance. The mother of a 
SAAWU leader, Mrs. Gqweta, died when her house was mysteriously 
set alight (Maree,1982;39). At her funeral police opened fire on 
mourners (ibid.;39). SAAWU attracted further state repression 
following its role in the Mdantsane bus boycott. The failure of 
the Wilson Rowntree boycott, state repression and a number of 
other setbacks resulted, according to Bonner(l983;27) "in the 
erosion of much of its support." Indeed, in the period following 
Ciskeian independence, SAAWU never recovered its former strength 
and will probably eventually merge with industrial unions, 
following COSATU's policy of "one industry, one union". 
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Nonetheless, once again state action failed to curb underlying 
working class militancy. Major increases took place in strike 
action in the Eastern Cape to 30 in East London and 71 in Port 
Elizabeth (NMC,1986;101) - as can be seen on fig.10. Despite 
possible state action, workers appeared increasingly willing to 
employ the strike weapon. It seems evident that the incidence of 
strike action could not be reduced through repression and the 
closing of other avenues of protest could well have served to 
. ( •t increase 1 • 
Neil Aggett's Death and the Conseguent Stayaway 
The death of trade unionist Neil Aggett in detention on the 5th 
February 1982 was to have far reaching repercussions for union 
organization in South Africa. In late 1981, a number of trade 
unionists on the Rand had been detained. Indeed, the police (both 
riot and security) had played a conspicuous role in the East Rand 
strikes of 1981. As Bonner (1983;5) notes, there was no evidence 
that Aggett had been involved in any illegal political work. All 
Aggett had done was to work for a democratic and worker 
controlled trade union movement (ibid.;5). The fact that he was 
detained, and subsequently died in detention, provides further 
evidence of the definite political colour the state was 
responsible for casting on the most normal aspects of industrial 
relations. Two days after his death, the Food and Canning Workers 
unions called a half hour stoppage for Thursday the 11th Febuary 
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in commemoration of his death. This call was supported by the 
FOSATU and Western Cape unions. This stoppage was particularly 
well-observed in the Western Cape. Approximately 12 400 workers 
observed the stoppage at FCWU plants (SALB, 1982;7). Only 
one of the employers approached beforehand refused to agree to 
the stoppage taking place, and another employer joined workers at 
the commemoration service (ibid.;6). In the Eastern Cape 25 000 
workers observed the stoppage after a successful demonstration; 
6500 in the East London district and 30 000 in the PWV region 
(ibid.;9-16). The action appeared to have been directly aimed 
against the state. Indeed, workers made it clear that they 
perceived the state "had gone too far" and that they were not 
taking action a9ainst employers (ibid.;6). Although this only 
represented a small fraction of the total workforce, it 
demonstrated the growing power of the independent unions. The 
joint action provided further impetus towards moves for union 
~nity, and, indeed, demonstrated the potential for unified strike 
action. Meanwhile, the fact that the FOSATU unions were most 
successful in getting workers to observe the stayaway (see 
SALB,1982 ;7-16) showed that there was no substitute for strong' 
workplace organization. However, it also demonstrated the import 
of grassroots militancy, adding credence to Luxembourg's comments 
in this regard, who sees worker militancy as being all-important 
(see Luxembourg,1971;225). 




played a conspicuous role. However, despite · the occasional 
tensions between political organizations and unions, the 
increased politicization in the townships had gradually forced 
the unions to adopt a more political stance. At the 1982 FOSATU 
congress, Joe Foster argued that "FOSATU should be involved in 
community issues, but maintain its worker identity" 
(SALB,1982a;89). However, Foster opposed the forming of direct 
alliances with political organizations(ibid.;89). The predominant 
sentiments expressed seemed more in favour of the unions becoming 
an independent political actor. It was only when COSATU was 
formed did many of the former FOSATU unions seek to identify 
themselves with broader "Charterist" political movement. 
Overall Characteristics of Strike Action in 1982 
All in all, 394 strikes took place in 1982 (NMC,1986;99), as is 
reflected in fig.1. Of these, 207 took place in the PWV/Southern 
Transvaal region (NMC,1986; lOl)(see fig.10). This can be seen as 
a reflection of the continued restiveness in the East Rand metal 
industry. In comparison to the previous year, employers adopted a 
far harder line towards striking workers. In £act a· massive 27.5% 
of strikes countrywide ended in the dismissal of strikers 
(CSIR/NIPR,1983;37). Prominent in this regard was the dismissal 
of strikers at Scaw Metals (East Rand), which badly damaged 
MAWU's organization at that plant. During this year, a new 
economic recession began, resulting in massive retrenchments in 
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the metal industry.. Whilst this led to further instances of 
strike action (Cooper,1982;7), it became increasingly clear that 
workers should temporarily seek to consolidate their gains, 
instead of embarking on further action immediately. 
Despite the mounting recession, the rate of increase of the CPI 
slowed, and now stood at approximately 13.9 % (SA 
Reserve Bank,1983;11). This does not seem to have had any effect 
in discouraging workers from striking, as is clear from figs.5 & 
6. Real wages for blacks increased in most sectors of industry 
(NMC,1986;99) - see fig 16. The major causes of strikes during 
1982 are depicted in fig.8. The major cause of strikes was once 
again wages, causing 186 strikes in all (NMC,1986; 101). Sixty 
strikes were caused by disciplinary factors(ibid.;101), and can 
be seen as a reflection of the reaction of workers to the East 
Rand retrenchments. There were far fewer recognition strikes 
during this year, with only 21 occurring in all (ibid.;101). It 
seems that after gaining recognition in a number of key plants 
during 1981, unions now shifted their demands to their area, such 
the increasingly common demand for a living wage. Whilst ·fewer 
sympathy strikes took place in 1982, their continued 
manifestation is indicative of rising working class solidarity. 
The Aggett memorial stoppage provides further evidence, as does 
the substantial increase in the number of workers involved per 
strike. An average of 192 workers participated in the average 
strike in 1982 (NMC,1986; 100). 
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Clearly, by 1983, organized labour in South Africa had made 
significant gains. Union membership had experienced rapid growth, 
but mostly not at the expense of effective organization. From 
1979-1983 the signed-up membership of the independent unions had 
increased from 70 000 to almost 300 000 (Maree,1987;7). An even 
more dramatic indicator of the unions' growth was the number of 
recognition agreements signed over the same time period - from a 
modest 5 to over 406 (ibid.;7). Meanwhile, important changes had -
been made in legislation governing industrial relations. However, 
the number of unionized workers expressed as a percentage of the 
overall workforce remained small. 
An Impending Political Storm 
Meanwhile, there were indications of an impending political 
storm. The East Rand strike wave and the Eastern Cape disputes 




dissatisfaction seemed to transcend workplace issues and 
unions faced growing internal problems when they failed to 
cognizance of this fact. This was particularly so in the 
highly-charged political climate of the Eastern Cape. The Eastern 
Cape - based NAAWU had already split, resulting in the formation 
of the breakaway MACWUSA, which enjoyed close ties to political 
organizations. Clearly, it would prove increasingly difficult to 
separate rising political tensions from dissatisfaction at the 
workplace, and most especially the ultimate expression of the 
\ 
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latter, the withdrawal of the worker from the labour process, 
from the former. Swilling (1988;8) argues that the government's 
"total strategy" of reforms in a wide range of areas from labour 
to local government was met by unprecedented resistance from 
workers and unions. In the end the state could only re-establish 
its authority through a fresh wave of repression. 
As Karis (1983-4;393) notes, the six years since the 1977 
crackdown had been marked not only by the rise of the independent 
unions, but also of popular political organizations. The parallel 
rise of these two expressions of working class militancy would 
pose the state with an unprecedented challenge. However, as 
events of subsequent years were to show, they both remained 
extremely vulnerable to repressive action by employers or the 
state. As Webster (1983;22) notes, strikes still tended to be 
fairly short lived single-factory affairs. Unions remained in a 
fairly weak position, exacerbated by rising unemployment. They 
tended to avoid protracted trials of strength for fear of 
jeopardizing newly-won gains. 
The Changing Nature of Industrial Conflict: Legal Strikes 
Despite this, a number of important instances of collective 
action took place in 1983. In June of that year, an overtime ban 
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at Natal Threads organized by the National Union of Textile 
Workers (NUTW), represented one of the first legal instances of 
collective action . since the Wiehahn reforms. When the reforms 
were first announced, there appeared to be but little benefit 
accruing to legal strike. action. Workers could still be fired for 
striking legally, whilst the complex procedure to be followed 
before striking could result in the reasons for the dispute being 
forgotten by the average worker. However, as Friedman (1987; 332-
3) notes, it was becoming increasingly clear that there were some 
advantages from striking legally. Some employers,such as Carlton 
on the East Rand and Natal Thread, had promised that they would 
not employ the tactic of selective dismissals if workers struck 
legally (ibid.;332-3). As it would prove most costly to recruit 
and train an entire new workforce, this represented a significant· 
saving for management. Increasingly, many employers believed that 
workers should receive some reward for employing legal or 
negotiated channels when striking, in the form of restrained 
action against strikers. Although this viewpoint was not general, 
and illegal strikers could still (and often did) strike without 
the entire workforce necessarily being dismissed, it did 
represent the start of a gradual shift in opinion. In addition, 
not only did the police appear reluctant to intervene in legal 
disputes in urban areas, but also the strike ballot (part of the 
process to be followed when embarking on legal strike action) 
proved to be a·useful mechanism in rallying workers to the union 
cause (ibid.;332-3). 
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The Industrial Court and IMSSA 
Towards the end of this period; increasing use was made of the 
Industrial Court (see fig .. 15) . A landmark decision had been made 
at the Fodens case (1983), where the court found that employers 
were obliged to engage in collective bargaining in good faith 
with the trade union which represented the majority of employees 
(Thompson,1989;620q). T~us, it was not only the increased use of 
the court, but also the content of decisions made that was 
important. -
Although the Industrial Councils remained the major route to the 
Industrial Court and thus a potentially attractive negotiating 
forum (with unions such as MAWU participating therein), a 
significant development was the establishment of the Independent 
Mediation Service of South Africa (IMSSA). Initially services 
offered included mediation (being defined as where a mediator is 
appointed with the aim of resolving a dispute that had 
deadlocked), but this was later extended to include arbitration 
(where both parties agree to accept the verdict of a impartial 
judge of their choosing) (IMSSA,NDb;n.p.). From May 1983 to June 
1984 IMSSA mediated in 25 disputes (IMSSA,1984;n.p.). From ·July 
to October 1984 IMSSA mediated in a further 25 (IMSSA,1985a;n.p.) 
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'The Continued Importance of Wage Demands 
All in all, 336 strikes were to take place in 1983 (NMC,1986). Of 
these 112 were triggered by wage demands (NMC,1986;101). Although 
wages as a demand may appear strictly economistic, as noted 
earlier, they may well represent the articulation of a wide range 
of grievances. In addition, in a time .of recession, demands for 
significant increases in pay are those demands employers would 
find hardest to meet. Thus, in such circumstances, workers would 
only ·resort to wage strikes if they felt they had the 
organizational ability to sustain a protracted dispute. Real 
wages for blacks had only increased very modestly during 1983 
(see fig. 16), partially accounting for the continued importance 
of wage strikes 
Strikes in Natal 
Nine strikes occurred in the Pietermaritzburg· region of Natal 
(NMC,1986; 101) (see fig.10).It ~s interesting to note that 
instances of collective action continued to occur in the latter 
region and in Durban { where a massive 60 strikes took place 
{NMC,1986;101}), despite the growing estrangement between 
Buthelezi and the independent unions. Whilst clearly many workers 
remained members of Inkhata, it appeared that by resorting to 
frequent collective action,their primary loyalty in the workplace 
was to the independent unions. Even as early as 1975 a survey of 
black workers in the Durban region had indicated that only a tiny 
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percentage (1%) of those interviewed saw increased ties with the 
KwaZulu government as of any importance (Webster,1979;24). This 
would have severe consequences in weakening Buthelezi's apparent 
dominance of black politics in rural and peri-urban Natal. 
Shorter and Smaller Strikes 
An average of 192 workers were involved in the average strike in 
1983 (NMC, 1986; 99-100). Following the hard line followed by 
many employers in 1982, a cautious approach seemed in order. 
Unemployment continued to . rise, but, as noted in previous 
chapters, increases in unemployment seem no longer to have served 
to discourage workers from striking. The continued rise in 
strike action and unemployment during the mid-to-late 





back up this assertion. Inflation increased 
of increase of the CPI now was 11 % {SA Reserve 
~ank,1985;9},as reflected in figs. 2,5 & 6). However, this can 
only be seen as a further contributor to a basic rise in strike 
action as a response to wider socio-political forces. 
Advances in Worker Organization on the Mines 
Meanwhile, major advances were being made in worker organization 
on the mines. The Chamber of Mines had reviewed its opposition to 
the recognition of black trade unions (Duff,1983;9). CUSA had 
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formed a National Union of Mineworkers (the NUM), which was soon 
recognized by the Chamber. As Duff (1983;9) notes, CUSA unions 
generally exhibited a lower propensity to strike than many of the 
other independent unions. It seems that the Chamber seriously 
underestimated the NUM, which it hoped would not prove overly 
militant (Duff,1983~9), but turned out to be a strong opponent. 
Throughout the 1970's there were indications of an underlying 
mil~tancy amongst miners, manifest in actions such as spontaneous 
strikes, "faction fights", and seemingly irrational destruction 
of property (see Chapter 3). Thus, although isolated from 
political developments in the townships, the potential existed 
for the mines to become a major site of resistance. 
Formation of the UDF and National Forum 
The general increase in the number of unionized workers in 1983 
was to be overshadowed by broader events. In 1983 the government 
introduced the Black Local Authorities Act. It was hoped that the 
resultant community councils established would not only relieve 
the growing political dissatisfaction within the townships, but 
also prove self-financing through increased rents and levies (see 
Grest & Hughes,1984;51-3). However, the resultant system lacked 
any vestige of legitimacy and town councillors soon became 
ostracized by the community (ibid.;53). The need for the 
established town councils to raise rents led to widespread 
resistance (ibid.;54). This resistance ranged from death threats 
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to court action and was compounded by the insensitivity on the 
side of some of the local councils. In addition to the Black 
Local Authorities Act, further legislation included the Orderly 
Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill and the Black 
Community Development Bill, all the above legislation soon becoming 
known as the "Koornhof Bills" (Barrell,1984;18). The "Settlement 
Bill" basically represented a shift in official thinking that 
would allow recognition for "permanent" urban blacks, but in 
effect restricted further blacks from gaining such status. 
In response to the Local Authorities 
Act and the 1983 Constitutional proposals, both the United, 
Democratic Front (UDF) and National Forum(NF) were formed 
(Barrell,1984;6). These political developments placed growing 
pressure on the independent unions to assume a more political 
stance. The UDF represented a broad coalition of a range of 
organizations, ranging from youth clubs to civic associations 
(ibid.;6). The Front attacked both the Koornhof Bills and the 
1983 Constitution "as an attempt to modernise apartheid" 
(ibid.;6).Some unions such as SAAWU and the Media Workers' 
Association of South Africa affiliated, whilst others, such the 
GWU did not, arguing the need for independent worker organization 
(ibid.;14-5). Interestingly, the affiliation debate did not so 
much revolve around the necessity for adopting a political 
stance, but rather the need to ensure working class 
representation (ibid.;14-5). The launch of the UDF led to the 
formation of the AZAPO-sponsored National Forum, dedicated to 
Black Consciousness(ibid.;10). The AZAPO had rejected the UDF ·on 
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the grounds that it encouraged "ethnic fragmentation"(ibid.;10). 
In the sphere of industrial relations, the new wave of political 
activism was to result in the stayaways of 1984. 
Revolt in the Townships 
Despite problems revolving around state repression and logistical 
limitations, the UDF successfully mounted a number of campaigns. 
These ranged from a "people's weekend", with protest rallies to 
successful boycotts of local Community Council elections 
(Barrell,1984;14). By December, the UDF (via its affiliates) had 
a membership of L 5 million people (ibid.; 17). The growing 
resistance in the townships presented the unions with a fresh 
challenge - they had a choice of confining their activities to 
independent organization (and risking becoming irrelevant in the 
eyes of their constituency) or openly embark on joint action with 
the UDF (and risk a fresh wave of state repression). In the end, 
the strategy adopted by most of the independent unions was to 
support stayaway action, whilst continuing to represent workers 
on day-to-day issues on the shop floor. On the national level, 
the unions busied themselves with the formation of a new union 
federation (Barrell,1984;14). 
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The 1984 Stayaways 
The first of these stayaways took place on September the 3rd. 
This was a one day stayaway to protest against rent increases. It 
was called by student, political, and civic organizations in the 
Vaal Triangle townships. This stayaway ended in repressive police 
action, and an equally violent reaction by the community 
(LMG,1985a; 75). The police seem to have acted in a particularly 
heavy-handed manner, which led to an increase in violence and 
resistance, not only on the Vaal Triangle, but subsequently also 
the East Rand (ibid.;75). Two weeks later the Release Mandela 
Committee called a stayaway in Soweto in solidarity with the Vaal 
townships. Once again, the stayaway ended in "unrest" (ibid.). 
One month later, a highly successful stayaway took place in 
Springs. This stayaway was well organized, with FOSATU members 
giving their assistance(ibid.). It demonstrated that if trade 
unions participated in stayaways, a far greater degree of success 
would be achieved. The Labour Monitoring Group (1985; 79) 
suggested. that the growing su.ccess of stayaways could be 
ascribed to a resurgence of working class militancy in the 1980s. 
A far larger stayaway was then called by COSAS to take place on 
the 5-6th November in the Transvaal. This stayaway enjoyed 
widespread support by worker organisations, owing to the 
deepening ties between them and community organisations 
(LMG,1985a;79-84). Demands expressed reflected· both workplace and 
community concerns, calling for a reinstatement of fired striking 
workers at Simba Quix, reforms in the education system; no 
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further increases in bus fares or municipal charges, as well 
as an end to detention without trial and a withdrawal of troops 
from the townships (LMG,1985a;84). This stayaway was 70% 
successful in 80% of unionized plants (LMG,1985a;85). There was 
80% overall participation in the Vaal and far East Rand, with 60% 
of the near East Rand and 91% of the Kempton Park/Isando also 
showing 80%+ participation(LMG,198Sa;85). It has been argued 
(see LMG,1985a;85) that the success of the stayaway could be 
ascribed to close co-operation for the first time between the 
unions and political organizations, with democratic structures 
within the unions enabling unified action despite pressure from 
the state. The state's response to the stayaway was the usual 
one- further detentions of CUSA and FOSATU members. SASOL workers 
who had supported the stayaway were dismissed. Although on the 
day after the stayaway they had attempted to return to work, they 
were turned back by the police and army, with substitute labour 
being employed (Ntaopane, 1985;36). The fact that SASOL workers 
observed the stayaway call despite the prior warnings of 
management provides further evidence of the reduced effect 
unemployment had as a deterrent against resorting to collective 
action at the workplace,and showed the rise in political 
conciousness and militancy amongst workers. Union activists 
I 
believed the stayaway was but an excuse to get rid of the 
independent union (the CWIU), which had been organizing at that 
plant(ibid.;36). Once again, the links between workplace and 
township struggles were clearly shown after a protracted nation-
wide campaign and threats of co-ordinated action by a range of 
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unions, SASOL agreed to reinstate 70% of the dismissed workers 
(Hudson,1987;217). 
Further Legal Strikes and Consumer Boycotts 
In January 1984, the new tactic of resorting to legal strike 
action manifested itself when CUSA's S A Chemical Workers Union 
took part in a nationwide legal strike at AECI. This strike 
involved over 8 500 workers (Friedman,1987; 334). However, legal 
strikers still enjoyed no legal protection. The striking chemical 
workers were fired, resulting in a significant setback for union 
organization. Few unions in 1984 had the capacity to mount 
protracted "trials of strength." A notable exception was the 1984 
Dunlop strike. This strike was caused by workers being fired for 
"unlawful industrial action", being stoppages as a result of 
disputes over pay and overtime (Sitas,1987;101). A secret ballot 
was held for a legal strike, but shortly thereafter the workers 
were fired (ibid.;102). The strike soon spread to all but 
Dunlop's Eastern Province plants (ibid.;102). The strike lasted 
four weeks until management agreed to reinstate unconditionally 
all dismissed workers (ibid.;100). The strike was significant not 
only for it's "trial of strength nature", but also the fact that 
it took place country-wide, demonstrating a certain degree of 
working class solidarity that had never been manifested hitherto. 
180 
\ 
During 1984, two further consumer boycotts took place - at Simba Quix 
and Dairy Maid. Both these boycotts were the result of hard line 
(CUSA,1985;68-72~ 
responses by management to strikes/ The success of these 
boycotts demonstrated the potential of this form of protest 
(especially where goods for which there are ready substitutes are 
concerned), and the high degree of working class militancy 
manifested during this period(ibid.68-72). 
The 1984 Miner's Strikes 
By June 1984, the growing dispute between the Chamber of Mines 
and workers over pay levels, led to a series of short strikes 
taking place on both the gold and coal fields (WIP,1984b;38). 
Most notable were the strikes at Coronation Colliery and 
Goedehoop mine. The former involved 1 700 workers, and was met by 
a violent response by white miners, mine officials, and police 
(WIP,1984b;38). The latter dispute was resolved after a day-long 
stoppage through further negotiation. In September the NUM called 
a legal strike, following the breakdown of talks with the Chamber 
of Mines. This was the first legal strike by black miners. It 
has been argued that the dispute served to highlight the 
contradictions inherent in the system (Van Niekerk,1984;11). 
Although legal, the strike was met with a heavy handed response 
by the state. The worst violence centered around JCI's Waterpan 
Mine, where 8 workers were shot dead and hundreds wounded 
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(ibid.) . The dismissal of 17 000 workers at Vaal Reefs and 
Hartebeesfontein showed the determination of management and led 
to the NUM losing some of its most active members on these mines 
(Leger & Van Niekerk,1986;76). All in all, the str~ke proved a 
damaging affair to union organization, with ·many being killed, 
injured or dismissed (Cobbett & Lewis,1985;15). This led to much 
bitterness over the legislation governing state action. Many felt 
that if such was the result of striking legally, there was little 
benefit in using the official collective baragining system 
(ibid.;15). State action (and most notably police action) had 
once again cast a political_shadow over what normally would have 
been an economistic dispute. Nonetheless, the rise in black real 
wages on the mines to R1490 (NMC,1986;99), showed that some gains 
had been made by worker resistance. 
Rising Strike Totals 
All in all, 469 strikes took place during 1984 _(NMC,1983;101), 
reflected in fig.1. Thi~ can be seen as further evidence of 
rising working class combativity. Disputes had generally become 
larg~r, with 388 workers being involved in the average strike, a· 
product of strengthening solidarity and union organization. The 
chemical workers' strike demonstrated the ability of the unions 
to mount sustained action country-wide. This would have obvious 
repercussions on the nature of subsequent political stayaways. 
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The major cause of strike action remained wages,. triggering some 
164 disputes in all (NMC,1986;101),and is reflected in f~g.8. 
This can be seen as partially the result of increased inflation, 
with the rate of increase of the CPI now reaching 11.7% (SA 
Reserve Bank,1985;9)(see figs.2, 5 & 6). However, they may have' 
represented the articulation of wider, more far-reaching demands, 
such as appears to have been the case with the Durban Strikes of 
1973 (see Institute for Industrial Education, 1974). In addition, 
as noted earlier, heavy handed police action, both by the riot 
police and in the form of the detention of trade unionists would 
soon politicize a primarly economistic dispute. As Knowles 
(1952;6) notes, the cause of strike action may be far more all-
encompassing than demands expressed might suggest. 
Overall Trends in Strike Action 1980-4 
Over the period 1980-4 a number of trends become readily 
apparent. The first is the growing strength not only of the 
indepe_ndent trade union movement, but· also of popular political 
organizations. It appears that this was but a reflection of a 
rising politicization and militancy amongst blacks country-wide. 
Whilst the direct causes of most strikes remained strictly 
economistic, subsequent state action (most commonly by the riot 
and security police) cast an unmistakably political pallor over 
subsequent collective action. This police action, when combined 
with the 1981 Labour Relations Act provides further evidence of 
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the states gradual (since 1977) adoption of the now well-known 
reform and repression policy. 
Secondly, the 1980-2 period saw further rises in 




this period, it 
resort to strike 
stoppage. Whilst a new recession began during 
failed to curb the propensity of workers to 
action and may well have contributed to 
increased political discontent. 
The massive increase in strike action in the 1983-4 period should 
best be viewed against the backdrop of growing political 
resistance. The unions were finding it increasingly difficult to 
separate workplace from community struggles. It is interesting to 
note that those areas where political resistance was at its 
greatest, proportionately high numbers of strikes took place. 
Whilst demands expressed by these strikes remained ostensibly 
economistic, they provided a further reflection of a growing 
dissatisfaction with all aspects of the status quo. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Revolt and Reaction 
1985-7 
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The 1985-7 period saw not only the formation of two major union 
federations, but also the ushering in of a new era of 
unprecedented state repression. The latter became especially 
severe following the declaration of two successive States of 
Emergency. It was during these years that the "unrest" which had 
begun in the East Rand townships reached its peak. Meanwhile, by 
1985, there was considerable optimism amongst trade unions and 
popular political organizations over the potential for successful 
collective action be it against state or capital. To many, rapid 
change seemed inevitable and indeed imminent. This optimism 
culminated in the formation of South Africa's biggest union 
federation ever, COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions). 
Despite sweeping state action following the proclamation of three 
successive States of Emergency, large scale organized resistance 
to the status quo continued.to manifest itself, most notably in 
the form of stayaways. 
Formation of the "Super-Federations" 
After protracted {and sometimes highly acrimonious) unity talks, 
the "Western Cape unions" (e.g. the General Workers' Union), the 
UDP-affiliated unions, the FOSATU unions and other independent 
unions agreed to merge to form COSATU. At the launch the 
Nationalist government's policies and recent actions came under 
heavy fire. The new federation adopted a far more politically-
outspoken stance than FOSATU had. In essence, it represented the 
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merging of two traditions of trade unionism. These were 
"populism" (as espoused by community based unions such as MACWUSA 
and SAAWU) and "workerism" (which was favoured by the GWU and the 
FOSATU unions). It has been suggested that economic recession and 
rising state repression had both the effect of forcing the former 
to place more emphasis on shop floor organization, and the latter 
to adopt a more overtly-political stance (WIP,1986a;l9) .. Indeed, 
the "workerist" unions had faced growing pressures from 
membership to articulate political issues in a far more outspoken 
manner than a vague commitment to "working class 
politics"(ibid.;19). This resulted in the ."populists" and 
"workerists" having much in common in their opposition to, on the 
one hand, an increasingly oppressive state, and on the other, the 
very different type of unionism espoused by the CUSA and AZACTU 
unions. 
As COSATU Secretary-General Jay Naidoo pointed out in a speech 
made at Natal University, it was neither possible nor desirable 
for a trade union in South Africa to be non-political 
(Naidoo,1986a;34). Naidoo went on to argue that although not a 
political party, COSATU must of necessity voice the political 
aspirations of its working class membership (ibid.;34). Despite 
the need for a working class orientation, there was also a need 
"for unity in the struggle for all non-racists"(ibid.;36). After 
the launch of COSATU, CUSA agreed to merge with AZACTU (a 
relatively small Black-Consciousness-orientated federation). The 
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new federation, initially known as CUSA/AZACTU, soon adopted the 
abbreviation NACTU. This new federation adopted a policy line 
committed to black leadership (as opposed to the leadership of 
white officials). Its general ideological orientation was more-
or-less Black Consciousness. 
Advances by Miners 
Another major industrial dispute on the mines took place in 
September 1985, following the breakdown of talks between the 
Chamber of Mines and the NUM (LMG,1985b;ll). Faced with the 
prospect of widespread strike action, several major employers, 
including Anglo American, JCI and Rand Mines broke ranks and 
reached a separate settlement with the miners. All in all, 23-30 
000 workers were involved in strike action at Glenvaal, 
Goldfields and Anglovaal (ibid.;11). All but 10 500 returned to 
work following repressive actions by employers and police, and 
when a general dismissal of strikers was threatened, the strike 
was called off (ibid.;11). Although not a major "trial of 
strength", the strike was symptomatic of the growing challenge on 
the mines. The failure of the Chamber of Mines companies to 
present a united front represented a major new development - one 
of the most cohesive of employer federations had broken ranks 
when faced with a growing challenge from the workplace (Leger and 
Van Niekerk,1986;75). Thus, the strike "would have a far more 
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all-encompassing effect" (Knowles,1952;7) than would appear to be 
the case at first glance. 
The Rise of Political· Stayaways 
The theme of politically-motivated stayaways continued in 1985. 
From the 16th to the 18th of March, over 120 000 workers from 
Port Elizabeth's black townships observed a stayaway called by 
several "Charterist" political organizations, most notably PEBCO. 
(LMG,1985c;87). The stayaway was called in protest against food 
price hikes and related economic issues, including the 
Ford/Amcar merger (LMG,1985c;87). These were seen by the, callers 
of the stayaway as the direct result of the government's 
maladministration. A few weeks before the stayaway was due to 
take place, the FOSATU unions, the General Workers' Union, as 
well as several Black Consciousness organizations, issued a joint 
statement disassociating themselves from the stayaway. It was 
argued that workers were not properly consulted and that it "did 
not express workers interests" (Pillay, 1985;4). Furthermore, it 
was suggested that workers did not favour the stayaway 
(LMG,1985c;105). As Pillay (1985;4) notes, this represented a 
definite step backwards from the Vaal Triangle stayaway of 1984, 
which was characterized by a high degree of co-operation between 
trade unions and political organizations. Indeed, trade unions 
were asked to participate in the organization of the 1985 Port 
Elizabeth stayaway, but refused on the grounds that it was not 
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favoured by their membership (Pillay, 1985;6). Meanwhile, the 
community organizations claimed that they had the support of most 
workers(ibid.);6. However, it is clear that the unemployed 
militant youth active in political organizations would be far 
more likely to favour a stayaway than those with jobs to lose, in 
an area of high (and rising) unemployment. 
At first, the success of the stayaway would seem to represent a 
setback for worker organizations. Pillay argues that the trade 
unions failed to appreciate the even greater effect united action 
would have had (1985;14). However, at no time were workers as a 
group fully consulted by those organizations calling the 
stayaway. Indeed the demands expressed by the stayaway were 
unrealistic and failed to take account of the immense repressive 
powers the state had at its disposal. One can draw two 
conclusions from the stayaway. Firstly, its success demonstrates 
that community organizations on their own clearly had sufficient 
means to ensure an effective stayaway, even if it was without 
union support. 
Secondly, whilst the stayaway's success might seem to represent a 
setback for the unions, unified action would have resulted in it 
having an even greater effect (Pillay,1985;14). Despite. their 
increased willingness to take up political issues, the 
independent trade unions remained committed to retaining their 
autonomy. 
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The Political Stance of the Independent unions 
On the East Rand, the FOSATU unions had demonstrated a far 
greater willingness to take up political issues in response to 
pressures from members (Friedman,1987; 453). In Natal the 
political pressures placed on the independent unions were far 
less (for example, see Von Holdt [1988;17] on union organization 
in the Pietermaritzburg region). Indeed, the first major 
community-based boycott action of the 1980's in the latter 
province was called in support of fired striking workers from BTR 
Sarmcol, and not in response to any political issue. In August 
1985 a legal strike took place at this company over the issue of 
the recognition of MAWU ( MAWU,1985;32). Despite the strikes 
legality, management soon resorted to "scab" labour(ibid.;32). 
This led to a bus boycott, which proved unsuccessful owing to the 
continued custom of strike breakers who cushioned the impact 
thereof (ibid.;32). The dispute was characterized by a high level 
of police interference, with a worker meeting being broken up by 
riot police (ibid.;32). However, in all provinces, state actions 
continued to cast a directly political shadow on all aspects of 
trade union act~vity. In May 1985, Raditsela, an East Rand CWIU 
leader died shortly after being released from detention, 
resulting in a stayaway call by union leaders 
(Friedman,1987;453). 
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Strikes and Social Protest 
Simultaneously with rising political protest, a relatively high 
number of strikes took place in South Africa in 1985. This can be 
seen to be a direct reflection of Jgrowing working-class 
combativity in both the workplace and wider society. A total 
number of 389 strikes took place in this year (see fig.!), 
involving 239 816 workers, resulting in an average of 616 workers 
per strike 
triggers in 1985 
(NMC, 1987a; 427-429). The major strike 
are depicted in fig.8. As can be seen, 
significant numbers of strikes were caused by disputes over 
disciplinary matters (ibid.;427-9), indicative of the continued 
challenge to managerial prerogatives. Clearly, South African 
workers increasingly demanded not only a say in the wider 
political processes, but also in matters affecting them on a day-
to-day basis. Trade union related factors caused 28 
strikes(ibid.;427-9). 
Inflation increased in 1985, with the rate of increase of the CPI 
now reaching 16.2% (SA Reserve Bank, 1986;7-8), and is reflected 
in figs.2,5 ,& 6. Indeed, real wages dropped during 1985 (see fig 
16). The decline in real wages could have.provided one of the 
reasons for the rapid rise in strikes in the 1986-7 period. 
However, the picture is rather a complex one - in 1985 strikes in 
the mining industry increased disproportion~tely to 40, up from 
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25 in 1984 (NMC,1986;99). This took place despite the fact that 
real wages in this sector had more-or-less reached parity with 
other sectors of industry by 1981 (see fig. 16). Thus other 
factors, such as improved worker organization and increased 
militancy must have been partially responsible for the rise in 
the number of strikes in this sector. 
Mediation and Arbitration 
During this period, it seemed that the far-reaching nature of 
many worker demands could no longer be resolved by negotiation 
while existing relations of power were maintained. Although 
increased use had been made of the Industrial Court in 1986 (see 
introduction, DOM (1987;148]) and IMSSA (over 70 disputes 
mediated in the first six months of 1985 (IMSSA,1985b;n.p.]), the 
total number of strikes taking place continued to rise. IMSSA 
have suggested that wider political issues began directly to 
affect the nature of dispute mediation (ibid.;n.p.). AM Erasmus 
had adopted a contrary stance in many of his Industrial Court 
decisions, reversing the earlier stance which forced employers to 
bargain in good faith (Thompson,1989;620R). On a more positive 
note,. the Sentrachem case (not adjudicated by Erasmus) led to a 
decision that it was legitimate for employees to strike if their 
demands were not met through negotiation (ibid.;642U). It has 
been argued that this gave employees an effective right to strike 
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(ibid.;642U). 
The Role of Inkhata in Natal 
A high number of strikes took place in the Durban region, as is 
reflected in fig.10. Relatively-speaking, less political conflict 
had taken place in this region than was the case for either the 
Eastern Cape urban centres of Port Elizabeth/Uitenhage and East 
London despite the latter's lower instance of strike action. 
However, this need not imply a lack of militancy. 
By 1986 it was becoming increasingly clear that the growing 
strength of the independent trade union movement and its more 
overtly-political stance was serving to dilute Inkhata's formerly 
absolute hold on power in the Natal region. As noted in previous 
chapters, the break with Inkhata and the independent trade unions 
had taken place in the late 1970's. In 1986 this break became 
formalised when Inkhata established UWUSA (United Workers Union 
of South Africa). Although in the first two months of its 
existence it claimed to have recruited between 4000 and 5000 
members, it supplied little evidence to back up its claims(see 
SALB interview with the KwaZulu Minister of Labour [Cenco, 
1986;51]). Critics of UWUSA claimed that the new union would 
serve the .sole function of dividing the working class by 
increasing tribalism (Tvl. May Day Committee,1986;1). Dominated 
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by Inkhata leaders, mostly businessmen (Weekly Mail, May 9,1986) 
the new labour organization proved only capable of establishing a 
presence in the Inkhata stronghold of Northern Natal. Its 
inability to pose a serious threat outside this region and its 
reputation as a "sweetheart union" posed serious limitations (Van 
Niekerk,1986;12). Nonetheless, UWUSA's formation and the 
increasingly politically outspoken stance of COSATU has forced 
many Inkhata members in Northern Natal to make a choice between 
the continued support for it or the independent unions 
(WIP,1986;5-6). 
Continued Rises in Strike Totals 
Despite the worsening recession, an unusually high number of 
strikes took place in 1986 793 in all (SA Labour 
Statistics,1987; 429),and is reflected in fig.!. This represents 
an increase of over 100% from 1985, a clear reflection of 
increased worker militancy. The unrest can be seen to have 
reached its zenith during this year. This culminat~d in a new era 
of unprecedented repression, with two consecutive States of 
Emergency being declared in this year. 
The average number of workers per strike in 1986 was 535 (SA 
Labour Statistics, 1987; 428), a slight decrease from the figure 
for .the previous year, but nonetheless far larger than was the 
case in the 1970's. Nonetheless, the average strike in 1986 still. 
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was far larger than was the case for many years in the 1970's. 
This can be seen as a product of the growing strength of worker 
organization. All in all, .424 390 South African workers took 
part in strike action in 1986 (ibid.;428). Once again, inflation 
increased. The rate of increase of the CPI now was 18.6% (SA 
Reserve Bank, 1988;9), a symptom of the worsening economic 
situation, that would serve to increase the already-high levels 
of dissatisfaction amongst the working class. This was 
exacerbated by a decline in real wages in many sectors of 
industry (see fig.16). 
Wages as a Determinant of Industrial Conflict in 1986 
The predominant cause of strike action in 1986 remained wages, as 
is clear from fig.8. This seems to be not only a response to the 
ravages of inflation, but also an attempt by workers to better 
their overall position in society. While economic factors clearly 
did contribute to the relatively high numbers of wage strikes, it 
is important to see increasing industrial conflict as occurring 
as a parallel development to escalating political unrest. The 
fact that the unions ·had become more politicized demonstrates the 
linkage between workplace issues and wider society. As appears 
to have been the case with the 1973 strike wave (see previous 
chapters), wage demands may represent the articulation of more 
far-reaching grievances, such as a dissatisfaction with existing 
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relations of power within society. The struggle for improved 
material conditions can, in itself, be the product ot the wider 
socio-political environment (see Bonner,1987;56). Twenty-seven 
strikes were caused by union related matters (NMC,1986;99). 
Approximately 102 strikes were caused by disciplinary matters 
(ibid.), proportionately a roughly similar figure to 1985. 
Escalating Resistance in both Workplace and Wider Society 
Probably the most significant development in the arena of 
industrial relations in the 1985-6 period was the more than two-
fold increase in strike action in the latter year. It is 
important to view this in the context of rising political 
resistance. In 1986 two States of Emergency were declared. It 
seems probable that one of the consequences of the subsequent 
wave of state directed repression was that much latent militancy 
and subsequent resistance was channelled into the workplace on a 
country-wide basis. Hyman's (1981;53) assertion that latent 
working class militancy is transferable would indeed seem 
relevant to South Africa of 1985. No longer able to safely 
articulate their grievances in. the political arena, increasing 
numbers resorted to strike action. Even the fairly conservative 
Human Relations school of industrial relations acknowledges that 
the closure of channels of communication will have far-
reaching consequences (see Hyman,1981;53). The closure 
of all channels through which peaceful protest in the community 
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could be expressed could well have had far reaching consequences 
for all aspects of South African industrial relations. 
Indeed, even if demands expressed by strikes appeared on the 
surface to be economistic, they should be seen as a symptom of 
wider dissatisfaction with the status-quo. Increased combativity 
at the workplace may simply be the product of a far broader 
underlying resistance. As one of the few channels left open for 
legal collective action, the workplace was becoming increasingly 
a place of conflict. 
The emergence of the two "super federations" can likewise be seen 
as a sign of increased militancy, as wel~ as the product of over 
a decade of unprecedented growth on a nation-wide basis. Owing to 
their democratic structures and strong organization, these two 
union federations seem likely to escape the co-option or direct 
suppression that was the lot of many of their South African 
predecessors. A product of the heady years of the early-to-mid 
19BO's and of over a decade of dedicated union organization, 
COSATU and NACTU not only united more workers than was ever the 
case in the past, but also-(this appeared especially the case 
with 
of 
COSATU) more willing to take up political issues than 
their founder unions and federations. By its sheer 
many 
size, 
COSATU instantly became a major South African socio-political 
actor. However, it still remained vulnerable to repression, as 
was to be shown by events of subsequent years. 
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COSATU and the Freedom Charter, NACTU and Africanism 
To many, the launch of COSATU in late 1985 seemed to usher in a 
new era of political involvement by the independent unions. It 
has been suggested that the successive States of Emergency, which 
were marked by a clampdown on popular political organizations, 
created a vacuum, which could only be filled by the independent 
trade unions adopting a more overtly-political stance (Markham 
and Matiko, 1987b; 115). COSATU and its member unions were by no 
means immune to either state repression or action by mysterious 
death squads. Many unionists were detained and in 1987 COSATU 
house was burnt down under suspicious circumstances (Markham and 
Matiko,1987a;3). However, despite setbacks, COSATU was able to 
continue functioning owing to the strong organization of many of 
its member unions. As Jay Naidoo remarked, COSATU. was "not just a 
. ( 
building" (quoted in Markham and Matiko,1987a;4). The 
restrictions on popular political organizations had done nothing 
to reduce the ever-rising extent of working-class militancy. 
Instead, it was to have the effect of channelling this militancy 
into the work place. This would result not · only in increased 
manifestations of conflict in the workplace (most notably in 
record numbers of strikes taking place), but also in workers 
pressuring unions to adopt a more overtly political standpoint. 
Markham and Matiko (1987b; 115) suggest that state action 
resulted in unions seeking to increase their ties with popular 
political organizations. At COSATU's Second National Congress, 
the Freedom Charter was adopted as policy. Although· the imediate 
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adoption of a more overtly-socialist "workers' charter" was ruled 
out, it was decided to continue discussion on the issue of 
transition to socialism (SALB,1987d;3). This created concrete 
links between the COSATU unions and "Charterist" popular 
political organizations. Clearly, much water had passed under the 
bridge since the clashes between unions and community 
organizations in the Eastern Cape of the early 1980s. However, 
it is important to note that closer co-operation did not mean 
that unions had abandoned their primary role of representing 
workers on shop floor issues, as is evidenced by the numerous 
1 
strikes over wages. It was only because they had strongly 
democratic internal organizational structures, with much power 
being devolved to factory level, that they were in a position to 
adopt a more overtly political stance without risking being 
immediately silenced through arbitrary state action. 
As -a parallel development to COSATU's growing ties with 
"Charterist" popular political organizations, NACTU had much in 
common with the Black Consciousness movement. The- major obstacle 
to reconciliation with the COSATU unions remained NACTU's 
insistance on black leadership (see Weekly Mail, October 9,1986). 
However, NACTU also has common ground with Pan Africanism. At 
/ 
its launch it was stressed that the entire country belonged to 
the "indigenous people" (CUSA/AZACTU,1986;50). However, it is 
still uncertain as to whether the final stance NACTU adopts will 
be more Black Consciousness or Africanist in orientation; 
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Important differences remain between these two standpoints. 
These largely revolve around questions such as who is an 
"African", who is "amongst the oppressed" and are all blacks 
working class, and all working class blacks? Perhaps NACTU's ties 
- \ 
with both streams of thought may provide momentum for what would 
seem the most logical - ~ total reconciliation between Black 
Consciousness and Africanism. 
The Effects of the Emergency Regulations on Trade Unions 
The Second State of Emergency resulted in increased numbers of 
detentions. Six hundred and fourteen trade unionists were 
detained, 80% of which had ties to COSATU (Markham and Matiko, 
1987b;116). In addition to detentions, COSATU's organization was 
disrupted through security police raids and bannings of 
publications and meetings (Naidoo,1986b;2). COSATU leadership 
viewed this as a directly political attack on the union movement, 
warranting a political response (ibid.;5). The actions of the 
state seem to have led to a series of "wildcat" strikes, most 
prominent being those involving CCAWUSA members (Innes,1986;47). 
Thus, once again, the incidence of industrial conflict was 
directly increased through state action. These protest strikes 
were met with a degree of success in that some trade unionists 
were released from detention(ibid.;47). However, a protest 
stayaway called by COSATU on June 14th proved to be a 
failure(ibid.;48). Innes argues that this demonstrated the need 
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for caution and consultation.before adopting such strategies 
(ibid.;49). Fine (1987;221) argues that COSATU underestimated the 
damages wrought through detentions. Furthermore, the lack of an 
alliance with popular political organizations made it harder to 
initiate politically-orientated protests (ibid.;221). Meanwhile, 
conventional instances of strike action were marked by police 
interference. Indeed, Markham and. Matiko (1987b;ll8) suggest that 
all major instances of strike action at this time were 
characterized by "brutal intervention" by either representatives 
of management or police. 
UWQSA in the Emergency Era 
The mass detentions of trade unionists has created a gap which 
UWUSA has attempted to fill as part of its challenge (and 
that of Inkhata generally) to the independent unions. Indeed, it 
has been argued that there was a definite pattern to state 
repression in the northern Natal region (Green,1986b;78). In this 
region key COSATU members were detained, giving UWUSA a free hand 
to organize (ibid.;78). UWUSA has been most successful in 
establishing a presence at companies such as· BTR Sarmcol, where 
the independent unions had earlier fought (and .lost) a bitter 
struggle for recognition (see SALB,1985;3). Following a strike 
in May 1985 virtually the entire Sarmcol workforce was dismissed. 
By 1987 Sarmcol had recognized UWUSA (Leeb & Radford,1988;1-3). 
Bennett (1988;4) points out that the bulk of Inkhata's support 
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seems to lie within the KwaZulu bantustan. Nonetheless, Buthelezi 
does have some (albeit diminishing) support amongst urban blacks 
in Natal, probably mostly amongst recently urbanised "migrants" 
who seek to retain some or other link with their "homeland" 
(ibid.;4). This situation has been exacerbated by the apartheid 
ideology, which has attempted to ensure that urban blacks only 
remain on a temporary basis (ibi.d. ;4). Indeed, probably the most 
serious challenge facing the independent unions from this quarter 
will probably occur in the townships and not at the workplace. A 
mere month after UWUSA's launch, COSATU released a dossier 
detailing instances of alleged harassment of its members by 
Inkhata functionaries (Bennett,1988;22). There has been 
increasing instances of conflict taking place between the UDF and 
Inkhata in Natal, the latter receiving the backing of the 
security forces (De Villiers,1985;34). Critics of Inkhata 
have argued that that organization has shown an increasing 
willingness to become identified with the repressive mechanisms 
of the state (Mare & Hamilton,1987;121). The conflict between 
progressive organizations and Inkhata has become most pronounced 
in the Pietermaritzburg region, where Inkhata saw the growing 
presence of the unions and the UDF as· a direct threat (Von 
Holdt,1988;17). The first series of clashes had taken place 
during the stayaway following the BTR Sarmcol strike (ibid.;17). 
The conflict was exacerbated by the formation of independent 
committees who claimed allegiance to COSATU or the UDF, but 
resorted to unauthorised attacks on Inkhata members (ibid.;19). 
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The situation further worsened when evidence emerged of co-
operation between Inkhata members and the security 
(ibid. ;23). 
forces 
The Railway. Strike 
One of the most significant instances of strike action in 1987 
the three month long S.A. Transport Services (SATS) dispute. 
This strike involved a large sector of South Africa's "forgotten 
workforce" the black workers employed in parastatals or the 
public sector who were denied the protection of the Labour 
Relations Act. Despite this lack of protection, the protracted 
SATS strike resulted in a significant gain for workers. SATS 
agreed to reinstate all the 16 000 fired strikers, and acceded to 
a wide range of demands, from job protection for detained SATS 
employees, to the upgrading of two hostels for railway workers 
(Singh, 1987; 38). A major reason for the_ success of the strike 
was that many black SATS workers possessed some or other skill 
(SALB 1987b;37). This meant that unskilled strike .breakers 
(mostly drawn from the white working class) were not able to 
perform their jobs in a totally satisfactory manner (ibid.;37). 
The strike 
across the 
began at the City Deep SATS yards and then spread 
Reef area. Interestingly, the major issues of the 
strike were demands for an end to racist practices by SATS and 
demonstrations of solidarity and not simple demands for more pay 
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(Matiko,1987b;9-10). By the first week of April over 2 000 SATS 
,workers were on strike (ibid.;10). 
The union involved in the dispute was the South African Railways 
and Harbours Workers Union (SARHWU), supported by the National 
Union of Railway Workers (NURW). The strike was characterized by 
unusually high levels of violence. This included the police raid 
on COSATU House on the 28th of May when a meeting of railway 
workers was broken up. On the 22nd of April a SARHWU meeting in 
Germiston was attacked by police. The police then turned their 
at.tentions once more to COSATU House, which was the target of a 
bloody siege. Sadly, it seems that pr~or the raids either SARHWU, 
or over-zealous members thereof did "execute" some 
strikebreakers.During late November/early December 1987 ·several 
leading SARHWU members appeared in court (several were later 
convicted of murder) (Finance Week 17/9/87 23/12/87). This 
bleak page in the history of the independent unions gave the 
authorities some justification for their actions. It is clear 
that the state regarded strikes in the public sector in an 
extremely serious light and was prepared to use the full measure 
of its emergency powers to counter such action. During the 
dispute SATS adopted a very hardline policy, accusing SARHWU of 
attempting to overthrow the status quo not only at SATS, but also 
in other sectors of industry (Matiko,1987b;4). However, as can be 
seen by the above, state action failed to preclude SARHWU from 
making some significant gains. Indeed, the major result of police· 
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action seems to have been that of adding fuel to a highly charged 
political situation, which would have the effect of further 
increasing working class combativity. 
The Post Office Dispute 
The railway strike was followed by a strike of postal workers. On 
the 8th April, a dispute at the Power Plant depot triggered off a 
Reef wide strike involving 8 000 members of the officially-
recognized Post Off ice and Telecommunications Workers Association 
{POTWA) (Singh,1987; 38). Matiko ascribes a major cause of the 
strike to an intransigent management, who had refused to 
discuss worker grievances (1987a;l6). This dispute was to last 
over five weeks before a settlement was finally reached. The 
Post Office agreed both to reinstate 13 dismissed workers and end 
race segregation in its staff facilities (ibid.;16). This 
included continuing paying the full salary of a Post Off ice 
worker jailed on a charge of intimidation {SALB,1987a;26). 
Shortly after the main dispute, a second Post Office workers 
strike broke out in East London, which was also successful in 
gaining most of the demands expressed by workers (ibid.;26). As 
noted earlier, public sector employees do not enjoy the 
protection of the Labour Relations Act, and thus the ability to 
extract concessions in this area through collective action 
represented a major advance for organized labour. Singh {1987;40) 




trade unions in the private sector sector would 
over into the public sector. The emergence of 
representative independent unions in the public sector serves to 
demonstrate the continued vitality of the independent trade union 
movement as a whole despite emergency restrictions. Indeed, as 
noted earlier, repressive'state action seems to have had the 
direct effect of increasing working class militancy and 
combativity and the willingness of workers to challenge the state 
directly. 
The 1987 Mineworkers' Strike 
A further major "trial of strength" ~ook place on the mines~ This 
was to prove the biggest and costliest dispute in South Africa's 
history, mobilizing 
Mothikeli,1987;58). 
34-0 000 workers in all 





protracted wage negotiations between the NUM and all the major 
mining houses (unlike previous years,where at least some houses 
reached a settlement with the union before a strike was resorted 
to). Statements by management indicated that they saw the 
possibility of proving to the NUM that they would not necessarily 
·be moved by the threat of strike action (ibid.;62). The strike 
' 
would have political effects if only because of the history of 
co-operation between the Chamber of Mines and the government in 
constructing the system of labour control. The dispute was marked 
by high levels of violence, with frequent intervention by mine 
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security and police, and the detention of· a number of key NUM 
officials and shaft stewards (ibid.;63). After almost three weeks 
of striking negotiations resumed, but soon broke down again. 
60 000 
This led to mass firings~nestimated workers were dismissed) 
" 
and then a settlement based on an offer the NUM had previously 
rejected( ibid. ;69). The actions by the state during the di_spute 
demonstrates the degree of political seriousness it ascribed to 
any form of major resistance on the mines. While the dispute had 
only mixed results for workers (some concessions, but disruptions 
to union organization), it demonstrated that organized labour in 
the mining sector had become a major force to be reckoned with in 
the socio-political arena. As Rex (1977;36) notes the results of 
the strikes could have far-reaching effects from shifts in the 
basic balance of power at the workplace to wider political 
repercussions. 
Rising Strikes and a Breakdown of Orthodox Channels of Protest 
An unusually high number of strikes took place in 1987 - 1148 in 
all (DOM, 1987) - reflected in fig.1. Furthermore, strikes during 
1987 tended to be far larger - 110 strikes involved more than 
1000 workers in 1987, compared to 80 in 1986 (ibid.). South 
African strikes still tended to be fairly short by European 
standards - 653, representing some 56.9% of all strikes in 1987, 
were of less than a day's length in duration. However, as can be 
seen by the above, several protracted disputes did take place, 
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most notably the SAR&H and Post Office strikes. It can be argued that 
expression as a result of repression will 
protest (see Hyman,1981;53). The year 
result in a widespread 
1987 seems to have 
represented the peak of worker militancy following the widespread 
resistance and repression of the 1985-6 period. Only in 1988 
would state and capital suceed in a concerted counter-attack 
which would result in a dramatic decline in strike totals. 
Major Stayaways 
The 5-6 May 1987 stayaway appears to have been the most extensive 
instance of such action in South Africa's history to that date 
(LMG,1987a; 49). Held in protest against the all-white election, 
it was o})served by·SOO 000 workers on the 5th and 600 000 on the 
6th (ibid.;49). It was the first stayaway in protest against an 
all-white election since the heyday of the legal ANC in the late 
1950s. The success of this stayaway demonstrated the high degree 
of political consciousness amongst workers and their willingness 
once more to use the weapon of collective action in the workplace 
in order to voice more far reaching overtly-political demands. 
The stayaway was most widely observed in the Port Elizabeth/ 
Uitenhage region where 98-99% of black workers did not go to 
work (LMG, 1987a; 501). As .evident in previous chapters, the Port 
Elizabeth/Uitenhage area has been characterized by an unusually 
high. degree of political consciousness in the 1980s. Although 
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earlier events had showed that community organizations were 
strong enough to successfully hold a stayaway on their own, the 
apparently high levels of solidarity shown in the May 1988 
stayaway clearly represented the product of close co-operation 
between trade unions and community organizations. This serves to 
demonstrate the increased co-operation between these two 
manifestations of working class militancy that was the direct 
product of successive waves of Emergency repression. 
The very length of the mines, Post Office, and railway strikes, 
and the general success of the stayaway despite repressive action 
by the state raises, once again, the possibility of a mass 
strike. Luxembourg (1971), citing the example of the 1905 strikes 
in Czarist Russia, argues that militancy is of greater import 
than organization. In contrast Engels (quoted in Luxembourg,1971) 
sees effective organization being of great value. The 
combination of these two assets, organization and militancy, 
could well prove devastatingly effective in the future. 
, 
A second stayaway took place on June 16, Soweto Day. Emergency 
restrictions resulted in no major political organizations' overtly 
supporting· it (LMG, 1987b; 52). The Labour Monitoring Group has 
suggested that June 16 already had become a de facto public 
holiday that would be observed regardless of the standpoints (or, 
rather, lack of) assumed by organizations (ibid.). Its success 
demonstrates the limits of state repression. As borne out by the· 
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Durban strikes of 1973, and the unrest on the mines in the early 
1970's, state action simply result in protest assuming a more 
faceless and seemingly spontaneous form. 
NUMSA: A Major Development in Working Class Politics 
COSATU's strategy of a single unified union per industry received 
a major boost in May, when the National Union of Metalworkers of 
South Africa (NUMSA) was launched. At its fir~t congress, the new 
federation recognized the Freedom Charter as policy, thus placing. 
it firmly in the "Charterist" camp. However, the Freedom Charter 
was only accepted as a minimum demand, and it was argued that the 
interests of workers could only be fully realized under a 
socialist system (Obery, 1987;8). Indeed, it was argued that a 
socialist "workers' charter" should be drawn up (SALB,1987c;14). 
It was seen as essential that "the struggle for socialism should 
have working class leadership"(ibid.;14). Thus, whilst willing 
to adopt policies that were held by popular political 
organizations, it was clear that the independent trade unions J 
were determined to retain their own political agenda. The timing 
of NUMSA's launch, when State Repres~ion had just reached a new 
height COSATU House had recently been besieged and record 
numbers of trade unionists were in detention) placed no little 
pressure on the new union to assume an overtly political stance. 
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NUMSA brought together a wide range of metal and motor unions, 
most notably MACWUSA, MAWU, MICWU , and NAAWU. The new union 
adopted the standpoint that the primary interest of organized 
workers should be the creation of a democratic socialist state 
controlled by workers (Obery, 1987; 8). The Freedom Charter would 
serve as a good base on which workers could build their own, 
specifically socialist political programme. While NUMSA .welcomed 
alliances with popular political organizations, it insisted that 
the struggle for a more equitable system should be under the 
leadership of workers (Obery, 1987; 10). Obery argues that this 
standpoint will result in the new union having a growing 
influence in the arena of socialist politics (ibid.;8). Indeed, 
the sheer size of NUMSA's membership (over 136 OOO[ibid.;8]) will 
result in in a 
range of 
strengthen 
that union having considerable influence 





position of the "Charterist" popular 
the new union seems determined to 
political 
retain its 
autonomy in determining policy. NUMSA's adoption of an explictly 
pol~tical program (even if rather sketchy) contrasts with the 
position of many of the independent unions in the 1970's, who 
were often wary of adopting a political stance. This further 
demonstrates the growing politicization of South African 
industrial relation in the 1980s. 
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Continued Wage Strikes 
The major cause of strike action in 1987 was, once again, wages, 
causing 295 disputes in all (DOM, 1987), despite the fact that 
the rate of increase of the Consumer Price Index had slowed to 
16.1% (SA Reserve Bank,1988;9), as is shown on figs.1,2,5 & 6. 
It is clear that broader factors than simply direct inflationary 
pressure were responsible for the relatively high number of 
strikes. One reason could have been that black real 




year (see fig.16). However, as noted in previous chapters, wage 
demands may be symptomatic of a wide range of grievances, whilst 
at the same time being difficult to accede to in a time of 
recession. 
An even more significant development was the dramatic increase in 
the duration of the average strike. As noted previously, by 
overseas standards South African strikes still tended to be 
fairly short. However, the average South African strike had more 
than tripled in duration - to an average length of 9.9 days, up 
from 3.1 days in 1986 (DOM, 1987). This was mainly due to 
1987 being such an exceptional year. The Post Office, mines and 
railway disputes all represented protracted ''trials of strength", 
lasting five and three weeks and three months respectively. This 
development represents a new chapter in the history of the 
independent unions and contrasts sharply with the late 1970s when 
unions generally sought to avoid damaging confrontations. This 
2i3 
could well have far-reaching repercussions, particularly when the 
increased numbers of stayaways are borne in mind. When large 
numbers of workers stay out on strike for long periods of time, 
the effects of such action can no longer be confined to the 
workplace and spill over into wider society. Apparent increases 
in the degree of politicization of collective action at the 
workplace, and the linkage between workplace issues and factors 
of a broader socio-political import could well have been 
partially responsible for increasing the willingness of workers 
to resort to protracted strike action in an era of political 
revolt. The fact that unions in several cases were capable of 
mounting sustained instances of strike action demonstrates their 
ability to survive unprecedented levels of repression. 
Unprecedented Repression and Increased Conflict 
~, 
As can be seen by the above, the post-1984 period is of import in 
that it saw unusually high levels of strike action (peaking in 
1987), combined with unprecedented state repression. Indeed, 
these two occurrences must be seen as linked - if any means of 
free political expression are removed from the members of a 
community, the high degree of latent working class militancy will 
manifest itself at the workplace. State repression failed to 
preclude several major instances of successful strike action from 
taking place in 1987. Whether. the decline in strike totals in 
1988 and 1989 represents the start of a new trend or simply a 
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temporary decline remains unclear. Indeed, it can be argued 
that the major effect of repression seems to be that of giving 
collective action a more faceless form. Many disputes and 
tiisturbances in 
f 
the early 1970s were characterized by such a 
form. In this regard, history would repeat itself, only on a 
doubtlessly far larger scale than before. The changed role of the 
unions, increased strikes and stayaways and unprecedented levels 
of state repression directed against both unions and political 
organizations all serve to demonstrate the increased import of 
political variables as a crucial factor in understanding the 
frequency, nature and intensity of strikes and stayaways. 
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CHAPTER 7 
A General Overview of Events 1970-87 
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Clearly, the 19705 and 1980s have been a turbulent era for south 
Africa. Both these decades were marked by unprecedented levels of 
political discontent. The most spectacular manifestations thereof 
were the 1976 Soweto uprising and the mass insurrection from 1984 
to 1986. These years were also of import in the sphere of 
industrial relations. Not only did these years see a massive 
resurgence of strike action, but also the rise of strong, 
democratic independent trade unions. The relationship between the 
rise of the independent unions and growing industrial conflict on 
the one hand, and increasing political resistance on the other 
will now be evaluated in a general review and broad summary of 
the major issues and events covered in previous chapters. 
The late 19605 should best be viewed as a period of forced 
inaction. Most of the apartheid edifice was already in place and 
the government was now more concerned with increasing the 
repressive powers of the state. For blacks, the 1960's were an 
essentially frustrating period. They lack both a means to 
articulate demands and seek redress of grievances. 
The wave of repression following Sharpeville had the effect of 
silencing not only most black popular political organizations, 
but also most black trade unions. Too often, the latter had 
neglected the need first to build strong and democratic 
organizational structures, playing a subordinate role to 




(see Lambert,1980;103-4). Some effective 





these only succeeded in organizing ~imited numbers of workers. 
Strikes during this period tended to be comparatively short 
affairs, involving relatively few workers. Demands were generally 
a reflection of immediate concerns, with but little attempt being 
made to push back the frontier of control. A few major instances 
of strike action did occur, such as the Durban dock workers 
strike of 1969. However, it represented more the exception than 
the rule during these difficult years. A significant development 
was the emergence of the black consciousness movement, which was 
to play a major role in the 1972-6 period, yet did not seem to 
organise many workers (Fisher,1977;342). Perhaps this movement 
represented one vehicle for workers to voice their grievances. 
However, as events of subsequent years were to-show, there was no 
substitute for democratically structured trade unions. Indeed, 
where political organizations have attempted to establish trade 
unions from above (a good example would be SASO's founding of 
BAWU), they have had only very limited success in the long term. 
Though seemingly more peaceful than the years that followed it, 
the 1970-1 period is of interest in that there were already signs 
of a growing resistance. This is borne out by the results of 
surveys conducted during this period (for example, see 
Schlemmer,1975;5) as well as developments such as the PUTCO 
strike, the various dock workers' strikes and the wave of strikes 
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in Namibia.During this period the foundations of many of the 
independent unions were laid. This was mostly the result of the 
formation of a number of worker service organizations on a 
country-wide basis, as well as the founding of the Urban Training 
Project ( UTP) . The former were mostly founded by students and 
academics, with the help of practising or ex trade union 
officials. The latter was founded by a group of former TUC SA 
officials, who had been expelled from that federation for 
devoting their attentions to the then unpopular cause of the 
unionization of black workers. These embrionic union structures 
adopted a cautious approach, for fear of attracting the unwanted 
attention o~ the state. For example, the Durban activists 
shielded their activities of worker organization behind the 
facade of a "benefit fund", aimed at covering the funeral costs 
of members. Fear of state repression was to have a positive 
effect in that it encouraged the new unions to place much 
emphasis .on internal democracy, with decentralized decision-
making. 
Most strikes by black workers during this period tended to be 
fairly spontaneous affairs. Indeed, they were often caused by as 
basic a factor as poor communication (see fig.7). However, some 
significant instances of strike action did occur. Most notable of 
these was the June 1972 PUTCO bus drivers' strike. This strike 
was effectively ended by direct police action. However, the 
dispute eventually led to the formation of the Transport and 
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Allied Workers Union (TAWU). 
In the sphere of industrial relations, 1973 is best known as the 
year of the 1973 Durban strike wave. Although, as can be seen 
above, preceding years were by no means peaceful, 1973 ushered in 
a new era of industrial conflict. Starting at the Durban plant of 
Coronation Brick and Tile, the strike wave soon spread right 
across the Durban/Pinetown region. Most strikes were of 
comparatively short duration and exhibited little evidence of 
formal worker organization (Fisher,1977;347). Despite this, tne 
strikes showed proof of an unusually high degree of worker 
solidarity. It seems that both state and capital were taken 
rather by surprise, for neither adopted a coherent strategy to 
deal with this new development. Police ·action was to a 
surprising degree restrained, whilst many employers were quick to 
grant concessions in the form of wage increases (see Dekker, 
1975;225). 
Although the direct causes of the strike wave seemed primarily 
economistic, it is important to view the course of events in the 
broader South African socio-political context. Owing to 
government policy, there were no effective channels for voicing 
grievances on a wide range of issues, from bus fare increases, to 
a lack of basic political rights. According to Fisher (1977;344-
5) this lack of effective channels was particularly apparent at 
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the workplace, where there was widespread dissatisfaction with 
the liaison committee system. Indeed the actions of the 
Nationalist government seem to have cast a political shadow on 
all aspects of life for the average South African. It is 
important, therefore, to view this new era of collective action 
against the South African political background. The 1973 Durban 





both being symptomatic of a rising challenge to 
of the status quo. Both the 1973 strike wave and 
should be seen as symptomatic of an increased 






In addition to the Durban strike wave, 1973 also saw the 
foundation of some of the first independent trade unions, 
including MAWU, CWIU and NUTW, who were to play a major role in 
years to come. In 1974 the centre of industrial 
South Africa shifted to the PWV region, although 




Elizabeth regions (see fig.9). Demands seemed to have shifted to 
a more sophisticated level, with unusually (when compared to the 
late 1960~) high numbers of strikes being triggered off by the 
issue of dismissals. 
Standing between the 1973 Durban strike wave and the tumultuous events 
of 1976, the course of events in 1975 have tended to be overlooked by 
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both those studying political developments and labour relations. 
Nonetheless, this period is of import, if only because of the 
rising conflict on the mines. Owing to the fact that black miners 
were bereft of any form of union representation, this conflict 
tended to assume a rather faceless form. Largely, it revolved 
around £,action fights and a seemingly irrational destruction of 
property (see Kirkwood, 1975; 30-32). However, despite this lack 
of formal organization, several instances of strike action did 
take place. Most notable of these were the strikes at the 
Harmony, Lorraine, and Merriespruit mines. These strikes involved 
workers from a wide range of ethnic backgrounds. There seems to 
be some evidence that the rising conflict on the mines was 
partially a response to changes in · the broader 
environment (see Kirkwood,1975;30-35). These 
political 
political 
developments included factors such as the winning of independence 
in Mozambique and the rise of the Black Consciousness movement in 
South Africa. 
Despite the growing restiveness on the mines, the total number of 
strikes taking place in 1975 declined sharply. This can probably 
be partially ascribed to increases in unemployment (see fig.11) 
which would serve to discourage workers from seeking long term 
gains. Indeed, during this period, the organization of the 
independent unions continued apace. This would place workers on a 
far firmer footing when resorting to collective action in the 
future. Despite their rapid growth, the independent unions 
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remained vulnerable to repressive action by both employers and 
the authorities, as witness the defeats at both Heinemann and 
Armourplate. In both disputes management and state adopted a hard 
line response. At Heinemann workers were baton-charged by police. 
and dismissed (see MAWU,1977;49-59). Although the Armorplate 
dispute represented the first legal strike by blacks in South 
Africa'a history, workers were dismissed and faced criminal 
charges within hours of starting a picket line (see Glass & 
Allied Workers' Union,1977;6-1-65). 
1976 is best remembered as the year of the 
' 
Soweto uprising. 
Although sparked off by discontent over the teaching of Afrikaans 
at schools, it represented the culmination of growing political 
discontent, exacerbated by rising inflation and growing 
unemployment,the latter of which would directly affect school 
children who were faced with increasingly bleak prospects. 
Despite the political unrest, instances of disruptive action in 
factories proved rare. However, strikes did seem characterized by 
an unusually high degree of working · class solidarity. 
Interestingly, the first successful stayaways in recent years 
took place during this year in August and September 
(SAIRR,1978;86). A November stayaway proved less successful, 
apparently because many employers threatened to take disciplinary 
action (SAIRR,1978;115). The Soweto uprising was followed by a 
fresh wave of state repression, which definitely had the effect 
of weakening the newly-emerged unions. 
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This wave of repression, together with rising unemployment (see 
fig.11) resulted in the substantial decrease in strike action in 
1977. Nonetheless, there was evidence of a growing militancy 
amongst the country's black workforce. This can be seen as the 
result of continued dissatisfaction with the status quo. Workers 
had no means of seeking redress for their grievances other than 
through collective action at the workplace. However, this option 
was not feasible to many workers, owing to the total lack of 
protection for striking workers, even if the strike was legal. 
This would seem to be a major deterrent in a time of rising 
unemployment. In addition, the threat of further coercive state 
action remained. Despite this, the independent unions succeeded 
in recovering from the wave of bannings and other manifestations 
of coercive state action which were common in the early months of 
this year. Important centres of industrial conflict remained the 
PWV region (where most South African industry is concentrated), 
the Durban/Pinetown area ('scene of the 1973 strike wave), and 
East London (a district with a long history of political 
activism), as is reflected in fig.9). 
By 1978 the total number of strikes began to increase again. This 
occurred despite rising unemployment. It seems that high 
unemployment was becoming a less effective deterrent to workers 
r 
contemplating strike action. It can be argued that beyond a 
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certain point significant numbers of workers had become 
reconciled to structural unemployment and were no longer prepared, 
to refrain from collective action on account of this (see figs. 
11 - 14 ). The lack of any form of social welfare legislation 
had resulted in high unemployment having the gradual effect of 
increasing the number of dependants per worker. This would have 
the effect of decreasing net wages and adding an urgency to wage 
demands - effectively increasing the basic needs per worker. This 
would be exacerbated by a gradual slowing (or even decline) in 
the rise of real wages (see fig.16). As Bonner (1987;56) notes, 
the common demand for increased wages represented a reflection of 
the ongoing struggle for improved material conditions, an 
inevitable product of the unjust political system. 
The fear of repressive state action resulted in the independent 
trade unions continuing to seek to play a low profile. Indeed, 
many were reluctant to become too openly identified with 
instances of strike action. However, 
unions had already begun to establish 
structures that would place them on a 
challenge of the 19BO's. 
the . independent trade 
sound . organizational 
firm footing for the 
The formation of FOSATU (Federation of South African Trade 
Unions) represented a major advance in the sphere of trade union 
unity .. It can be argued that this extended organization enabled 
workers to embark on more sustained instances of strike action.· 
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Indeed the number of workdays lost through strike action 
increased dramatically, despite a slight decline in the total 
number of strikes taking place (see NMC,1986;107). 
Significant instances of strike action included the Cape Town 
stevedores' strike and the Fattis and Monis strike. Both disputes 
involved workers unionized by the Western Cape unions. The former 
is of interest in that it was triggered off by the issue of 
recognition (of the Western Cape General Workers' Union). This 
demand was rapidly acceded to. The Fattis and Monis dispute is of 
interest in that it culminated in a consumer boycott. After seven 
months management agreed to a settlement. This represented a 
comparatively novel form of collective action in South Africa, 
and demonstrated the close ties that exi.sted between the 
workplace and the community. The tactic of consumer boycott was 
later employed in the Colgate-Palmolive and Wilson-Rowntree 
disputes, the former being successful and the latter not. 
It was during 1979 that the Wiehahn report was released. This 
report called for a major overhaul of the country's industrial 
relations system to include blacks in the statutory collective 
bargaining structures. An initial attempt was made to exclude 
migrant workers from the resultant reforms. The strong reaction 
against this from the independent trade .unions (see 
SALDRU,1979;91-3), resulted in migrants eventually being 
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included. The effect of the Wiehahn reforms proved highly 
paradoxical. To paraphrase Nietzche, they achieved everything the 
government had hoped for, and nothing. On the one hand, many of 
the independent unions registered and made full use of the newly 
available bargaining structures. The Industrial Court adjudicated 
growing numbers of disputes. However, despite the increase in 
negotiation and mediation taking place through the official 
structures (as well as at the informal level, it seems, through 
bodies such as IMSSA), the number of strikes taking place has 
only increased. The most likely explanation for this has been 
provided by Webster (1987;217), who points out that the state has 
failed to incorporate the unions at a political level. The denial· 
of any meaningful political rights has resulted in increased 
levels of comabativity being manifested at the workplace. 
Although, as can be seen by the success of many of the consumer 
boycotts (e.g. Colgate-Palmolive; Fattis and Manis), this did not 
preclude some instances of conflict between the independent trade 
unions and some of the recently-emergent community organizations. 
This was particularly so in the highly-charged atmosphere of the 
Eastern Cape. Indeed, the failure of the FOSATU-affiliated United 
Auto Workers to assume a more overtly political stance resulted 
in that union splitting, with a breakaway union, MACWUSA, being 
formed. MACWUSA forged strong ties with PEBCO. However, critics 
have argued that this was at the expense of shop floor 
organization, and thus made that union far more vulnerable to 
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state repression. 
Thus, the independent unions faced growing pressures from two 
directions - on the one hand from community organizations and the 
community at large to take up political issues; and from the 
state on the other hand, with its ever-present threat of further 
coercive action. Indeed, the latter directly intervened in a 
number of industrial disputes in 1980, most notably at the FRAME 
strike in Durban (where police teargassed strikers [Mawbey, 
1980;9-ll]), and the red meat dispute in Cape Town (where a 
number of prominent trade unionists were detained). Heavy-handed 
police intervention in the Volkswagen strike in Uitenhage 
resulted in widespread unrest being triggered off in neighbouring 
townships. Although the police intervened only in a minority of 
strikes overall, these were often amongst the largest strikes. 
Probably, the state felt that it was in these highly-visible 
disputes that its interests would be most threatened should 
workers make further gains. 
By 1980 the number of recorded instances of strike action began 
to increase dramatically. Simultaneous with this development was 
the continued growth of the independent trade unions. Most 
notable was the rise of the militant Eastern Cape-based "populist 
unions", who were later to affiliate to the UDF. This development 
should be seen as but a product of increased working class 
militancy that was finally to come to a head in the post-1983 
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mass protest. 
The rising number of union-related and disciplinary disputes 
reflects the growing working class militancy during 1981. 
Interestingly, a further major cause of strike action during this 
year was the government's ill-advised "Pensions Preservation 
Scheme" (see fig.8). In fact the scheme sparked off such a 
reaction that the government was forced to abandon its proposed 
changes in legislation. Even on its own, this development served 
to demonstrate that the independent unions had become a major 
South African socio-political actor. However, the independent 
unions were still extremely vulnerable to coercive state action. 
This was particularly apparent in the Border region, where the 
community~orientated SAAWU reached its peak of support, only to 
fall victim to the onslaught of the Sebe brothers, a blpw from 
which it would never recover (see Maree,1982;37-9). 
During 1981 a major strike wave was to take place on the East 
Rand. Whilst, like the 1973 Durban strike wave it provided 
symptoms of a rising militancy, the East Rand wave involved 
mostly unionized workers (mostly in the metal industry). Rapid 
unionization had occurred in that industry, a simultaneous 
development with the rise of the popular political organizations 
in the townships. 
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The death in detention of trade unionist Neil Aggett on the 5th 
of Febuary 1982 was to have far-reaching, repercussions for the 
independent unions. Not only did this result in a successful 
nation-wide stayaway, but the stayaway•s organization gave rise 
to increased moves for unity amongst the independent. trade 
unions. His death showed how state action yet again cast a 
directly political shadow over most aspects of industrial 
relations in South Africa. Indeed, it demonstrates that even the 
most basic aspects of workplace organization represents a 
profoundly political act. 
It is important to note that after 1980 the rise of the 
independent trade unions was paralleled by the emergence and 
growth of the new popular political organizations. Both these 
manifestations of working class militancy were to present the 
state with an unprecedented challenge in the 1980's. However, 
both remained vulnerable to state repression, with neither being 
in a position to mount a successful sustained challenge to the 
status quo. Most disputes until 1982 were of comparatively short 
duration, with few recorded instances of protracted strike action 
(see IIR 1980-2). It seems evident that most unions sought a 
quick resolution of disputes and avoided protracted "trials of 
strength" for fear of jeopardizing recently-won organizational 
gains. Only a few protracted strikes took place, one of the 
first being the 1984 Dunlop strike. 
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Workers could still be dismissed for striking legally. However, 
it seems evident that legal strike .action did afford them some 
degree of protection from more enlightened employers. Unions 
remained still vulnerable in both peri- urban and rural areas. 
Not only were employers liable to adopt a more hard line 
approach, but the police were also more likely to resort to 
coercive action. 
A major development during these years was the rise of the 
National Union of Miners (see Duff, 1983;9). For the first time, 
many black miners enjoyed the backing of a democratically 
mines 
to the 
structured trade union. This resulted in struggles on the 
increasingly taking the form of strike action. Owing 
important position of the mines in the South African 




The new constitution and the-Black Local Authorities Act sparked 
off an unprecedented popular reaction, resulting in the formation 
of both the UDF and the National Forum. These developments were 
followed by a series of successful stayaways (most of which were 
characterized by a high degree of co-operation between workers 
and popular political organizations) against a backdrop of rising 
"unrest". The success of the stayaways demonstrated both the 
strength of the independent unions and the ties between workplace 
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and township. Indeed, the 1983-4 period should be seen as a 
period of growing resistance to' the status quo in both the 
community and shop floor. In November 1984 a major overtly-
political stayaway took place. Its success can be largely 
attributed to the widespread support of worker 
organizations (particularly FOSATU) and demonstrates the 
considerable force of joint action by unions and political 
organizations (see LMG,1985a;79-85). Whilst there had been 
involvement in political issues before on the part of FOSATU 
(such as its "vote no" campaign during the constitutional 
referendum), this was the first major instance when that 
federation used its organizational strength at the workplace in 





evidence that workers would no 





deterrent to striking. Workers at SASOL were threatened with 
dismissal if they observed the stayaway (see Ntaopane,1985;36). 
Despite this, they did not go to work on the relevant 
were summarily fired, once again providing evidence 
reduced deterrence of unemployment. The highly-charged 
environment seems to have provided a major incentive in 





By 1985 the "unrest" which had begun in the townships of the Vaal 
Triangle reached its peak. As can be seen by the above, this 
unrest formed only one facet of a growing challenge to the state, 
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which included also strategies such as schools boycotts and 
stayaways. To many the government's fall seemed imminent. 
However, it was to become clear that the government had yet to 
unveil the vast coercive powers it had at its disposal. 
Meanwhile, protracted unity talks had finally led to the joining 
together of the FOSATU unions, the "UDF unions" and several 
unaffiliated unions to form COSATU in November 1985, South 
Africa's biggest union federation ever. The new federation 
indicated from the outset that it would assume a directly 
political stance (see Obery, 1987;9). Many wor~ers now believed 
unions should get involved in the overall struggle for political 
change. However, there was still considerable debate as to which 
strategy should be adopted in order to bring this change about. 
This debate largely revolved around the question of alliances 
with political organizations and the issue of working class 
leadership in resistance. COSATU's adoption of the Freedom 
Charter as policy has shifted the· focus of much of this debate 
into the question of a more overtly-socialist "workers' charter" 
to supplement the Freedom Charter (see Obery,1987;8). Soon after 
the launch of COSATU, the two union federations dedicated to 
black leadership, CUSA and AZACTU, agreed to merge to form NACTU. 
Like COSATU, NACTU soon began to take up issues that were of 
concern.to its membership, albeit from a perspective more in line 
with the black consciousness movement and Africanism (although 
recent reports suggest that the latter is gaining predominance). 
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Meanwhile, the- independent trade unions had made a number of 
significant gains at a more practical level. Most notable of 
these were concessions gained from some mining companies, 
following the failure of the monolithic Chamber of Mines to to 
reach agreement on wage levels. Significant gains were made in 
the me~al industry, with a dramatic move towards worker unity 
taking place in the formation of NUMSA, being a merger of the 
leading motor and metal workers' unions. A major advance on a 
more global level was the series of Industrial Court decisions 
giving legal strikers job protection. 
Politically motivated stayaways continued into 1985. Most notable 
of these was the March stayaways in Port Elizabeth. However, 
unlike the Reef stayaways of 1984, political organizations failed 
to gain the backing of many of the independent unions. The 
resultant conflict represented a setback from the unity manifest 
in the stayaways of 1984 and reflected some of the tensions that 
had led to the formation of MACWUSA. By 1988 stayaways had 
reached an unprecedented level, mobilizing record numbers of 
\ 
' workers on a countrywide basis. It can be argued that the closure 
of other channels of peaceful protest will have the effect of 
increasing the incidence of such action (see Hyman,1981;53). The 
declaration of successive States of Emergency proved severely 
disruptive to worker organization. Despite this, the independent 
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unions continued to function, not only in their representation of 
workers at shopfloor level, but also in voicing the· political 
aspirations of workers at a time when key political actors were 
being silenced (see Naidoo;l986). Thus, state action continued to 
politicize the role of the independent unions. 
Another major development in recent years has been the rise of 
major "trials of strength". The most significant instances of 
this in the 1980's were the 1987 Post Office, Railways and 
miners' strikes. Although all three dispute~ resulted in workers· 
gaining _valuable concessions, the miners' strike seems to 
have severely weakened the NUM. Clearly, worker organization has 
still to make further advances before "trials of strength" can be 
fully employed as weapon by the unions. 
One of the most significant developments to take place in the 
1985-6 period was the massive increase in strike action, a 
reflection of the continued increase in working class militancy. 
Even if demands expressed were strictly economistic, they 
represented a growing willingness to challenge all aspects of the 
status quo. On.the political sphere, the general atmosphere of 
revolt culminated in the declaration of two consecutive States of 
Emergency. However, state repression failed to reduce the 
recorded instances of industrial conflict. Indeed, as noted 
earlier, some of the first protracted "trials_ of strength" of 
modern day South Africa took place in 1987, most notably th~ 
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Railways, Post Office and miners strikes. The ongoing closure of 
almost all avenues of peaceful protest resulted in the greatly-
increased use of the stayaway weapon, culminating in the early 
June 1988 stayaway. Thus, although the emergency may have 
suppressed political protest, it could neither eliminate it in 
entirety, nor preclude its manifestation in a different form. 
The two parallel trends, of rising working class militancy and 
combativity on the one hand and of increasing state repression on 
the other have continued to date. 
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CHAPTER 8 
Theory and Practice: Towards a New Theory of Industrial Conflict 
for South Africa 
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As has been noted in Chapter 1, there .is a vast body of 
literature that attempts to explain the nature of strike action. 
Unfortunately most of this literature bases its conclusions on 
the industrial relations experiences of Europe and the United 
States. The purpose of this chapter is to attempt to evaluate the 
validity of that literature, and of recent contributions of 
social theory, in the light of the South African experien~e of 
industrial conflict in recent years. Unfortunately, space and the 
scope of this study preclude.a truly comprehensive coverage of a 
fascinating topic. Nonetheless, it is hoped that some of the most 
important areas can be re-evaluated in the light of some of the 
conclusions reached in preceding chapters. 
Causes and Characteristics of Strikes: Theory and the South 
African Reality 
i)Community Structures. According to the Kerr-Siegal thesis 
certain industries will tend to be more strike-prone than others, 
most notably those industries where the workforce is drawn from 
small, closed communities (1954;193). As noted previously, the 
South African mine compound would represent the ultimate in this 
regard. Indeed, the South African mines have always been 
characterized by high levels of conflict (even prior to the 
formation of the NUM and the unionization of miners). The absence 
of effective collective organisation resulted in this conflict 
often assuming a faceless form, such as seemingly pointless 
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destruction of property and "faction fights". However, as can be 
seen from previous chapters, many industrial disputes in the 
1970's and 1980's involved workers drawn from the major PWV 
townships. These townships brought together people from a wide 
range of origins and certainly do not represent closed 
communities in the conventional sense of the word. However, they 
may represent closed communities in the sociological sense of the 
word in that they bring together the politically dispossesed. 
This may account for unusually high levels of working class 
combativity and solidarity! The values, norms, and collective 
experience of a South African township in a major centre could 
have something in common with a small closed European working 
class community, or, indeed, an isolated rural location. 
An interesting variation of this thesis has been provided by 
Eldridge' (1968;37), who asserts that group cohesion will prove a 
crucial factor underlying strike action. It has furthermore been 
suggested that strikes are likely to take place in conditions of 
high employment,t!ith really big strikes taking place when real 
wages decline(ibid.;37). Whilst obviously solidarity plays a 
crucial role in determining the degree of success of strike , 
action anywhere, employment/unemployment and wage levels seem far :I 
more complex variables in the South African context. As noted in 
previous chapters, whilst rising unemployment may have served to 
discourage- South African workers from striking in the 1970's, 
this appears no longer to have been the case in the 1980's. 
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Likewise, direct economic stimuli in the 1980's appear to have 
been less predominant in relation to wider socio-political forces 
as a determinant of industrial conflict. Although the apparent 
causes of strike action as per the DOM often appear economistic 
(as noted in previous chapters) such demands often represent the 




at the Workplace. The question of Blauner's 
assertion that the nature of technology present in 
will determine the level of industrial conflict 
present has not been fully assessed in this dissertation. 
Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that in the 1970's and 
1980's significantly more strikes took place in motor 
manufacturing firms located in the Eastern Cape, than in their 
Transvaal-based competitors, although all employ similar levels 
of technology. Thus, it is clear that other factors (such as the 
long tradition of activism in the Eastern Cape) must have been of 
greater importance. 
iii)Communications. The "Human Relations" school of industrial 
relations, with its stress on a basic underlying harmony at the 
workplace, and the need for improved communication between 
managers and workers, se~ms rather problematic in the South 
African context. Society is wracked with a major conflict, a 
conflict that seems frequently to manifested at the workplace. 
240 
Nonetheless, in the absence of any channels for voicing 
grievances will result in a certain number 'Of disputes being 
caused by poor communication. This explains the proportionately 
greater number of such disputes prior to the emergence of the 
independent trade union movement. However, improved communication 
at the workplace in the 1980's has not led to a reduction in 
industrial disputes, which have, in fact, increased. 
iv) Strikes as a Cyclical Phenomenon. It has been argued that 
strike action tends to be cyclical (a point taken up by 
Cronin[1979] in his study of strikes in the U.K.), whilst certain 
industries will be prone to disputes of a particular nature. 
South African strike action in recent years does indeed appear to 
be cyclical from comparatively few strikes in the 1970-2 
period, to a substantial rise in the 1973 to mid-1975 period, 
then a lull in the years leading up to 1980, followed by another 
rise (see fig.1). However, the resurgence of strike action in the 
1980s shows no signs of abating to the "lows" of the 1976-B 
period. Indeed, it seems that only far reaching change or drastic 
state action will succeed in achieving this. Thus, the political 
variable seems to have precluded South African strikes action 
.from relapsing into a cyclical pattern. Trade union membership 
has likewise continued to rise instead of fluctuating, unlike 
that which seems to have been the case in the 
U.K.(Cronin,1979;17). Indeed, the continued rise.in both strike 
action and trade union membership may be seen as the combined 
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product of underlying socio-political forces. In the South 
African context it can be argued that strike patterns have 
followed contours of political repression. For exampl~, strike 
totals were comparatively low in the 1962-1971 period, the 1976-8 
period (during and after the Soweto uprising) and during 1988 
(ongoing state repression following the declaration of the State 
of Emergency and changes in labour relations legislation [see 
introduction]). Fisher goes on to suggest (1980;35) that the 
length of a strike will depend largely on the resources striking 
workers have at their disposal, both financial and in terms of 
militancy and commitment. In the South African context, workers 
have very limited financial resources at their disposal. However, 
in many instances this seems amply compensated for in terms of an 
unusual degree of_ underlying working class militancy. 
v)The Complexity of Strike Action. 
McCord has suggested that two factors are of crucial importance 
in understanding the nature of collective action (see 
McCord,1980;116). Firstly, there is the complexity of the 
phenomenon of strike action. Although recognizing this does not 
in itself provide solutions, it does emphasize the need for 
caution in ascribing simplistic explanations to instances of 
industrial conflict. Secondly, McCord argues, any worsening in 
the economic position of the average worker, will provide a major 
source of dissatisfaction at the workplace(ibid.;116). Clearly, 
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in South Africa in the 1970's and 1980's lncreased inflation, 
periodic recessions and rising unemployment (which increases the 
number of dependants per worker) have no longer been an effective 
deterrent against collective action. However, of far greater 
importance is that there has been a general increase 'in 
resistance to the existing relations of power in wider society 
which has taken a variety of forms, from "unrest" to industrial 
conflict. Increasingly, it seems that the political variable has 
assumed an overriding importance in encouraging workers to resort 
to collective action. Whilst purely economistic factors continue 
to play a role, they cannot be seen as the overriding determinant 
of strikes and stayaways in the South African context. 
Meanwhile, Knowles has argued 'that strikes appear to be often 
spontaneous and unpremeditated (1952;6). The causes, whilst 
seemingly economistic, may be the result of far wider factors. 
South African strikes in the early 1970's often appeared to be 
spontaneous outbreaks of conflict. This was particularly the case 
with the 1973 Durban strike wave. However, most strikes and 
stayaways in the 1980's appear to have been planned well in 
advance. This was most apparent following union strategies, 
including agre~ments with certain employers and Industrial Court 
decisions(see introduction) which have given a certain degree of 
protection to legal strikers. Thus, the nature of South Africa's 
industrial relations system serves to reduce the overall validity 
of this assertion of Knowles•s. However, clearly Knowles is 
correct in his argument that strikes may well be the result of 
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far wider societal forces. In the South African context, this 
would be the wider political conflict endemic in society. 
Hyman seems to be correct in his assertion that if workers suffer 
from a severe form of deprivation, they will register their 
protest in some or other way (1981;53). As noted in previous 
chapters, (for example, see Chapter 2) a high level of relative 
deprivation exists amongst South Africa's black population in 
relation to whites. This has been considerably bolstered in 
recent years by gradually improving standards of education 
concurrent with rising unemployment. Education usually has the 
effect of increasing people's value expectations in life, but a 
high level of unemployment will, ensure that, for many, these 
expectations are never met. This can explain the reason why, for 
example, an unusually high level of militancy was. exhibited by 
the unemployed in the 1985 Port Elizabeth stayaway, who helped 
mobilise workers despite opposition from the unions (see 
Pillay,1985;4-6). Whilst the employed might tend to be somewhat 
less militant (e.g. the conflict between unions and popular 
political organisations during that stayaway), they also seem to 
have had a high degree of relative deprivation and have 
themselves demonstrated unusual levels of militancy. 
It can be argued that all industrial disputes will inevitably 
result in the relocation of centres of power at the workplace 
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(see Rex,1981;36). Definitely, some relocation of power has taken 
place in South Africa following the.rise of the independent trade 
union movement'. Good examples would include the conduct of the 
1988 wage talks on the mines, where the emphasis has shifted from 
arbitrary action to negotiation, and, of course, the government's 
abandonment of its ill-considered pensions legislation in the 
1980-1 period, in the face of a wave of pension-related disputes, 
as well as the second thoughts by several major employers of the 
1988 Labour Relations Act amendments in the light of the June 6-8 
stayaway. 
It has been further suggested that if the state intervenes in. 
industrial disputes on a repeated.basis the result could well be 
rising social conflict escalating to dimensions approaching civil 
war (ibid.;36). As can be seen in previous chapters, heavy handed 
state interference appears to have had the effect of politicising 
otherwise economistic disputes in numerous instances in the 
1970's and 1980's (although beyond a certain stage it could 
suceed in repressing all forms of resistance). Indeed, arbitrary 
state action has resulted in political factors permeating almost 
all aspects of life for most South Africans. 
Of equal interest is Hyman's assertion that attempts to suppress 
a conflict without removing the causes may result in the conflict 
simply manifesting itself elsewhere (1981;53). This appears to be 
the case in modern-day South Africa. One of the major causes of 
245 
the Durban strikes appears to be the total lack of effective 
channels for workers to voice their grievances on a wide range of 
community-based issues. Likewise, it is interesting to note . the 
rise of strike action in the early 1980s. At this time the UDF 
and related organisations had yet to emerge and the governments 
actions meant that one of the few place where workers could voice 
their discontent with a relative degree of safety was on the shop 
floor. 
A Critigue of Established Frames of Reference 
i) The unitarist perspective, which argues that employers and 
employees have essentially common interests, cannot in itself 
provide a satisfactory explanation for the increasing numbers of 
strikes taking place in the South Africa of the 1970' and 1980 1 s. 
This view rests on the assertion that society is ultimately based 
on consensus, which, clearly, South African society is not. This 
reduces the value of the belief that strikes are essentially a 
soluble problem, without a need to restructure relations of power 
in wider society (see Allen,1966;153). 
Nonetheless, it is clear that many South African employers 
broadly adhere to this frame of reference. Hyman's (1981;59) 
assertion that there is often widespread ignorance in society as 
to the underlying causes of strike action, appears very true in 
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the context of white South African society. There is a lamentable 
tendency to ascribe strikes and stayaways (along with most of the 
country's ills) to "communists", "the communist controlled ANC", 
"agitators", "a radical minority", and, of course, the mysterious 
and elusive "total onslaught". Often, the underlying causes, in 
terms of short term economic hardship and, in the long term, a 
near total lack of any means of peaceful political protest 
are ignored. Indeed, it is but a simple matter to ascribe 
conflict at the workplace to superficial' factors should the 
underlying causes prove more disturbing. This has increasingly 
become the case in South Africa - the state, and indeed several 
major 
grips 
employers, have shown a fundamental inability to come to 
with the basic causes of conflict and to seek realistic 
solutions. 
ii)Pluralism. Several pluralists(see Hyman1981 ;156-8) suggested 
that strike action represents a negative inducement, calculated 
to better the position of the protesting group, without 
automatically leading to far-reaching change. Indeed, it has been 
argued that if effectively managed industrial conflict can, in 
the end, contribute to a company's effectiveness (Kelly, quoted 
in Jackson, 1983;31). However, both these assertions seem 
dubious in the South African context. In the absence of any 
proper political representation, collective action at the 
workplace remains one of the few forms of protest open to black 
South Africans. Pluralist theory can neither provide an adequate 
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explanation for those manifestations of industrial conflict which 
are the direct result of political developments, nor for heavy 
handed state action against those incidents of strike action 
(often seemingly economistic) which it perceives as a direct 
threat to its position. Both the nature of the protest that has 
taken place and the very demands (and policy statements) 
expressed by trade unions and popular .political organisations 
clearly indicate that far more is desired than short term 
betterment. Whilst many independent trade unions have 
participated in state created structures, this (despite dire 
predictions to the contrary) has not led to any reduction in 
militancy, and in fact the breathing space gained may have 
enabled the independent unions to be even more outspoken in their 
demands. Reforms in industrial relations legislation have failed 
to co-opt politically the independent unions into the ruling bloc 
(see Chapter 5 and Webster,1987;217). 
iii) Marxist Perspectives. In his writings on industrial 
conflict, Lenin is both critical of role played by trade unions 
and optimistic about the potential of strike action as a vehicle 
for change (see Knowles,1952;7). Basically, Lenin saw trade 
unions as ready targets for co-optation by the ruling class. 
However, as noted previously, this certainly does not appear to 
be the case in modern South Africa. The independent trade union 
movement, with its emphasis on internal democracy, remains a 
major force in pressing for far-reaching change. 
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With regard to the potential· of mass strike action, it is 
interesting to compare Engel's writings with those o~ Luxembourg 
(see Luxembourg,1971;224-245).Whilst the former writer argues 
that a radical transformation of society by means of a mass 
strike will only be possible should workers possess both perfect 
organisation and large reserves of strike pay, the latter 
suggests that in the end working class militancy is of far 
greater import. It is significant that in the South African 
context, successful instances of strike action, and indeed strike 
waves, have taken place in the absence of formal 
organisation. Stayaways have mobilized millions of 
worker 
workers 
countrywide. However, such stayaways have been of comparatively 
short duration, albeit that the unions have demonstrated through 
conventional instances of strike action the ability to mount more 
/ 
sustained action. The potential of a prolonged stayaway as a 
means of bringing about far reaching polit'ical change is, as yet, 
unknown. However, in view of the vast resources of coercive power 
the state has at its disposal, it is unlikely that such action 
will be attempted in the next few years. A major constraint 
· against resorting to such drastic action is the ability of 
capital to recruit labour from alternative sources (Rex,1981;16), 
particularly evident in the South African context where 
unemployment has assumed enormous dimenslons . 
. 
Recent theoretical contributions. It can be argued that a major 
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shortcoming of established radical theory of industrial conflict 
is that (unless modified) it represents an attempt to impose 
theoretical unity~ without making sufficient allowances for the 
very different social situations that may occur. For example, 
Lenin's writings failed to predict the kind of role that has been 
played by the independent trade unions in South Africa. Thus, it 
is necessary at this stage to evaluate more recent theoretical 
contributions, in order that better insights might be gained of 
the nature of industrial conflict in South Africa. 
In view of the preceding chapters, it appears evident that the 
independent unions fulfill many of the functions of a social 
movement. This appears to have been particularly the case in the 
mid-to-late 1980's, when the states political repression created 
an organizational vacuum, forcing the independent unions into the 
political arena. Thus,·strikes and stayaways became 
politicized, providing evidence of the need to 
increasingly 
go beyond 
conventional industrial relations theory. As noted in Chapter 1, 
the independent unions have found much common ground with 
community-based organizations, with the joint objective of ending 
an unjust system of social relations (see Lowe,1986;33). 
As is clear from previous chapters, the independent trade unions 
have suceeded in avoiding co-optation into the system, despite 
all the efforts of state and capital to achieve this. Whilst 
.increased use has been made of established bargaining machinery 
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such as the Industrial Court (see fig.15), this has not been at 
the cost of worker militancy. Indeed, if anything workers seemed 
more willing to resort to strike action. In doing so the unions 
have disproved the pessimism of much of established theory. 
Indeed, as Edward Greenberg (1983;216) has suggested, democratic 
participation at the workplace has provided workers with valuable 
experience in democracy. In the post-1984 period, the democratic 
structures of the unions had the effect of forcing them to become 
more involved in the struggle for broader democracy in South 
Africa (Webster,1986b;l9). Just as Lambert (1988;34) suggests was 
the case with SACTU, the independent trade unions seem to have 
transcended the conventional mould of trade union organization, 
becoming social movements capable of maintaining a very real and 
sustained challenge to all aspects of the status quo. Webster 
(1986b;25) argues that "the trade unions in combination with 
.student and community groups have begun to play a leading role 
beyond the workplace in the struggle for democracy and political 
rights in society at large." The unions have responded to the 
needs of the working class by broadening their demands to include 
calls for wider political democracy (Lambert & Webster,1988;41) .. 














control, which have ranged from the use of brute force to more 
subtle methods of domination, the former including police action, 
and the latter aspects of ·the Wiehahn reforms. The lack of 
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success of attempts at incorporation resulted in recourse to more 
overt methods of control, employing the full coercive powers of 
the state through successive States of Emergency. Subtle (and 
more modern) attempts at control had failed, resulting in 
recourse to overt coercion. The close ties between the 
independent unions and popular political organizations despite 
the multi-class nature of the latter provides further evidence of 
the importance of Foucault's notions of power. 
Foucault argues that modern strategies of domination have become 
increasingly sophisticated, allowing an apparently greater degree 
of freedoffl as long as ultimate relations of power remain 
unaffected (Poster,1984;158-162). Reform is permissible as long 
as domination is unchallenged. As Maree and Budlender (1987;122) 
note~ the state retained (and even increased) its battery of 
repressive legislation, enabling it to crush any organizations 
which threatened its power. All is modifiable except the control 
of the ruling elite. The increasing use of the strike and 
stayaway weapon resulted in the state curtailing both forms of 
collective action, the former through the 1988 Labour Relations 
Act Amendments, and the latter through Emergency regulations. 
As noted earlier, Giddens argues that whilst power is not in 
itself a resource, the exercise thereof depends on the amount of 
resources available (1979;91). There has been a shift in the 
balance of power (and thus of resources) in the unions' favour 
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(even despite the Labour Relations Act Amendments) since 1970, 
and it has required the state to employ more repression to 
maintain its domination. Giddens seems correct in his arguments 
that working class resistance can remain formidable under 
capitalism (Giddens,1982;52). This argument seems particularly 
relevant to South Africa - the independent trade unions have 
defied conventional Marxist theory and have successfully avoided 
incorporation into the ca~italist system. Despite participating 
in state structures, they have retained their militancy. Thus the 
\_ 
state failed in its attempt to control the unions through the 
Wiehahn reforms. This adds credence to Giddens's critique of 
functionalist perspectives - structures of control do not always 
work {see Giddens 1982;32). Unique circumstances may preclude the 
various interests in society from . acting in a coherent or co-
ordinated manner (Giddens,1982;32). 
In view of the above, it seems evident that none of the· 
established theories of industrial conflict provide a totally 
satisfactory means of explaining the complex nature of strikes 
and stayaways in South Africa. Pluralist theory has conceptual 
shortcomings in that it fails to take full cognizance of 
political variables in its assumptions that industrial conflict 
can be confined to the workplace and, as such, be seen as 
distinct from wider political issues. Meanwhile, much of the 
radical orthodoxy is pessimistic about the role of the unions as 
a vehicle for socio-political change, discounting the possibility 
of their becoming social movements, pressing for social 
253 
transformation. 
It seems that a more appropriate framework is required, including 
broader theories covering issues such as popularly based social 
movements and wider relations of power within society. South 
Africa seems one of those situations where, Foucault has argued 
(quoted in Dreyfus and Rabinow,1982;28), one cannot explain all 
through "a single language of understanding." Perhaps, as 
Foucault (ibid.;106-7) suggests, it may be impossible to impose 
theoretical unity on a very complex set of circumstances. 
Definitely, some of the theoretical contributions evaluated above 
provide insights of use in analyzing the South African situation. 
However, none seems to provide the whole truth. Indeed, it can be 
argued that there is a need to develop new frameworks of 
understanding to explain the complex nature of the South African 
socio-political situation. The development of such a framework is 




In view of the overall trends uncovered in this study, it becomes 
clear that the main thrust of the central hypothesis is correct - that 
is that the nature of strike action is affected by political factors. 
This relationship is both a two-way process and is evident in a wide 
· variety of ways. 
Firstly, there is the general increasing incidence of strike action in 
the 1980's. Since the 1970's the independent trade unions have become 
a force to be reckoned with in South African society. This has been 
paralleled by unprecedented increases in political resistance, which 
has included such events as the 1976 uprising and the revolt of the 
1980's. It would be naive to assume that these two developments are 
divorced from each other. Kerr and Siegel (1954;193) have argued that 
the nature of the community will affect the incidence of strike 
action. In South Africa it is.clear t}\at community struggles are often 
subsequently manifest in the workplace and vice versa. There are 
numerous examples of the former, including such developments as the 
rise of directly political stayaways, expressing demands of relevance 
at both community and national level. In the political twilight of the 




and have thus assumed an immense significance. Indeed, 
increases in their size and duration have made the 
of collective action approaching a mass strike 
increasingly real. It is important to note that the relationship 
between workplace and community is a two-way process. Worker struggles 
have led to community action, one of the most spectacular instances of 
this being the consumer boycotts of the early 1980's. 
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Secondly, the political dynamic is reflected in the nature of 
worker grievances. As borne out by numerous surveys (see Chapter 
3), even in the early 1970's black workers felt a high degree of 
relative deprivation and identified their economic plight with 
wider social issues. Even if specific demands expressed by 
workers when striking remained economistic, such demands could 
merely represent the articulation of a plethora of grievances, 
many of which could have had a wider political relevance (see, 
for example, the 197 IIE report of the 1973 Durban strikes). As 
Bonner (1987;156) notes, the government's apartheid policy 
resulted in the collapse of the rural economies of the homelands 
which increased pressures on blacks to seek improved material 
conditions in urban employment. This would force blacks actively 
to seek better wages, even if this could only be achieved through 
strike action. Thus, the struggle for improved material 
conditions through wage strikes is inherently linked to the wider 
political reality (see Bonner,1987;56). 
Thirdly, there is the changing role of worker organization. The 
early worker service organizations avoided political issues for 
fear of attracting state repression. This position has 
substantially changed, and today the independent unions have 
assumed an increasingly political stance. From modest beginnings 
the independent trade unions have grown rapidly, especially since 
1979. From 1~79 to 1985 the claimed membership of these unions 
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grew from 144 000 to 717 000 (Maree,1987b;8). This would make the 
political stance of the unions of even greater importance, as 
would the consolidation of the presence of many unions on the 
shopfloor, with the number of recognition agreements having 
increased to+/- 450 by 1985 (ibid.;9). This would result in many 
employers having an interest in good relations with the unions, 
and thus becoming more sensitive to any political demands the 
unions might choose to express. 
Interestingly, South African strikes have tended to follow 
Cronin's (1979;17) theory that strikes tend to come in waves (see 
fig.1). It is interesting to note the linkage of these waves to 
the incidence of state repression. While such repression is not 
the only reason for such phenomena, it is significant to note the 
drop in strike totals in the 1977-8 period (the effects of the 
post-Soweto wave of repression), the pre-1973 period 1generally 
characterised by low levels of resistance following the banning 
of the ANC and PAC and the crushing of SACTU after Sharpville) 
and the drop in strike totals after 1987 (increased Emergency 
repression and restrictive legislation such as the 1988 Labour 
Relations Act amendments). 
COSATU's la~nch ushered in a new era of working class politics, 
with the federation soon adopting the Freedom Charter as policy 
and calling for a mor~ overtly-socialistic "Worker's Charter". In 
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several respects the independent unions have increasingly fallen 
into the role of social movements in the Castellian sense of the 
word. Castells (see Lowe,1986;16) saw such movements as becoming 
of growing importance owing to political parties being 
increasingly incapable of securing far-reaching political change. 
The state's banning of the UDF and other popular political 
organizations has resulted in the independent unions assuming a 
more political stance as one of the few popularly based 
organizations left. 
Even if demands expressed by strikers were totally apolitical, 
with no linkage between worker and community struggles, the South 
African state's response would still have had the effect of 
making almost all collective action at the workplace an intensely 
political act. The South African state differs from the European 
totalitarian mould in one important aspect- as it seeks to 
exclude a substantial proportion of the country's population 
from all political participation on solely racial grounds, it 
cannot resort to the traditional methods of mass political 
mobilization into a narrow orthodoxy (see Arendt on 
totalitarianism in O'Sullivan,1975;241-242). There can be no 
Stakhonovites for black South Africans. Any form of action which 
might mobilize significant numbers of blacks into any direction 
which could possibly threaten the status quo is thus viewed with 
extreme suspicion. Even in totally economistic strikes, heavy 
handed police action has often taken place. Although the state 
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only intervenes in a minority of disputes, these are often among 
the largest. It appears that while the authorities are prepared 
to let a minor dispute take its course, they will not hesitate to 
intervene should they perceive their interests to be threatened. 
This would obviously serve to link workplace struggles with wide~ 
political injustices in the eyes of workers. 
Indeed, the sphere of labour relations has served as a testing 
. . 
ground for future state strategies, most notably in the 
introduction of the reform/repression policy in the late 1970's, 
a policy that became particularly pronounced by the mid 1980's. 
Foucault (Poster,1984;160-4) has argued that ultimately social 
relations are about dominance by a ruling elite (or class segment 
if a Poulantzian analysis is preferred). As society progresses, 
methods of domination become increasingly subtle, as witness the 
attempted co-optation of the independent unions via the Wiehahn 
reforms. These reforms succeeded in bringing many of the 
independent unions into the statutory established collective 
bargaining structures, with increasing numbers of disputes being 
resolved through the mediation of the Industrial Court. However, 
this strategy failed to reduce either worker militancy or the 
number of strikes taking place. Most probably this was due to 
the state's failure to incorporate politically the independent 
unions (Webster,1987;217). The state cannot achieve this unless 
it abandons the cornerstone of its policies - the exclusion of 
blacks ·from any meaningful political participation at the 
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political centre. This necessitated a retrogressive step to more 
direct manifestations of power, in the form of bannings, riot 
police action, the detention of trade unionists and similar 
measures. Despite the fact that state policy has become 
increasingly removed from the apartheid blueprint, one point is 
clear - that domination by the ruling elite is one point that is 
non-negotiable. Interestingly, the new Labour Relations Act 
amendments seem very typical of a new state strategy of 
deregulated repression. Employers are in essence encouraged to 
take civil action against unions. Just as with measures to' get 
employers to deduct rent arrears from worker's salaries, this 
represents an attempt to shift the blame for what is in the end 
coercive state action onto the shoulders of groupings which may 
be temporarily allied, but in the end are sacrificable to 
preserve the dominance of the ruling elite. 
This brings us on to the second facet of the thesis - that the 
linkage between political factors and industrial conflict is not 
only real but increasing. Research done seems to prove this point 
also correct. Cronin's (1979;17) argument that strikes are 
cyclical and are paralleled by waves of unionization, appears 
correct in the South Africa of the mid-to-late 1970's and 1980's. 
As noted earlier, the rise of the South African independent 
unions was also paralleled by the rise of popular political 
organizations and increased political resistance. There does seem 
to be a common origin of the two in an unprecedented resurgence 
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of working class militancy. This linkage appears increasingly 
apparent in the 1980's, the two "super-federations" having 
adopted overtly political policies, allied to either Charterism 
or Black Consciousness. The rise of stayaway action in the 1980's 
I 
has been the most spectacular manifestation of the increased 
politicization of collective action at the workplace, opening up 
a new avenue of popular protest that may lead to unforseen 
possibilities for bringing about political change. 
As Dahl (1978;10) notes "the distinction between politics and 
economics is not perfectly sharp." this seem particularly so in 
South Africa where, as noted earlier, worker struggles for 
improved material conditions through wage strikes may be the 
result of economic pressures placed upon them by the government's 
apartheid policy (see also Bonner,1987;56). Both politics and 
economics are inherently concerned with the issue of resources 
and this may be another reason for political forces affecting 
wage . struggles. The limited options for political protest may 
have had the effect of focussing renewed emphasis on the 
shopfloor as a site of struggle, where strategies available range 
from overtly-political stayaways to strikes with political 
undercurrents (e.g. see Fisher's [1977] writings on the 1973 
Durban strikes), all increasingly attractive options in the ., 
period studied in the dissertatlon. This differs sharply from the 
experience of the white working class which in the end used its 
politically priviledged position as the main means of expressin~ 
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its principal demands. 
Further evidence of the increased politicization of collective 
action is the declining influence of unemployment as a deterrent 
to striking. As noted in previous chapters, fluctuations in the 
unemployment rate in the 1970's did seem to have some effect on 
the propensity of workers to strike, a view commonly held in 
conventional wisdom. However, by the 1980's the total rate 
of unemployment and the number of strikes both rose substantially 
(see figs 11-14'). Thus, it is clear that this factor no longer 
served as a deterrent to striking. While inflationary pressure 
clearly has remained an important strike trigger, it seems that 
wider socio-political factors also played a key role. 
Interestingly, Hyman (1981;53) argues that the suppression of 
specific manifestations of conflict without removing the root 
causes thereof, may simply result in the conflict being diverted 
elsewhere. This would explain the massive increase in strike 
action in the pre-1988 Emergency era, when political repression 
reached an unprecedented high. On the other hand, once worker 
organization began to be directly affected by state repression, 
the reverse could hold true (see earlier comments on the cyclical 
nature of strikes)- the threat of state action could then make it 
increasingly difficult for workers to strike. 
Increasingly the ,unions have adopted many of the facets of a 
social movement. As Lambert & Webster (1988;31) note, the 
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formation of COSATU represented a shift in basic union philosophy 
towards a broader concern with non-factory issues. However, 
several unions (such as the NUTW) remained committed to 
independent working class politics, as distinct from those (such 
as SAAWU) who adopted an "alliance stance" which favoured close 
ties to popular political organizations (such as the UDF) 
(Lambert,1986;15-16). To an extent there has been a growing 
~onvergence between these two positions, particularly as a result 
of state repression. COSATU has become increasingly identified 
with the "Charterist" movement. Nonetheless, unlike previously 
politically concerned federations such as SACTU, the COSATU 
unions built up their power on shopfloor organization (see 
Maree,1987b;4). 
The nature of South African industrial conflict seems in many 
respect unique, fitting none of the established theoretical 
paradigms of strike action in its entirety. As Hyman (1979;323) 
notes, there are important differences between first and third 
world strikes. Thus, theory conceived in the first world may have 
little relevance to the third (see ibid.;333). However, it seems 
evident that specific aspects of theory are of relevance, be they 
Luxembourg on the mass strike, Cronin on the cyclical nature of 
strikes, Knowles on the spontaneity of ~trike action, and, on a 
more general note, Castells on social movements, and Foucault and 
Giddens on the wider structuring of society. From· this, a 
synthesis of theory and the South African social reality has been 
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put foreward. Hopefully, new light has been shed on the nature of 
South African strikes and their place in the wider socio-
poli tical reality. 
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APPENDIX: The Inter.pretation and Val1dity of Strike Statistics 
During the 1970's and 1980's three methods have been employed to gai: 
overall statistical information on the incidence and nature of strikes 
and stayaways·. 
i) Employers are legally obliged to report any "discontinuance of 
work" owing to a dispute to the Department of Manpower on the 
prescribed form L.R.33. This data is then summarized and is available 
from a range of sources. These include Department of Manpower(DOM) 
Annual Reports, reports by the NIPR/CSIR and National Manpower 
Commission (NMC), as well as in computer print-out form from the DOM. 
Figures from the NMC and print-outs supplied by the DOM seem sometimes 
to vary (usually a difference of one or two units) from DOM Annual 
Reports. Doubtlessly this is due to the inclusion of returns from 
employers that were received too late for publication in the DOM 
Annual Reports. 
The limitations of this source largely revolve around the fact 
that it fails to take account of those instances where an 
employer disputes that a strike has actually taken place 
(according to the form, a strike is only defined as such where 
workers express identifiable demands). In addition, problems 
emerge in those cases where workers put forward a range of 
demands, and it is left to the employer's discretion as to which 
of these he/she records as the underlying cause of the dispute 
(see Fisher,1977;335). Thus, some of the detailed nature of 
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workers' demands may be lost. 
The writer has summarized the DOM data from the sources listed 
above, as none include all the data that is available. For 
example, the NIPR/CSIR report (1983) is more detailed than the 
DOM Reports of the 1970's. Conversely, the DOM and NMC reports of 
the late 1980's provide a far more comprehensive and accessible 
source of information than the relevant NIPR/CSIR report. 
Incidently, the DOM Annual Reports (as well as the SA Reserve 
Bank Quarterly Bulletins) generally tend to supply data only on 
an annual or biennial basis. 
The situation is even less satisfactory in evaluating the level 
of black unemployment. No accurate official data was available in 
the most of the 1970's (official data only becoming available in 
1978) and thus an alternate source (Simkins) was employed. 
Simkins's data is based on the number of full time jobs available 
(Simkins,1982;10). Thus unemployment (net totals) will thus be 
higher than offical estimates. In looking at the regional 
distribution of strike action, the researcher has (in the 
interests of clarity) only included major centres (where the vast 
majority of strikes have taken place). The various categories of 
strike triggers employed by the DOM are fairly self-explanatory, 
the exception being "wage related" or "payment" disputes (these 
terms appear to used interchangeably). The official definition is 
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a demand that relates to pay but "excluding demands related to 
specific wage levels" (NIPR/CSIR,1983;6). The researcher visited 
the Department of Manpower in Pretoria to obtain further clarity 
on issues pertaining to the DOM statistics. 
ii) A second method for gathering strike statistics is via 
reports employers may have sent to their relevant employer 
association (such as ASSOCOM). This has been only presented in 
summary form twice (in 1979 and 1982), and this was published by 
the Anglo-American Corporation's(AAC) Manpower Department (refer 
to Chapter 4). In subsequent years the AAC appear to have 
employed only the official statistics of the DOM, thus having the 
same inherent limitations. 
iii) An alternative method of gaining data on strike action is 
from press reports. A problem with this method is that only the 
more newsworthy strikes will be recorded, and thus totals will 
tend to be substantially lower than those supplied by the DOM. 
This source is employed by the Institute of Industrial Relations 
(!IR) and is included in their "Information Sheets." 
It is clear that none of the above sources can be totally 
accurate. However, what is significant is that generally speaking 
the overall trends that emerge are similar. In fig.18 strike 
totals from three different sources in the 1980-4 period are 
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depicted. As can be seen, fluctuations in the strike total are 
similarly reflected by all three (the one exception being the 
Anglo-American figure for 1982). If more detailed information 
from these sources dealing with the size, causes and regional 
distribution of strike action is scrutinised, it is once again 
evident that although totals may vary, similar trends tend to 
reflected by all three. Thus, although not too much importance 
should be attached to minor details (such as small fluctuations 
in causes or overall totals), it seems that the general trends 
(as depicted in the graphs in the introduction) are accurate. 
A final note: Owing to the fact that it has often been necessary 
to summarize data from several annual (or in the case of the SA 
Reserve Bank, quarterly) reports, it has not (for reasons of 
space) always been possible to include individual page references 
for data that may, for example, have been gleaned from all the 
DOM or NMC Annual Reports over a ten-year period. Incidently, the 
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